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ABSTRACT 
This study is a contribution to research within the 
sociology of disasters. The material is presented in two 
inter-related parts. The first four chapters provide an 
introduction and a background to disaster research from a 
sociological perspective. This portion of the study also 
provides the framework - Powell and Rayner's (1952) model 
of Disaster Time - upon which a specific disaster will be 
considered. 
(vi) 
The disaster which this research focusses upon is introduced 
in the fifth chapter, that is, the May 24, 1968 Richter 7 
magnitude earthquake centred 15 kilometres north of the township 
of Inangahua in the South Island of New Zealand. 
Briefly, the contents of the study are: 
Chapter I introduces definitions and discussions of Natural 
Hazards, Natural Disaster, and Collective Stress Situations. 
Chapter II is devoted to a discussion of one of the most 
formidable natural hazard agents - earthquakes. This discussion 
of earthquakes is directed primarily on the New Zealand 
situation. 
The orientation of Chapter III is (a) to provide a 
discussion of the sociological perspectives as they apply to 
disaster research; (b) to introduce a discussion of the 
variables that a researcher has to consider when analysing a 
(vii) 
disaster; (c) to present examples of sociological models of 
disaster time, and a model of disaster space, and, (d) to introduce 
the Powell and Rayner model of Disaster Time. 
Powell and Rayner in 1952 proposed a descriptive scheme for a 
disaster, based on a formulation in terms of developmental stages. 
They characterised each stage by its own integrative mechanisms, 
distinctive variables, and a set of unique tasks for each of the 
various actions of the affected social system. The stages 
developed by this model are: the Pre-Emergency Phase, which 
consists of a Pre-Warning stage; the Emergency States, comprising 
Warning, Threat, Impact, Inventory, Rescue and Remedy; and a 
Post-Emergency Phase, which they termed 'Recovery'. 
Chapter IV presents a discussion of the methods used in 
disaster research. This chapter also contains the methods used 
in the analysis of the 1968 Inangahua Earthquake, from which this 
study is a result. 
Chapter V begins with information about the Inangahua region -
a short history of the Inangahua region; counter-measure agencies 
in the Inangahua area; an attempt to assess the 'West Coast 
character'; a brief discussion of earthquakes in the Inangahua 
area. Against this background, and within the framework of Powell 
and Rayner's model, the earthquake of 1968 is reviewed. 
The final Chapter (Chapter VI) entitled, 'Reflections on the 
Powell and Rayner model of Disaster Time', looks at problems 
applying the model; the limitations of the model; the strengths 
of the model; and the application of the model to earthquakes. 
CHAPTER I 
NATURAL HAZARDS, NATURAL DISASTERS 
AND COLLECTIVE STRESS SITUATIONS 
1.1 Natural Hazards 
According to Zimmerman (1957), the physical environment 
is "neutral" and it is human culture that determines which 
elements are considered to be resources or resistances. A 
natural hazard can be considered a resistance because of the 
adverse effect it can have on human society. Russell (1969) 
says: 
"At first glance there would seem to be one 
clear difference between hazards and non-hazards 
for a particular time, place and population. 
That is, hazardous events tend to be extremes 
found far out in the tails of relevent probability 
distributions of the particular kind of event. 
Hazards can be defined only in terms of their 
impact on human society, and hence they must be 
seen as the joint product of natural events and 
existing adjustments to those events. Since 
hazards are so named because they cause economic 
and social disruption, the level of economic 
activity in an area, the institutional framework 
of the society in that area and the previous 
decisions about specific adjustments to the natural 
event in question are all involved in assessing 
what events are of a hazardous character". 
(19~9:4-5)(see also White 1974:3; Kates et al 
1973:3; Burton and Kates 1964; 
Wenger 1978:26). 
Hazards are those events, geophysically produced, that 
are atypical in human society and cause social disruption, 
economic loss, death, or injury to members of that society. 
A rainy day or a cold westerly airstream for instance, are not 
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hazards unless they are present for a prolonged period of time, 
or are unexpectedin theiroccurrence. These events may lead 
to, in this example, flooding or snowstorms. Rain and snow-
storms are frequent occurrences at particular times of the year 
for particular societies and on the whole, these societies are 
organized to cope with the natural agent. A natural event 
becomes a hazard only when it is produced by an abnormal or a 
prolonged geophysical or climatic phenomenon. The probability 
of it raining in New Zealand tomorrow is relatively high but 
the probability of an earthquake occurring that devastates an 
inhabited area is lower although New Zealand has over 300 
earthquakes per year. It is only when the rainstorm reaches 
flood proportions, or when a shallow-focus Richter magnitude 6 
(or over) earthquake occurs, does it become a natural hazard 
and/or a natural disaster. 
Associated with the result of such natural events is 
the fact that these events are less common, thus the probability 
is more remote of their occurrence. Because the probability 
of a hazardous event occurring is less than that of more 
frequent geophysical/climatological events (for example a 
Richter 3 earthquake or a rainy day), these more extreme events 
are hazards because society usually has not adopted sufficient 
mitigation measures· as it has done for the more frequent 
geophysical/geological events (such as storm drains on roads 
to disperse surface water). 
For a working definition of 'natural hazard', Burton 
and Kates propose the following: 
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"Natural hazards are those elements in the physical 
environment, harmful to rna~ and caused by factors 
extraneous to him". 
(1964:417) 
Kates goes on to expand this definition and states that a 
natural hazard 
"is an interaction of man and nature, governed by 
the coexistent states of adjustment on part of 
the human use system and the state of nature in 
the natural events system. In this context it is 
those extreme events of nature that exceed the 
capabilities of the system to reflect, absorb, or 
buffer that lead to the harmful effects, oft-times 
dramatic, that characterize our image of natural 
hazards". 
(1971:438) 
This definition implies that a natural hazard is determined by 
the technological level of the society in question. Kates (1971) 
provides verification of this suggestion when he states: 
"Human response to natural hazard is organised 
into three distinctive techno-social patterns or 
stages of adjustment: folk or preindustrial; 
modern technological or industrial; and 
comprehensive or post-industrial. Each stage is 
marked by a preferred cluster of adjustments, a 
distinctive process of choice and characteristic 
patterns of ~amage occurrence". 
( 1971:3 39-440) 
The expansion of Kates' typology of societal di~tinctions and 
adjustments to hazards is as follows (for a schematic 
representation, refer Figure 1): 
1) Folk or Pre-industrial Societal adjustments for 
example, are often mystical, irrational_ or imbedded in the 
broader cultural context of life and livelihood (i.e. tradition). 
These adjustments require more modification of human behaviour 
in harmony with nature than reliance on the control of nature • 
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They are inflexible and easily abandoned. They are low in 
capital requirements and require action only by individuals or 
small groups. Damage-causing natural events appear to be 
frequent,the average loss per event is low, but the ratio of 
deaths-to-damage is high. 
2) Modern Technological or Industrial adjustments 
involve more or less conscious decisions from a limited range 
of technological actions emphasising control of nature. These 
·adjustments are inflexible and difficult to change. They are 
high in capital requirements, require interlocking and 
interdependent social ·organisation and tend to be uniform. 
Damage-causing natural events become less frequent, death 
rates diminish, but average damage loss per event is extremely 
high. 
J) Comprehensive or Post-Industrial adjustments combine 
features of both earlier stages so as to involve a larger 
range of adjustments, greater flexibility and variety of 
capital and organisational requirements and the institutional-
ization of broadened choice from the array of potential 
factors (i.e. building codes, disaster subcultures). Damage-
causing natural events increase, death rates diminish, and the 
average damage los~ per event decrease by up to half the 
maximum potential damage. Nevertheless, absolute danger and 
deaths may remain high as a function of increase in population 
and wealth. 1 
1
wenger refers to a two-dimensional belief system about the 
relationship between human behaviour and natural forces. His 
"unicausal, passive and deified" belief system corresponds to· 
Kates' Folk or Pre-Industrial society; whereas Wenger's 
"complex, activistic, naturalistic causal beliefs" can be seen 
to correspond to Kates' second and third classifications 
(Wenger 1978:20). 
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Within this typology it is suggested here that New 
Zealand is still in the modern technological or industrial 
stage. Daniel Bell, one of the prime exponents of the post-
industrial society concept, stated five main dimensions 
that characterize postindustrial society: 
1) the predominance of service-production over 
goods-productio~; 
2) the pre-eminence of the professional and 
technical classes; 
3) the centrality of theoretical knowledge as the 
source of innovation and policy formation; 
4) the planning and control of ~echnological growth; 
and, 
5) the creation of a new intellectual technology 
which is grounded on rationality and which 
provides the basis of a new mode of decision-
making (refer Maskell, 1977). 
Maskell also concludes that New Zealand cannot be termed a 
post-industrial society, but changes are occurring, notably 
the growth of the service and the profess~onal and technical 
occupational groups which would suggest that New Zealand's 
future lies in such a direction. Bell's dimensions of post-
industrial society'are not perhaps as fully developed in the 
New Zealand socio-economic system as they are in the United 
States of America (Maskell 1977:11). With reference to 
natural hazards adjustments, New Zealand society at present 
does not possess adequate institutionalized mitigation 
methods for reducing the effects of a natural disaster 
(Britton, 1979). 
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Elaborate technical and social mechanisms enable man 
to seek from nature that which is useful and to buffer that 
which is harmful to man. To cope with the harmful effects of 
nature, sets of human adjustments are found in all human use 
systems (for example, seismic resistant buildings, flood 
dykes and levees, land-use patterns). By chance, or even by 
design, these adjustments can prove insufficient to cope with 
a given set of natural events and serious detrimental effects 
may ensue. But the character and/or magnitude of a hazard 
may be altered by man's actions: there is little hazard from 
flood if man does not inhabit or use floodplains. Where man 
builds or lives with reference to the location of potential 
extreme geophysical or climatic events determines the 
character and extent of hazards to man. The extent of the 
hazard is also a function of how man builds. Man can live in 
some areas of high seismic activity if he designs and builds 
his structures with adequate seismic resistances. Great 
earthquakes may come, but casualties, economic losses and 
social disruption can be minor. Hazards can be reduced, even 
if not completely eliminated in some instances. This ties 
in with Miletti et al's (1975) use of the term 'hazard', which 
they discuss in relation to man and his activities to future 
extreme geophysical events. The occurrence of a specific 
natural event may or may not have any impact on the human 
use system, this being the function of the size of the event 
and the character of the adjustment. Thus natural events are 
not seen in a vacuum. They are seen as having certain effects 
or consequences, and it is rather the consequences that are 
feared than the hazard phenomenon per se. 
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To complicate the matter further, the rise of the 
urban-industrial society has been coincident with a rapid 
increase in a type of hazard which may be described as 'quasi 
natural'. These hazards are created by man, but their harmful 
effects are transmitted through natural processes. Thus, 
man-made pollutants are carried downstream, ocean-plying oil 
tankers break-up or collide spewing their cargo into the sea 
creating ecological problems on the coastline, radio-active 
fallout is borne by air-currents, and pesticides are absorbed 
by plants leaving residues in foods. (For an elaboration on 
man-made disasters, refer Turner 1978). 
Kates has provided a schematic representation pf the 
effect and adjustment to natural hazards (see Figure ~)(1971). 
His explanation of the schema is as follows: 
"For some bit of the earth's Sl,lrface, for spme 
small moment in time,man and nature in th~ form 
of a human use system and a natural event syste~, 
interact to pose a naturql hazard. !be exist~nce 
of such hazards generates a specific set of 
hazard effects and its own homeostatic control 
governs the ad~ption of adjustments that modify 
the human use system, modify the natural event 
system and modify the hazard effect through 
emergency adjustments". 
(1971:444) 
One implication within Kates' schema is that the ~ocial system 
is in a state of 'balance' or equilibrium prior to the onset 
of a hazard. Kates' model of the 'human use system' (i.e. 
the social system), suggests it is a static model, not one of 
change. The modification that Kates suggests, occurs as a 
result of the interaction between the human use system and the 
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natural event system present problems of another kind - that 
of 'within system containment'. Change in this 
representation of Kates, occurs only within the parts of the 
(human, natural) systems that have been identified as influenc-
ing the outcome of the interaction between the human use 
system and the natural event system. Change is not 
identified as being caused by any 'external' agents or from 
any sources not identified in the model (e.g. from 'without'). 
It may well be that objectively, a social system will 
be in a state of non-balance. A system can be out of balance 
due to a number of reasons (e.g. economic or fiscal problems, 
lack of hazard mitigation devices, no land-use control etc.). 
But a system can only be out of balance if it is perceived to 
be out of balance by the people within that systeci. As 
Kastenbaum states: 
"The concept of disaster requires a background 
of relative stability and normality - that is 
a 'non-disaster' background. An event would 
not, and could not be singled out as a disaster 
or catastrophe if chaos and threat reigned at 
every stage and at all times". 
(1974:66). 
Referring back to Kates' diagram, presumably the 
emergency adjustments will, if the threat is repetitive or 
of severe devastat1on, become part of the now-permanently 
remodelled human use system (e.g. the imposition of new 
building codes for high-rise buildings following a destructive 
earthquake) that will remain characteristic of the human use 
system until such times as technological innovation supercedes 
11. 
the existing adjustments or until another devastating earth-
quake forces further change (due, for example, to public 
pressure on local or national government). Of course, the 
adaptation process within the human use system is not this 
simple. There are many intervening variables that come into 
effect before adjustments are finally adopted (such as conflict 
of interests; persuasion of alternatives; or unwillingness to 
do anything by the power elite within that particular society; 
the state of technology; perceived frequency of a disastrous 
natural event; and the fiscal means to develop adjustments). 
One should note that this model, along with other 
writings on natural hazards and disasters, defines a 'hazard' 
only if it affects human use and/or occupance of an area. If 
there is no occupance or established use of an area, a geo-
physical event such as an earthquake, hurricane or flood 
would not be regarded as a hazard. In order for a geophysical/ 
climatic phenomena to become a hazard, both the event and human 
proximity to that event must be present. 
1.2 Natural Disasters 
The distinction between the concept of hazard and that 
of disaster lies basically in the time perspective. Hazard 
refers to a potential set of events. Disaster is a 
descriptive label for what is happening or what has already 
taken place. One of the basic problems in the analysis and 
study of disaster situations is the defining of the term 
'natural disaster' or, more precisely, Barkun's "homeostatic 
disaster" (Barkun 1977:220). The word 'disaster' has more 
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than half-a-dozen meanings ascribed to it, ranging from a 
limited disruption of human activity, to the physical 
destruction of a natural catastrophic agent, to the dislocation 
and lack of co-ordination in personnel and resources during the 
various stages of disaster emergence (refer Westgate and 
O'Keefe, 1976). To the United States Office of Emergency 
Preparedness, disaster is the 
" •• occurrence or immediate threat of widespread 
or severe damage, injury or loss of life or 
property resulting from any natural or man-made 
cause". 
(1972:8). 
Other authors have defined disaster more quantitatively. 
Sheehan and Hewitt, for example, in their pilot survey of 
global disasters for the years 1947-1967, descr~bed a major 
natural disaster as an event satisfying one or more of the 
following criteria: 
1) it caused at least $1 million in damage, or 
2) killed or injured at least 100 people. (1969:11) 
Michaelis considered "accident" as events in which at least 
one person but no more than 999 people were killed or injured, 
or placed in imminent danger of being killed, whereas 
'disaster' similarly involved 1,000 up to 1,000,000 persons, 
and the term 'catastrophe' was reserved for events killing or 
imminently endangering one million or more individuals 
( 1972 : 4-14) • Such quantitative definitions of disaster are 
of limited use for a description of the disaster situation. 
Definitions such as Sheehan and Hewitt's, and Michaelis' miss 
out the most important factor in a disaster situation, 
that is, disasters are the disruption of normalcy, it is an 
event which seriously disrupts normal activities. Such a 
disruption can occur whether or not __ ~ $1 million in damage 
has resulted or if less than 1,000 people are dead or in 
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imminent danger of death. Although such definitions as the 
above include one of them most important features of disaster -
that is, that disasters are about people, 'primarily a lot of 
people' (Westgate and O'Keefe, 1976:46), this is only a 
partial definition of disaster. 
In the everyday common-sense definition, disaster is 
thought of as mass destruction of·property and extensive 
injury and/or death to persons. This definition is dependent 
on the social setting in which the disaster is seen to occur. 
Massive damage to property and persons on a battlefield is not 
considered disaster, because the general consensus accepts 
these consequences as the results of warfare. A military 
disaster occurs only when the social organisation of the Army 
breaks down or does not operate in an efficient or integrated 
manner (Form and Nosow, 1968:11), or, alternatively, when your 
side loses. The difference between disaster and non-disaster 
is that under disaster conditions, social organisation in some 
way becomes disrupted. Disaster therefore, may be defined as 
a condition in which the established social life (i.e. the 
routines of social ·living) of a community or a section of that 
community abruptly ceases to operate effectively as 
perceived by the community and/or outside inhabitants, and is 
severely disrupted through an excess of forces external to that 
system. These external forces, when referring to a natural 
disaster, are the result of some geophysical event, such as an 
earthquake, tsunami, landslide and the like, or some 
climatological event such as a flood, blizzard, tornado, 
cyclone and hurricane. A disaster situation also suggests 
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that the crisis management capability of the community has been 
exceeded with the existence and utilization of extensive 
emergency plans and resources within the community being 
exhausted (refer Wenger 1978: 27-8). A more specific 
definition of disaster is an 
" ••• event, concentrated in time and space, in 
which a society or relatively self sufficient 
part of a society, undergoes severe damage and 
incurs such losses to its members and the 
physical structure that the social system is 
disrupted and the fulfillment of all or som~ 
of the essential functions of that society is 
prevented". 
(Endleman 1952)~ 
Miletti et al in their 1975 publication also use this 
definition for their description of disaster (1975:4). This 
definition centres on large-scale social systems and on 
matters of: 
l) biological survival (subsistence, shelter, health); 
2) order (division of labour, authority patterns, 
cultural norms, social roles); 
J) meaning (values, shared definitions of reality, 
communication mechanisms); and 
4) motivation within those systems. 
If an event is disrupting to individuals or small groups, but 
does not disrupt the social structure or network of a given 
society, it may be considered an emergency (Wenger 1978:27) or 
an accident, or possibly, an upsetting incident, but not a 
disaster. An event can be called a disaster if all the four 
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factors stated by Miletti et al were adversely affected in a 
particular society. 1 The focus of natural disaster then, is 
twofold; it relates to the disturbance, disruption and 
destruction of the lives of members of a community, but it must 
be seen within the context of the disruption and/or destruction 
of a social system which normally functions to supply the needs, 
to order the relationships, and to handle the ordinary 
emergencies of people in that community. Moreover, the 
disaster agent is understood to be external to that community 
(Beach 1967:12) and the situation is such that the people 
involved have little or no immediate control. Beach also 
states that there are a number of large-scale emergencies which 
do not 'qualify' as disasters as the latter term has been 
defined. The broad definition of disaster could be accep~ed, 
Beach states, but this would detract from the purpose of a 
definition which is of analytical value and enables one to focus 
attention and to facilitate communication, not to cover every-
thing one can think of. The word 'emergency' is perfectly 
adequate to cover all instances of extreme situations; the word 
'disaster' is then reserved for special kinds of 'emergencies', 
the kind that would involve an external agent and its widespread 
disruptive effect on a community or a significant par~ 
thereof ( 1967:13) •. 
1Similarly, Warren's list of normal community functions 
(production-distribution-consumption; socialization; social 
participation; social control; and mutual support), could be 
used as a criteria for determining whether a disaster 
situation had developed: if the above five functions were 
unable to be performed, the community could be considered to be 
in the throes of a disaster situation. If the agent of that 
upheaval ·was a geophysical/climatological phenomenon,then a 
natural disaster has struck (see Wenger 1978:19). It is more 
likely the case though, that in time of disasters, the 
priorities of these five functions will be altered, a "system 
of functional priorities tends to emerge" (Wenger 1978:29-31). 
Brown and Goldin (1973) state that there are four 
components of the 'ordinary' public definition of an event 
as a natural disaster which can be identified: 
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1) Those who see themselves as affected by the disaster, 
view it as impinging on a specific named social system 
1 that they defined as their own; 
2) The specific social system referred to in a disaster 
is taken to be differentiated, extended and permanent; 
3) The occurrence is taken as external in origin and 
therefore is unavoidable; and 
4) The occurrence is taken as sudden. (1973:42-43) 
Brown and Goldin have expanded these points. The first 
component asserts that naming something "Disaster" presupposes 
the idea of organisation and society (one can refer here to 
Kastenbaum's comments that the concept of disaster requires 
a background of relative stability and normality (1974)). 
Thus 'disaster area' is a territorial concept, it relates to 
system damage.2 The second component of the definition asserts 
that the reputedly affected system is something more than a net-
work of friendly relationships or a casual encounter. It is an 
. 
extended organisation in which the social elements are groups, 
compared to individuals, and it is an organisation to which 
individuals can themselves refer in establishing a generalised 
social identity. It is not enough that people see the 
occurrence of a disaster-agent as dangerous or disruptive to 
themselves, their families or friends. A disaster is first of 
1 Refer Form and Nosow, 1958. 
2 . 
Brown and Goldin (1973:43) 
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all a public affair: it is a destructive geophysical agent 
that affects all people within an area, depending on the spatial 
extent of the agent. Thus, while the problems of disaster may 
be raised in reference to the capacity of 'The System' to 
deliver services, they are normally formulated in terms of a 
threat to all or part of society. 
The third component indicates that if an occurrence is 
taken to be avoidable, it is not a disaster. As long as the 
acts of a particular agent are identified as causes or conditions 
of avoidability, the occasion might be treated as one caTiing for 
combat, vengeance or blame, but it is not a disaster. The term 
'disaster' is reserved for situations in which accountability is 
problematic and the agency is unintelligible. Brown and 
Goldin's explanation of this third component needs clarification. 
A geophysical agent may be intelligible; for instance, when an 
earthquake or hurricane occurs, people are aware and know the 
cause of the resulting devastation and it can also be an 
occasion for blame. If it is a flood, then why were there no 
stopbanks, and why did local government permit building to 
proceed in this area? If it is an earthquake, and buildings 
collapse with resulting death and injury, then whey were there 
not mo're stringent building codes?1 Accountability then may not 
1Another question could be asked based on the adequacy of 
buildings to resist earthquakes. In the recent earthquake in 
California (October 16, 1979, Richter magnitude 6.5) for 
instance, the Imperial County Services building in En Centro 
was said to be earthquake-proof, and was assumed to be able 
to withstand the tremors expected to occur in that region. 
During the earthquake however, this building was substantially 
damaged. The resistance of this building to earthquakes was 
not as great as the designers and builders had stipulated, and 
not as great as the owners and the public thought. If there 
had been any deaths or injuries resulting from this building's 
collapse, blame may have been apportioned to the designers/ 
builders. 
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be problematic, but it still is a natural disaster (given that 
society or a section of that society and its members suffer 
negative consequences). Clarification needs to be placed on 
the word 'avoidable'. The situation may be unavoidable, even 
if blame for, and the cause of the disaster is known. The 
event may be a disaster because "nothing could be done to prevent 
it". 
Finally, a disaster is seen as occurring suddenly. The 
term 'disaster' suggests something that appears without warning 
and becomes full-blown in a short time. Just as the normal 
conception of disaster implies that another order - the order 
of nature - has broken into the social order, it also implies 
that other processes have broken into the normal procedures 
and processes of the social system. In relation to the 
disaster, the term 'sudden' does not ref~r to the absolute 
rapidity of an event; the suddenness of a disaster points to the 
realisation by societal members that society, taken to be self-
sustaining or uninterruptible, has been interrupted. The term 
'sudden' then refers to a certain type of interruption that 
annuls what is taken to be the overall rationale of a social 
system; that of stability and the knowledge by its members that 
they can perform their roles because the belief that the social 
member is interacting with others and their roles in a'routine' 
fashion. 
Kastenbaum suggests as a hypothesis that 
" ••• it is possible that society 'needs' disasters 
as a means of venting interpersonal and intra-
personal pressures. Crudely put, this hypothesis 
involves projected identification of our satanic 
characteristics upon the forces of nature". 
(1974:70) 
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He also proposes a second hypothesis: Disaster provides a target 
phobia for group conversion of anxious dread into a specific 
fear. He explains his hypothesis thus: 
"Boundless, formless dread is an extremely 
painful, psychic state. Converting the nameless 
dread into specific fears does much to control 
that terror. A sor,t of mass phobic reaction 
can then establish itself around one source of 
jeopardy, each individuals attitude and behaviour 
reinforcing the others". 
(1974:70) 
That disasters may play positive roles in social behaviour has 
been commented on by researchers elsewhere (for example, Fritz' 
'therapeutic community' (1961)), but Kastenbaum's state~ent goes 
beyond this situation; he suggests that there are great~r latent 
functions of a large natural disaster that may ha v~ signif~cant 
repercussions for the mental health of the disast~r victims~ 
The term 'disaster' itself has undergone a number of 
efforts at reformulation-with varying degrees of success. 
Quarantelli and Dynes state that at least four references for the 
term have been noted: the physical agent; the physical 
consequences of the agent; the way in which the impact of the 
physical agent is evaluated, and, the social disruption and 
social change brought about by the physical agent and its impact. 
Almost all definitions use some version of this last conception. 
"In this rE)spect definitions of a social nature 
have clearly taken over and replaced the very 
early references wh~ch were stated almost solely 
in physical terms". 
(Quarantelli and Dynes 1977:24) 
The word 'disaster' has also come under 'extreme critical attack' 
(Quarantelli and Dynes 1977:14) because some disaster students 
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contend that it is a residue from the sweep of history and is 
thus an outmoded concept in light of the 'newer' terrors1 that 
have emerged in the modern world. As yet though, no statement 
has sufficiently defined the concept to the satisfaction of 
all disaster students. 
We may sum up the definitions of disaster by stating the 
following, taken from Dynes (1970:50): There are four different 
groups of meaning for the term 'disaster' as it is commonly 
.used in the literature on disaster studies: 
1) Disaster often refers to the disaster agent (e.g. 
hurricane, earthquake, tornado, ammunition explosion, 
landslide); 
2) Disaster also refers to the physical impact which 
an agent has, i.e. damage to property, loss of life; 
3) Disaster can mean the evaluation of the physical 
event. In other words, evidences of physical damage 
are evaluated as being disastrous; 
4) Disaster can mean the socio-economic disruption 
created by the physical agent. 
This last definition is the one that has been used and 
incorporated most frequently in the sociological literature ·on 
disasters, instead of the first mentioned, which had pre-
dominance in the early history of the study. But, in a 
practical context, the definition of disaster adopted will 
1This refers to the consequences of nuclear and thermonuclear 
attack, but would also be due to the ways in which human society 
in many cases have occupied geographical areas that are prone 
to devastation by geophysical agents. Related to this is the 
fact that many areas are densely populated, thus more 
casualties and economic disruption could be expected. 
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reflect the orientation of those involved in a disaster 
situation. The important thing to remember is that disasters 
occur at the interface of extreme natural phenomena and 
vulnerable settlement patterns. The factor of paramount 
importance is population, for without people there can be no 
disaster. On this basis, it is a valid approach to view 
disaster as the extreme situation which is implicit in the 
every day condition of the population. It is important to 
define the specific disaster situation as merely an extension 
of the everyday situation. 
We need to see disaster not just as a tragedy for the 
individual, but as creating a set of problems for various 
community organisations. A disaster tends to affect all aspects 
of a community in a cross-sectional fashion: governmental, legal, 
religious, industrial, and commercial, health, communications, 
welfare, educational,. and other organisational aspects. 
Finally, to quote Westgate and O'Keefe, to 
" ••• view disaster dynamically, it is necessary to 
consider not merely the disaster event, but also 
the system of activity that surrounds it, namely 
prevention, mitigation, warning, disaster relief, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction. More importantly, 
it means analysing in depth both the nature of the 
physical agent and the vulnerability of the 
population". (1976:37) 
Westgate and O'Keefe maintain that there is no common 
definition of disaster, no universal scale of disaster measurement 
and consequently little compatability between different sets of 
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data on disasters. We may conclude, as does Stoddard (1968), 
that disaster studies, even with recently generated interest, 
have multiplied the already ambiguous terminology rather than 
yield clarifying concepts and have resulted in few 
theoretical 'road maps'. 
1.3 Collective Stress Situations 
Natural disasters are part of the larger category of 
collective stress situations (Barton 1969:38). A collective 
stress occurs when a significant proportion of members of a 
social system fail to receive the expected conditions of life 
from the system. These conditions of life include 
" ••• the safety of the physical environment, protection 
from attack, provision of food, shelter and incp~e, 
and guidance and information to carry on normal 
activities". 
(Barton 1969:38) 
The above conditions are a general outline of what each person 
expects from his affiliation with a social group within a social 
system. But within each of these systems, different status groups 
within the community would anticipate and expect varying degrees 
of what would be 'normal activities'. Different groups within 
society have differing expectations, different reference groups 
will influence different degrees of what each person should define 
as 'normal activities'. 
Collective stress can occur and arise from sources either 
inside or outside the social system. External sources include 
large unfavourable changes in the environment of the system -
floods, drought, earthquake and attack from other systems, loss 
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of market or sources of supply. Internal sources include 
the various forms of massive social disorganisation; economic 
breakdown such as depressions, inflation or strikes; political 
breakdown such as riots, banditry, revolution and civil wars; or 
such drastic increases in government interferences with certain 
citizens as mass purges, pogroms and growth in tyranny 
(Barton 1969:38). 
It. could be argued therefore, that members of a society 
are living in potential stressful situations nearly all the 
time. The stress situation only manifests itself when one of the 
above factors becomes a reality (e.g. inflation or earthquake), 
or when sufficient social members perceive one of the above 
variables changing in relation to its 'normal' position. It 
must be remembered too, that members are subjected to 'routine' 
stressful situations most of the time; such routine stresses 
as status discrepancy, work dissatisfaction, the tendency of the 
modern population to be transient and subjected to the social 
upheaval associated with mobility (leaving one's friends and 
familiar surroundings). The word "stress" has been defined by 
Selye by giving the word a specific medical meaning, referring 
to generalized psychological response to illness, trauma or 
severe environmental fluctuations (1964:11). Selye's definition 
of stress is effective for a large-scale (social) situation, but 
stress can also refer to individual or group situations such as 
those described above. Barton also states that collective stress 
situations can also include a sudden rise of expectations that 
the system fails to meet such as the 'revolution of rising 
expectations' (1969:38). Collective stress could also result 
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within the framework of Merton's anomie theory: when there is an 
absence of common values in society, or there is a limitation 
of access to the institutionalized means to cultural values, 
stress may become apparent. 
DTiferent types of collective stress situations have also 
been discussed. The notion of consensus and dissensus types of 
crises have been advanced and fruitfully applied in research 
efforts (refer Quarantelli and Dynes 1977:23). Dissensus types 
·of crises are conflict-containing situations where there are 
sharply contrasting views of the nature of the situation, what 
brought it about, and what should be done to solve the problem 
(an example of this type of crisis is the university campus 
disturbances in the United States and Europe in the 1960's. In 
natural disasters the dissensus-type situation is less prevalent), 
Concensus-type crises are those where there is clear agreement by 
the majority of the affected population on the meaning of the 
situation, the norms and values that should be followed (this 
does not imply that there will be no conflict between values 
within different social groups, but the consensus-type 
stressful situation indicates that the majority of the population 
collectively view the situation as a crisis and there is 
agreement on the activities to restore the social system back to 
its pre-crisis state). Natural disasters as well as those 
induced by technological agents are major examples of this type 
of crisis. 
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The focus of natural disaster research to be pursued 
in this study will be on earthquake disasters. Earthquakes are 
one of natures most severe hazards. Earthquakes pose by far the 
largest single-event natural hazard faced in New Zealand. 
Earthquakes may affect great areas - sometimes hundreds of 
thousands of square kilometres - cause great damage to structures 
that may be measured in millions of dollars, cause substantial 
loss of life and injury, and alter the social and economic 
functioning of the communities in the impact area. Earthquakes 
sometimes result in compound disasters in which the major event 
triggers a secondary associated event. The secondary event may 
be natural, such as a landslide, or may result in the failure 
of some man-made system, such as a dam failure, or may be a 
combination of both. These secondary impacts may also result 
in additional loss of life and injury, and may increase the 
economic and social cost of the disaster. 
Chapter II introduces a discussion on earthquakes, 
particularly as they affect New Zealand. Against this background 
of earthquakes in New Zealand, the sociological perspectivep on 
disaster will be considered in Chapter III. In the remaining 
chapters a specific disaster model will be applied to a 
particular New Zealand earthquake disaster. 
CHAPTER II 
EARTHQUAKES: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
AND THE NEW ZEALAND SITUATION 
2.1 General Introduction 
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An earthquake is a burst of energy produced by the 
sudden release of stress within the ground. The state of stress 
is built up by the forces which mould the features of the 
earth's surface (refer Jordan 1971; Kahle 1974; Bett 1971; 
Clark Jr. 1971; Takeuchi et al 1970; Gutenberg 1951; G~t~nberg 
and Richter 1949; Bolt et al 1975; Tatsch 1977; Heck 1965; 
Eiby 1957). Some, although not all ea~thquakes, are cle~rly 
associated with movements along visible faults in the ground 
(faults are breaks or discontinuities in the earth's crust). 
They may have depths of tens of kilometres and may extend over 
hundreds of kilometres. Following earthquakes associated with 
faults, displacement of several metres between points on 
opposite sides of the fault are sometimes observed. The relative 
displacement may be vertical or horizontal or a combination of 
these. 
Historically our understanding of the cause of earth-
quakes is relatively new. By the middle of the nineteenth 
century it had been observed that the damage caused by many 
earthquakes was concentrated in a narrow zone, which suggested 
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that earthquakes had a localised source. It was not until the 
San Francisco earthquake of 1906 however, that it was recognised 
that earthquakes were caused by slippage along a fault in the 
earth's crust. In a classic study conducted shortly after the 
1906 San Francisco earthquake, Harry F. Reid of Johns Hopkins 
University discovered that for several hundred kilometres along 
the San Andreas fault, fences and roads crossing the fault had 
been displaced by as much as six metres (Boore 1977:69). Moreover 
precise geodetic (land surveying) surveys conducted before and 
after the earthquake demonstrated that the rocks parallel to the 
fault had been strained and sheared. On the basis of such 
observations, Reid proposed the elastic-rebound theory of earth-
quakes. Reid's theory which is still considered valid today, 
can be summarised as follows: 
1) Relative displacement of adjacent portions of the 
earth's crust produces strains greater than the rock 
can withstand. The consequent fracture of the rock 
causes an earthquake. 
2) These relative displac,ements build up gradually over 
a long time. 
3) The sudden elastic rebound of the sides of the fracture 
towards their positions of no strain are the only mass 
movement at the time of the rupture. 
4) The earthquake vibrations spring from the surface of 
the fracture. This surface area is initially small 
but may quickly expand. 
5) The energy released by the earthquake is derived from 
the strain energy stored in the rock before the shock. 
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This process is shown schematically on page 29. Many 
earthquakes are not accompanied by a break in the earth's 
crust, but this model, or something approaching it, is envisaged 
to apply to most earthquakes. 
Earthquak~s are divided into three groups, depending on 
their depth in the ground. They are: (1) shallow, when the 
depth does not exceed 60 kilometres; (2) intermediate, when 
the depth is from 70 kilometres to 300 kilometres; (3) deep, 
when the depth exceeds 300 kilometres (Gutenberg and Richter 
1949:10). 
The vast majority of earthquakes occur along plate 
boundaries because of the relative motion between two plates 
(refer Figure 3 )(Boore 1977:69-70). · Most shallow mid-oceanic 
earthquakes are due to the jerky relative motions of two plates 
sliding past each other along transform faults (Yor~ 1975). The 
circum-Pacific belt of earthquakes predominantly lies along 
various trench boundaries between plates, and in this case, 
the earthquake shocks are a result of the downthrusting of old 
oceanic plate into the mantle beneath the other plate. The 
dipping plane along which the intermediate and deep focus earth-
quakes occur correspond to the great tongue of cool ocean 
floor protruding into the warmer mantle. These earthquakes 
may be produced either by slips betwe~n the tongue and the 
mantle or by release of stresses in the cool slab as it adjusts 
to its new warm environment (see Figure 4 for a diagrammatic 
representation of plate generation). The fact that no earth-
quakes occur at depths greater than 700 kilometres is now 
readily explained by supposing that the descending plate has 
STAGES IN THE BUILD UP AND OCCURRENCE OF AN EARTHQUAKE 
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heated up to the temperature of its surrounding mantle by 
the time it has reached this depth and has been effectively 
re-absorbed in the .earth's interior (York 1975:41). 
The distribution of earthquakes over the earth is far 
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from random. The vast majority of earthquakes occur along three 
long belts; the circum-Pacific belt, in which about 80 per cent 
of the earth's earthquake energy release takes place; the globe 
encircling mid-oceanic ridge system; and the continental fracture 
.system which runs from the East Indies, through the Himalayas, 
southern Asia and the Mediterranean, finally perhaps, running out 
to sea to meet the mid-oceanic system near the Azores (Figure 5). 
The frequency of occurrence of earthquakes is well illustrated 
by the following table (Table 1). Evidently, there is one 
3hock per minute of the order of magnitude 2 or greater. While 
the vast number of earthquakes are small ones, it should be 
remembered that the great preponderance of the energy released 
by earthquakes per year is concentrated in a few large shocks. 
TABLE 1 
Frequency of Earthquake Occurrence 
(after Gutenberg and Richter, 1954) 
Magnitude 
Great Earthquakes 8 
Major Earthquakes 7-7.9 
Destructive Earthquakes 6-6.9 
Damaging Earthquakes 5-5.9 
Minor Earthquakes 4-4.9 
Smallest generally felt 3-3.9 
Sometimes felt 2-2.9 
No. per year 
1.1 
18 
120 
800 
6200 
49000 
3,000,000 
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Earthquakes throughout history have ranked high among 
natural hazards which have caused severe damage to life and 
property. In the last 1,100 years there have been over 60 major 
earthquakes with the total deaths estimated to exceed three 
million (refer table 2). The earthquake problem depends not 
only on the seismicity of the region, but also on the 
population density, the character of building structures, the 
level of national wealth and income. Obviously, if an earth-
quake hit an unpopulated area it can hardly be classified as a 
hazard. With the assumption that the seismicity remains the 
same, the damage to life and property increases with increases 
in population and economic developments. With the increase 
in occupancy of hazard areas, damage from natural hazards have 
been on the rise for several decades. In the United States 
for instance, the average annual rate of increase in damages 
as a result of hurricanes, floods, tornadoes and earthquakes, 
as estimated by Dacy and Kunreuther (1969), amounts to about 
2.5 per cent per annum. Compared to this, the rate of increase 
of earthquake damage alone has been 5.8 per cent per annum 
(Dacy and Kunreuther 1969:17). There has been an increase in 
large-scale disasters (defined as exceeding a 10 degree 
(latitude by longitude) area), and an increase in the number of 
deaths per year per million population, but a decrease in the 
overall number of disasters (Disaster Research Unit 1975: Paper 
Number 11). This decrease could be because there is a greater 
amelioration of extreme environmental conditions in the 
developed world. But Sheehan and Hewitt (1960) and 
Dworkin (1974) have stressed that they were employing secondary 
sources in their data-gathering of natural hazard statistics, 
TABLE 
Agent 
2 
Number of 
Disasters 
Floods 269 
Typhoons, Hurricanes, Cyclones 169 
Earthquakes 115 
Tornadoes 95 
Thunderstorms 35 
Snowstorms 31 · 
Hea twa ves 21 
Coldwaves 13 
Volcanoes 13 
Landslides 21 
Rainstorms 21 
Avalanches 11 
Tidal Waves 5 
Fogs 3 
Frost 2 
Sand and Dust Storms 2 
35. 
(Dworkin, J., Global Trends in Natural Disasters 
1947-1973, Natural Hazard Research Working Paper 26, 
19'74. ) 
Agent 
Floods 
Typhoons, hurricanes, cyclones 
Earthquakes 
Tornadoes 
Gales and Thunderstorms 
Snowstorms 
Heat Waves 
Gold Waves 
Volcanic Eruptions 
Landslides 
· Rainstorms 
Avalanches 
Tidal Wavep 
Fogs 
Frost 
Sand and Dust Storms 
Number of 
Disasters 
209 
148 
86 
66 
32 
27 
16 
13 
13 
13 
10 
9 
5 
3 
2 
2 
(Sheehan and Hewitt, A Pilot Surve~ of Global 
Natural Disasters, Natural Hazar s Research 
Working Paper 11, 1969.) 
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which contained a pro-American academic bias; thus they have not 
recorded many of the smaller practical situations of disaster 
which are not necessarily newsworthy but which do occur. The 
implications here are that disasters are occurring as frequently 
as before rather than decreasing in total numbers. A glance 
at Table 3 will provide evidence of the percentage increase 
of disaster types recorded for the period up to 1971. 
TABLE 3 
Disaster Average by Type per Annum· 
Type 1968-1971 1919-1971 % Increase 
Cyclone etc. 1.75 0.62 182.26 
Drought 1.25 0.13 861.5 
Earthquakes 2.00 1.3 53.8 
Epidemics 0.5 0.19 163.6 
Flood 6.75 2.7 150.0 
Volcanic Eruption o. 25 0.06 316.6 
Famine 0.5 0.25 100.0 
(After Baird et al: Disaster Research Unit Paper 11, University 
of Bradford). 
Therefore, despite the unreliability of the data, there 
does seem to be a general increase in disaster occurrence 
particularly when we consider the probability that the physical 
evert is constant. 
2.2 New Zealand 
About 80 per cent of the world's shallow earthquakes, 
90 per cent of intermediate and all deep shocks occur within 
the active belt that borders the Pacific Ocean: New Zealand lies 
within this active belt. It is on the boundary of the Pacific 
Plate and the Indian Plate, where the two-over-ride each other. 
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To the north of New Zealand, the Pacific Belt is dipping beneath 
the Indian Plate, while in the south of the country the Indian 
Plate is dipping beneath the Pacific Plate (Figure 6)(Fact 
Finding Group on Nuclear Power 1977:361). The general level of 
seismicity in New Zealand is fairly well established; New Zealand 
experiences about one per cent of the world's total earthquakes 
and can expect one shock of Richter magnitude 6 or more and ten 
of Richter magnitude 5 or more in a typical year, an earthquake 
of magnitude 7 every ten years, and one of Richter magnitude 8 
every hundred years. The Seismological Observatory, based in 
Wellington, determines the epicentres for all earthquakes whose 
magnitudes are 5 or greater and for all eart-hquakes reported 
felt. This amounts to about 350 earthquakes recorded in a 
typical year. In the years 1967-1974 there were 1,454 note-
worthy shocks. 
Earthquake risk throughout New Zealand is widespread 
(refer Figure 7). According to Adams (1977), large earthquakes 
have occurred fairly uniformly in a band extending in a north-
east to south-west direction, and the only part of the country 
where earthquakes of Richter magnitude 6 or more have not been 
located since records of earthquake occurrence began are the 
north-west of the North Island and the south-east of the South 
Island. Both of these areas however, have experienced earth-
quakes of magnitude 5. Thus no part of the country can be 
considered immune from the risk of earthquakes, although some 
areas have been subjected to more frequent earth tremors than 
others. 
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The cost of earthquakes to New Zealand can be measured 
in terms of life and economic losses caused by past earthquakes 
and by estimating future possible costs. Since 1848 deaths 
directly or indirectly attributed to earthquakes have amounted 
1 to 288 - 256 of these in the 1931 'Hawkes Bay' earthquake. 
Economic costs of past earthquakes are more difficult to measure, 
but some cost for selected earthquakes are: 
Year Location Cost 
1848 Wellington $30,000 
1855 Wellington $32,000 
1931 Hawkes Bay $10,000,000 
Wellington/ - 1942 $5,000,000 
1968 
Wairarapa 
$4,198,708 Inangahua 
(After Bligh: 1972). 
Note that the 1848-1968 figures are 
terms of present real dollar value. 
estimates that the 1848-1931 figures 
'significantly understimated'. 
unadjusted in 
Bligh 
are 
Paid-out claims from the Earthquake and War Damage 
Commission resulting from earthquake losses for the period 
January 1, 1945 to March 31, 1978 have amounted to an excess of 
$NZ10 million. The potential cost of a single future earthquake 
is difficult to measure precisely but a few comments can be made. 
1 . 
The Tuesday 3 February 1931 earthquake in the Hawkes Bay region 
registered 7.75 on the Richter scale. The earthquake occurred 
in a much more densely ~opulated area than any previous shock 
had done (Eiby 1957:148). The to~ms of Napier, Gisborne, 
Hastings and Wairoa all lay within the destroyed area. The 
business areas of Napier and Hastings were almost totally 
destroyed, with secondary impacts (fires) causing more damage 
and loss of life, (Grayland 1957:126). The earthquake 
occurred at 10.48 a.m. when, according to eye-witnesses the 
CBD was busy with shoppers (Milne 1974:18; Grayland 1957:125). 
A nurses' home collapsed, a home for the aged collapsed, a 
technical college,as well as private residences and shops 
collapsed, burying their inhabitants. 
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Power (1968) took a close check of all ·~vailable records of 
major earthquakes that have affected built-up areas, taking 
into account the particular circumstances, the nature of the 
ground, the state of construction and so forth" and estimated 
that a major earthquake centred in Wellington would result in 
damage costs equal to $US 2,000 million1 (1979 estimate of the 
1968 figure: Britton 1979). The effect of this on the New 
Zealand economy would be quite marked. The Earthquake and War 
Damage Commission fund, which in 1978 was $NZ 310 million, 
would be eliminated and, as about 80 per cent of this fund is 
invested in New Zealand, their sudden withdrawal could. have 
severe dislocating economic effects. Furthermore, rebuilding 
would have to be undertaken by construction firms to the 
detriment of normal building development, extensive borrowing 
would be necessary from overseas, and, Power concludes, the 
country would be faced with a set-back to the economy that would 
last for as much as a decade. 
This grim picture can be further heightened by noting 
that crustal deformation (uplift, subsidence, vertical and 
horizontal displacement) in the Alaskan earthquake of 1964 
(Richter 8) took place over an area of 25.9 million square 
kilometres. The North and South Island of New Zealand covers 
an area of 16.9 miLlion square kilometres: the consequence of 
an earthquake the size of the Alaskan shock for a country the 
size of New Zealand, may mean the whole area of New Zealand could 
In 1978 the estimated Gross National Product for New Zealand was 
$14,000 million*. The total damage cost of a major earthquake 
centred in Wellington would represent 14.28 per cent of the GNP 
as~uming the figure of $2,000 million is correct. (N.B. the US 
dollar and the NZ dollar at the time of writing was-gg.68 US 
cents to the NZ$1.00). 
* figure from National Housing Commission: The Demand for 
Housing in New Zealand, Part 2, R.P. 79/5, p. 41. 
42. 
suffer displacement and deformation if a shallow earthquake 
of Richter 8 (estimated to have a return period in New Zealand 
of a hundred years) occurred along a fault line. Death and 
destruction could be catastrophic. 
Table 4 provides data giving the date and location of 
all significant earthquakes in New Zealand, while Table 5 
provides information on the approximate return period of 
significant earthquakes for selected areas of the country. 
The area of highest earthquake risk in New Zealand 
corresponds broadly to the Main Seismic Region which covers the 
North Island and the northern half of the South Island 
(Figure 8). The frequency of earthquake occurrence within this 
region is fairly uniform so that towards its centre the like-
lihood of any particular locality experiencing damaging intensity 
increases. Localities near the centre of the region can be 
affected by earthquakes from all directions, whereas localities 
that are nearer the edges are less exposed. Within this 
region a shock of Richter magnitude 7 or more can be expected 
about once a ~ecade, one of Richter magnitude 6 or more once a 
year, and one above Richter magnitude 5 some ten times a year. 
For the Fiordland Region, covering the south-west part of 
the South Island, the figures are similar, but the area is much 
smaller, and there is reason to think that the proportion of 
large shocks may be greater (Eiby and Reilly, 1976). In neither 
case however, does the level of activity approach that in such 
parts of the circum-Pacific system as Japan, Chile or the 
Phillippines, and New Zealand may, in fact, be regarded as an 
area of only moderate seismicity. 
Date 
1460 
1826 
1843 July 
1848 October 
1855 January 
1863 February 
1881 December 
1888 September 
1891 June 
1893 February 
1897 December 
1901 November 
1904 August · 
1914 October 
1921 June 
1921 September 
1922 June 
1922 July 
1922 December 
1926 November 
1927 May 
1928 March 
1928 March 
1929 March 
1929 June 
1929 May 
1931 February 
1932 September 
1934 March 
1942 June 
1960 May 
1968 May 
1976 May 
1979 October 
TABLE 4 
EARTHQUAKES OF NEW ZEALAND 
(After Lominitz c, 197~) 
Epic entre 
Wellington 
Fiordland 
Wanganui 
Awatere 
S .W .Wairarapa 
Hawkes Bay 
Christchurch 
North Canterbury 
Raglan 
Nelson 
Wanganui Bight 
Cheviot 
Hawkes Bay 
East Bay of Plenty 
Hawkes Bay 
Hawkes Bay 
Taupo 
Taupo 
Wellington 
Morrinsville 
Nelson 
New Plymouth 
Mount Cook 
Arthurs Pass 
Murchison 
Fielding 
Hawkes Bay 
Wairoa 
Pahiatua 
Wairarapa 
Fiord land 
Inangahua 
Fiordland 
lOOkm south of South Island 
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Magnitude 
8 
7!-8 
7! 
7-7! 
8 
7 
7 
7 
7! 
7-7! 
7 
7.75 
7.75 
7t 
7! 
7.1 
7 
7 
7! 
7.7 
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TABLE 5 
APPROXIMATE RETURN PERIODS (YEARS) FOR INTENSITIES EQUALLING OR 
EXCEEDING MODIFIED MERCALLI SCALE VI,VII VIII AND IX AT SELECTED 
CITIES AND TOWNS THROUGHOUT NEW ZEALAND* 
Location IVIM VI MM VII MM VIII 
Whangarei 150 500 
Auckland 100 300 900 
·Hamilton 40 150 500 
Tauranga 40 100 300 
Rotorua 25 8·0 250 
Gisborne 25 80 300 
Napier/Hastings 10 30 80 
New Plymouth 15 40 100 
Wanganui 7 20 60 
Palmers ton North 6 20 60 
Masterton 7 20 50 
Wellington 6 20 50 
Blenheim 6 20 60 
Nelson 6 20 50 
Greymouth 20 40 90 
Christchurch 20 50 100 
Timaru 30 100 450 
Dunedin 150 800 
Invercargill 70 300 
*Based on historical earthquake occurrence. 
Source: Smith, W.D. 1976) 
MM IX 
1000 
750 
900 
250 
300 
150 
150 
150 
150 
:L50 
l50 
200 
250 
• 
• 
-- Principal active fauks 
* Volunots actin in lut 1000yr 
ShaKow nrthquaku 
• M > 7 1848-1972 
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FIGURE 8: NEW ZEALAND ACTIVE FAULTS, EAR1rHQUAKES, 
RECENT VOLCANOES and GRAVITY ANOMALIES 
Source: Courtesy of Seismological 
Observatory, Geophysics Division, 
Wellington. 
Between the Main and Fiordland Seismic Regions lies a 
less active Central Seismic Region. Here, the average level 
of activity is markedly lower, but it has an intermittent 
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character, and, during an active period a district within this 
Region may experience shocks with a frequency approaching that 
in the Main Seismic Region, while other places remain quiescent. 
Shocks here, and also in Northland1 have sometimes reached 
damaging intensity. 
2.3 A Short History of Anti-Seismic Measures in New Zealand 
The existence of a seismic problem in New Zealand was 
recognised in 1848. Limited governmental action and pioneering 
were the features of this early period. There were no major 
disasters in the country between 1855 and 1929 and interest 
in earthquakes declined. Nevertheless, several papers by New 
Zealanders were published in the early 1920's and the schools of 
engineering and architecture drew the attention of students to 
seismic problems. 
In the early years of European settlement, administrative 
authority lay in the hands of the New Zealand Company and its 
officials. The policy of the Company was to hush up natural 
disaster and thus help for the early settlers was not forthcoming. 2 
Indeed, there were 'hints in the Company's reports that an 
inferior type of settler had put up an inferior type of building 
1Northland is the northern part of the North Island and has the 
lowest average level of seismicity in New Zealand. 
2This was particularly the case after the July 8, 1843 Richter 7 
magnitude earthquake near Wanganui which substantially damaged 
a number of buildings in the area. 
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and that any troubles they faced were no more than their~st 
desserts. The Company's success in concealing the facts 
was so great that most accounts of destructive earthquakes in 
New Zealand still take the Marlborough earthquake of 1848 as 
their starting point (Eiby 1976). The 1848 earthquake which 
was about Richter magnitude 7 was centred in the lower part of 
the Wairau Valley, which was then sparsely settled, but the 
damage to Wellington was severe, and was augmented by the effect 
of two large aftershocks upon the already weakened buildings, 
one of which collapsed, causing three deaths. On this occasion 
the buildings destroyed included the headquarters of the New 
Zealand Company and concealment was out of the question! 
The south-west Wairarapa earthquake of 1855 (Richter 8) 
was the greatest New Zealand shock in recorded times and it was 
again the city of Wellington that was most seriously affected. 
Many citizens who had rebuilt in 1848 had done so with some 
awareness that their buildings might have to withstand further 
shocks, and with the growth of the colony, general standards 
of construction had improved but there was little knowledge of 
principle to guide them. On the whole, the view that fire was 
more to be feared than earthquake seems to have prevailed in the 
building by-laws of the next half-century, which coincided with 
something of a lull in seismic activity. Christchurch twice 
experienced trouble with the Cathedral spire in the 1880's 
(December 1881; September 1888, Richter 7) as a result of 
earthquakes. 
Before the 1920's, when isolated papers by New Zealanders 
began to appear in the Bulletin of the Seismological Society of 
America, there were few signs of local interest in the problems 
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of seismic engineering. The belated upsurge came when the 
lessons of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake were brought to 
the memory by the Santa Barbara (California) shock in 1925. 
At this time most New Zealanders who thought about earthquakes 
at all held the view expressed by the seismologist, Dr. C.E.Adams, 
in the official Yearbook for 1921; that earthquakes were of 
scientific rather than practical importance - but New Zealand 
engineers nevertheless were quick to see the possible relevance 
of the work in California by Reid. Earthquake problems became 
part of the courses at the Engineering School of Canterbury 
College, and a series of technical lectures given at Auckland 
by C.R. Ford in 1926 became one of the earliest treatments 
of the subject in book form. 
The Murchison earthquake of 1929 {June 16: Richter 7.75) 
was the first New Zealand shock to constitute a disaster in 
modern times. It involved the loss of seventeen lives and 
required a substantial evacuation of refugees to Nelson. 
Important geological investigations were made, and the effect 
of public opinion was to hasten the improvement in instrumental 
seismology. The Hawkes Bay disaster of February 1931 
(Richter 7.75) had more far-reaching consequences. As in 1929, 
the civil defence problems were in the hands of the Police 
Department, with important and indispensible help from the 
Armed Forces and the Navy. For the first time the Government 
moved to impose formal legal requirements aimed at improving 
public safety in the event of an earthquake. 
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The first step was to set up a Building Regulations 
Committee. The direct result was a recommendation that 
Parliament should meet in emergency session and at once compel 
municipalities to pass by-laws ensuring that all new buildings 
were designed to withstand a minimum horizontal acceleration 
one-tenth of that due to gravity. Two important points were 
further made. The first was that requirements should be uniform 
throughout the country; and, secondly, that local bodies should 
be compelled to adopt and to police the regulations. This is a 
requirement successive Governments have been reluctant to enact 
and even now some parts of the country do not have the 
protection of an adequate code (in 1970 for example, only 
130 of the 257 local authorities, covering approximately 56 per 
cent of the New Zealand population, had formally adopted NZSS 
1900, the recommended standard building specification: 
Britton 1979). 
The war brought developments in the field of earthquake 
engineering almost to a standstill, but there were important 
changes in the civil defence and the inaugaration of the 
Earthquake and War Damages Fund. 
Civil Defence has had a curious history that has left 
citizens a little ~uspicious of its aims. The earliest civil 
defence measure was G.W. Forbes' Public Safety Conservation 
Bill of 1932, which sought sweeping powers to handle disorders 
among the unemployed, making it clear that in the case of 'fire 
upheaval, earthquake or anything of that kind' the Police were 
to be left in charge. The Police had performed well in both 
the Murchison and the Hawkes Bay earthquakes, subsequent relief 
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and reconstruction being handled by local bodies and 
committees of civilians established under local body auspices. 
The resources and assistance of the Army and Navy played a vital 
part in every major earthquake from 1848 to 1942. But with 
the change in military emphasis from manpower to machinery 
and the abandonment of compulsory military training and the 
maintenance of reservists, the need for some alternative source 
of massive and disciplined help grew. Parliamentary interest 
in civil defence revived under the new threat of nuclear 
attack. In 1953 a Local Authorities Emergency Powers Act was 
introduced which made references to 'earthquakes, fire, flood 
and other natural phenomena' but it was not until 1959 when 
the announcement that a Ministry of Civil Defence was being set 
up to operate 'not only in the event of war, but also in the 
event of earthquakes or other natural disaster' that there were 
any signs that consideration other than military ones lay 
behind Departmental thinking. But the Ministry of Civil 
Defence remained a paper creation within the Department of 
Internal Affairs although some signs of public concern about 
earthquake risk was beginning to appear in the press. In 1960, 
the appointment of three Regional Commissioners to the Ministry 
of Civil Defence provided the start to a national framework, 
but it was not until 1968 that Civil Defence in New Zealand 
really came of age. The 'Wahine' storm and the Inangahua 
earthquake helped impress upon the public mind the value of 
Civil Defence and for the first time equated Civil Defence 
with the peace-time disaster situation rather than the 
disbelieved nuclear threat. 
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The organisation and staffing of Civil Defence, both at 
the national and local level, has since improved but evidence 
of lingering suspicions of its military past persists, 
including periodical suggestions that the name should be 
changed, and that retired Army officers should be less in 
evidence, still plague the organisation. But the most serious 
obstacle to the Civil Defence Organisation is still, as it has 
been in the past, the public apathy and lack of real knowledge 
of the function of the Civil Defence (Britton 1979: Brunton, 
Civil Defence Survey Christchurch 1979). 
The principal gain of the war years for the mitigation 
of disasters in New Zealand was the establishment of the 
Earthquake and War Damages'commission and its consequent Fund. 
In 1941, Parliament authorised the imposition of a compulsory 
levy of 25 cents on every $100 of all fire insurance premiums. 
This was initially to reimburse the owners of property damaged 
by enemy action, but it was further provided that any money 
remaining after the Second World War should be transferred to an 
Earthquake Fund. In 1944 the premium was reduced to five cents 
and the Act amended to provide further monetary support from 
the Consolidated Fund (refer Britton 1979). The need for an 
earthquake insurance scheme had become apparent in the Hawkes 
Bay earthquake of l931 when insurance companies paid out only 
£250,000 for losses they assessed at ten times that figure 
(refer Bligh 1972). The Earthquake and War Damage scheme now 
theoretically provides that anyone insured against fire is 
also insured against earthquake damage, but in reality the 
Fund is not substantial enough to reimburse damage caused by 
a sizeable earthquake in a densely population region 
(Britton 1979). 
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CHAPTER III 
AREAS OF SOCIOLOGICAL ENQUIRY 
).1 Introduction 
Sociologial perspectives are often classified according to 
whether they are micro- or macro sociological. In the former, 
concentration is upon individuals and small groups, focussing 
analysis on social interactions, the use of inductive~ 
oriented methodology, and, to use Glaser and Strauss' term, 
theory is "grounded" (Glaser and Strauss 1967). In macro-
sociology the focus is upon societies as a whole or on social 
systems (Smart 1976:12); emphasis is upon systemic, deductive 
and analytic research. However, this dichotomy is not viewed 
with absolute rigidity (see for instance, Smart 1976: 11 and 80; 
Mennell 1976: 139; Lenski and Lenski 1978:4). 
Within the sociological study of natural disasters, micro-
sociological analysis has been undertaken primarily within the 
Interactionist and Phenomenological frameworks. The emphasis 
has been placed (respectively) on the social relationships 
within a disaster situation and its meaning for the group or 
individuals involved. The Collective Behaviour focus has 
augmented the understanding and consequences of natural 
disasters. This "field of study" (Turner and Killian 1967:4) 
has as its area of concern the "kinds of group characterised by 
the spontaneous development of norms and organisation" (i.e. 
emergent groups) "which contradict or reinforce the norms and 
organisation of society" (Turner and Killian 1967:4). 
53. 
At the macro-sociological "level", the tendency has been 
towards the use of a "systems" approach (see Quarantelli and 
Dynes 1977:40; Miletti et al 1975:6; see also Rapaport 
1968:452). Barton (1969), for example, tries to analyse the 
workings of social systems under stress rather than to re-
construct the psychic processes of individuals collectively 
subjected to stress. 
Central to both the Interactionist and Phenomenological 
perspectives are the inferences that people construct their 
' 
everyday world through the interaction process, that the world 
is taken for granted and accepted as the real world, and that 
people live within this world and act in accordance with its 
socially-constructed meanings. Wolf's paper describing a group 
of people who have undergone a threat experience, uses a 
symbolic interactionist as well as a phenomenological approach 
(1975: 401-404). Wolf suggests though that the 
" ••• reality of the everyday world is nonetheless 
contingent upon events, and when the unexpected 
happens, or when a new situation occurs for which 
the old answers do not fit or work, this reality 
falls into question". 
( 1975:401) 
Fritz' article also displays this perspective; social 
differentiation and roles in society are patterned according to 
the populations perception of those roles. In a crisis 
situation people are forced to make critical choices (1961). 
Prince (1920) concentrated upon the manner in which individuals 
and groups responded to the dislocation of their accustomed 
social setting. In fact, Prince's analysis could be regarded as 
one of the forerunners of Goffman's "dramaturgical approach" 
(Prince 1968:60 and 70);(see Goffman 1975). 
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The phenomenological approach is a particularly relevant 
approach to the study of human response to natural disasters. 
This approach allows the researcher far better insights into 
the consequences of disaster for the affected population. 
Interactionists and phenomenologists have argued for the need 
to focus on the social situation and to view the social setting 
as those within the situation see it (Taylor 1970; Morris 1973). 
Bro~~ and Goldin define Powell and Rayner's 'disaster-time' 
sequence as being a phenomenological approach (1973:44, 60), as 
does Chapman (1967:7). In order to comprehend a situation such 
as the sequence of a natural disaster, the researcher has to 
regard the disaster as do the people who are actually involved. 
This is also an ethnomethodological approach because ·~ttention 
is focussing largely on the structure of the shared and tacit 
rules and knowledge that makes interacting possible" (Gouldner 
1971:320). The social world in this respect is held together 
by a dense collective structure of tacit understanding (what 
men know and know others know). Although disasters are not 
'everyday life' happenings which the above two theories are 
more inclined to be associated with, these theoretical 
approaches are still applicable to the rare instances of 
disasters because their focus is now turned to the disruption 
of everyday life apd how the people involved react to and 
regard the new situation. This approach, it has been argued, 
can make the normal (i.e. pre-disaster) situation and social 
structure clearer by exposing situations that would otherwise 
not be so obvious to the researcher. 
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Collective Behaviour theory is one of the more est~blished 
traditions of studying natural disasters and their consequences. 
This is probably because collective behaviour emphasises the 
emergence of new groups or the dislocation of established 
groups, and this is what occurs in a natural disaster. Marx 
and Wood state that there has been a large amount of research 
into collective behaviour and 'related areas' and there has 
been a great amount of work on more specialised topics (1975). 
Included in these 'specialised topics' is research on natural 
disasters. The Disaster Research Center's newsletter 
"Unscheduled Events" is cited as an example of the specialised 
topics (Marx and Wood 1975). Turner (in Turner and Killian 1967) 
emphasises emergent norms as the essence of collective behaviour. 
He argues that collective behaviour should be analysed w~th the 
same model of interactive and individual behaviour as is found 
in institutionalised behaviour. In crowd situations the 
individual acts not because he/she is automatically affect~d 
by group emotion, but rather because certain lines of 
behaviour are seen as appropriate and new norms appear in an 
undefined context. Quarantelli notes that collective 
behaviour has traditionally been concerned with the emergence 
of new groups. Yet, it has focussed primarily on conflict 
groups at odds with, or engaged in struggles with the dominant 
order and has tended to ignore another common type of emergent 
group: that of accommodative nature. Such a group shows 
highly co-operative internal relations and its external 
behaviour seeks to be integrative (Quarantelli 1970:371). The 
many informal groups that arise to help during emergencies 
or disasters are good examples. 
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Collective behaviour has been instrumental within 
disaster research because disasters create situations in which 
new groups emerge and established groups may undergo a 
change in their traditional roles. The Disaster Research Centre 
(Ohio State University) has significantly advanced understanding 
of behaviour in disasters and has helped shatter myths about 
widespread mass panic and looting during disasters. Collective 
behaviour has often been associated with strain resulting from 
economic crises, war, domination, mass migration, catastrophes 
or unanticipated disruptive ways of life. Besides, or 
perhaps, there has been advocacy of a merger between different 
sociological perspectives on particular disaster problems. More 
specifically, the usefulness of combining collective behaviour 
and a complex-organisational perspective has been suggested 
(Quarantelli and Dynes 1977:33). The suggestion is part 
of a much larger trend in sociology; the attempt to meld the 
long-held traditional distinction between conventional and 
·collective behaviour. Part of the reason why collective 
behaviour and conventional organisational theories have been 
distinct until recently is because few direct efforts have been 
made to reconcile the two approaches. Sociologists were 
seldom forced to study situations where both forms of behaviour 
were simultaneously present in the immediate situation. 
Sociologists looking at disaster situations could not avoid 
such situations; both kinds of behaviour abound in such crises. 1 
1The suggestion to meld collective bheaviour with the actions of 
formal organisations should not be seen as a panacea to the 
problems associated with the study of social behaviour in 
disaster: Stallings suggests that ''this comprehensive picture 
of human response to disaster ••• proved to be far from 
comprehensive" (Stallings 1978:88). 
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This general orientation (i.e. the focus on social 
interactions) has led to a number of researchers developing 
models of "disaster-time". Specifically, the models developed 
by Powell and Rayner (1952), Marks and Fritz (1954), Lang and 
Lang (1964), Beach (1967), and Turner (1976) will be discussed 
in a later section. 
Sociologists doing research in the disaster area have been 
increasingly inclined to accept 'system' notions (Quarantelli 
and Dynes 1977:32). Researchers and theorists in.disaster 
studies have also tended to see the system perspective as one 
avenue by which an interdisciplinary attack on disaster problems 
could be mounted. According to Rapaport, systems theory is 
" •• best described not as a theory but rather as a 
program or a direction •••• The outlook represented 
by this direction stems from various sources, and 
its adherents emphasise different aspects of the 
program". (1968:452) 
Parsons describes social system as 
"The concept that refers both to a complex of 
interdependencies between parts, components and 
processes that involves discernible regularities 
of relationships, and to a similar type of inter-
dependency between such a complex and its 
surrounding environment". 
(1968:458) 
' Sociological research on natural disasters has mainly been 
centred around a systems approach. Within this framework, 
most of the system approach is of the 'open-system' type in 
the sense that there is recognition of the interrelationships 
that exist between the basic components of the social system. 
(Basic components being such things as the family, religion, 
and law and order (social control) facilities). 
58. 
The notion of systems suggests a way of circumventing 
disciplinary limitations, and allows interdisciplinary research 
and theory development. Thus in a statement by Miletti et al 
they asserted that 
" •• the concept of system stress appears to offer a 
mechanism whereby research findings from studies of 
disaster might be integrated into a large body of 
literature across the social sciences." 
Barton (1969) orientates himself to the task of trying to 
analyse the workings of social systems under stre$s, rather 
than reconstructing the psychic processes of individuals, 
collectively subjected to stress. He 
"employs the general idea in functional sociology 
that holds that the elements of a social system 
are not infinitely malleable but that change in 
each element is constrained by its interdependence 
with other~ in the system". 
(Merton 1969:XX) 
Carr (1932) and Form and Nosow (1958) also developed 
models of disaster-time within a systematic framework~ 
3.2 Model Building 
A good model of a system illustrates and provides a 
framework for comparing the real world. It also highlights 
significant features of the real world. 
"It purports to identify major elements of a 
system, to describe the strengths and directions 
of the linkages between those elements and to 
simulate dynamically the processes that underlie 
the elements and linkages. A good model serves 
also as a practical laboratory for social scientists 
in which the consequences of change in process can 
be explained for their practical import". 
(Kates 1971:442) 
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Most models, Kates suggests, 
" ••• fail to do eithe,r well. Lacking a theoretical 
understanding of process, 1the model-builder then 
resorts to 'black boxes' frequently in the form of 
some probability distribution. A working model 
may ensue, even one useful for prediction, but 
unless one subscribes to the fiction that equates 
prediction with understanding, the model itself 
does not necessarily enhance the state of theory. 
Nor do most models succeed very well in their 
practical simulations ••• Nevertheless, we do learn 
from models, even in their failures and that is why 
we turn again and again to them in our research 
strategies. Faced with the need to model processes 
that we do not understand, we are given pause to 
determine whether we should seek to understand them 
before proceeding further. Then,when we resort to a 
'black box', it may be because we have fou~d that 
the process is not intrinsic to understanding the 
phenomenon directly under study". 
(Kates 1971:442) 
The use of black-boxes does not explain the relationship 
between input and output, thus the researcher is still faced 
with the absence of crucial data. Having determined that there 
must be some reason for the different behaviour (output) due to 
a change in the environment that the person exists in (input), 
the researcher might be encouraged to try to obtain the links 
between the input and output with increased confidence, because 
he knows the inputs affected by the outputs. Thus we can emerge 
with what is most helpful for science: a statement not of gross 
ignorance, but of highly specific ignorance, a veritable 
agenda of research needs. 
1The inventor of the model may think of the human being as 
responding to certain stimuli (inputs) and as a result, 
portraying certain kinds of behaviour (output). To this extent 
he constructs a model of the human being and he asserts that 
the conceptualized human being has stated properties, these 
properties being relations between input and output. In this 
form his theorizing may be said to treat the individual as a 
'black box'. That is, the theorist only reproduces the minimum 
relationship between input and output variables that combine to 
produce a given behaviour. This is regarded as a minimal model. 
·~hen we model a system, we reduce it to a 
mosaic, with distinguishable elements, 
boundaries and single characteristics which 
combine nevertheless to give a representation 
greater than the sum of its parts. To make 
it dynamic, we can animate the mos~ and if 
its representation is still recognizable, we 
have some reason to be encouraged". 
(Kates 1971:442) 
Disasters and the more general human behaviour in 
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extreme situations, are a type of event which can be described 
or measured along many different dimensions and in terms of 
many variables. In order to compare disasters, classify their 
variations and determine how constituent factors act and 
interact, it is necessary to formulate a general theoretical 
model which defines what these dimensions and factors are. 
It should be possible to describe under the categories of this 
model any disaster as a total event, leaving out no major 
dimension of social structure or process, individual or 
collective behaviour which can be observed. While it is 
obvious that no disaster (or event under any circumstances) 
can ever be completely described in this objective manner, 
there is a considerable difference between a description or 
illustration which leaves blank major areas of possible 
observation, or fails to organise wha.t is observed into a 
coherent whole without internal contradictions, and one which 
is internally coherent and make~ use of all available 
theoretical resources for the building of the observational 
frame of reference. 
At present all we should expect from models in disaster 
research is a somewhat piecemeal development of general 
hypotheses and theoretical assumptions - miniaturized theories -
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as Janis puts it (1954:16). This is so because it would be 
unrealistic to assume that theories pertaining to disaster 
phenomenon ~re somehow going to push far ahead of our present 
social science knowledge. Rather, we must expect the 
theoretical developments in disaster to grow directly out of 
the current theoretical concepts and hypotheses with which 
researchers in each of the various disciplines are preoccupied. 
In Figure 9, an attempt is made to divide the effect of 
a natural disaster into different sectors for purposes of 
research. Different types of disasters will have different 
effects on social behaviour, primarily because each type of 
disaster (for example, earthquake compared to flood) has 
different boundaries or working areas. A flood is usually 
limited to riverine areas, flood plains or low-lying areas/ 
valley floors. It is a hazard when the floodwaters affect 
housing, work areas, including cultivated or grazing areas. 
The boundaries of an earthquake are more diverse. As well as 
affecting the areas mentioned above in the flood example, 
earthquakes can affect all areas of land, the limiting factor 
being the magnitude and the distance away from both the epi-. 
centre and the hypocentre. Also, taking the example of the 
earthquake, each specific geophysical event has its own unique 
features; a Rich~er magnitude 6 earthquake is markedly different 
in effect from a Richter 7.5; and for that matter, two earth-
quakes of the same magnitude will have different effects on 
the earth's surface depending on the depth of the hypocentre 
and the strata in which the earthquake is located. 
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It is not often that a hazard will have the same 
structure and consequence as another hazard. Therefore, the 
nature of the event has to be considered with respect to a 
disaster event. The extent of the hazard needs consideration 
also; whether it is localised (focalised: Carr 1932) or 
diffuse in physical area. The severity or magnitude (in the 
case of earthquakes) is important; the more severe the geophysical 
agent, the higher the probability of greater social, economic 
and physical disruption, together with psychological disruption. 
The timing of the event is also important. The 
consequences of an earthquake, for example, on social and 
psychological variables, and the resulting numbers of casualties, 
death and social disruption depend to a high degree on whether 
the earthquake occurs during the working day or in the evenings 
and weekends. If it occurs in the night or in the evenings when 
most of the population are at home together as a family unit, 
anxiety is reduced for members of the family. Anxiety is 
heightened when primary groups are fragmented as is often the 
case during the working day. If it occurs during the working 
day at noon when there is increased concentration of 
people in certain areas of a city (such as the Central Business 
District [CBD] and outlying factories), the propensity for 
anxiety is greater~ Because of the high concentration of 
people in the CBD during the business day and the relatively 
high density of buidlings, an earthquake could exact more 
injury and destruction than if the earthquake struck the CBD 
at night. 
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How long th~ disastrous event lasts, or the duration 
of the event is also a significant factor. An earthquake 
may last from seconds to minutes and tremors may occur before 
and after the main event that affect the community for months. 
A hurricane or a severe snowstorm may last for hours or days. 
A flood may present danger to a community for days or weeks. 
Finally, the frequency of the event or a combination of 
different geophysical events is a deciding factor in under-
standing the consequences of a disaster. It needs to be noted 
here, that all these factors are dependent on the other 
variables in a disaster. It is the combination of these 
characteristics of the agent that causes a disaster (along of 
course, with the human use system). No one of these variables 
can be understood or can be performed in isolation. 
Reactions to a disaster can be studied from different 
points of view. The reaction may be studied at a micro-level 
and concentrate on individual behaviour or, the study can 
concBntrate on a group or other collective (e.g. family) 
responses. The study may concentrate its analysis on the 
reactions of organisations (formal/informal, emergent/established 
Dynes 1970); or it may be studied at a macro-level to include a 
study of the response of the affected community. Disaster 
analysis can also be extended to understand international or 
cross-cultural reactions. 
These reactions from different social sections of the 
impact area are affected by other variables, such as whether 
the person, organisation or community has had previous 
experience with a disaster event (whether it be the same 
type of agent or of another hazardous agent). Has the 
individual or community got anything to 'fall back on' as a 
response to the abrupt change in the situation following 
impact? How does closeness of settlement affect reactions; 
will the reaction of a collectivity or group be the same in a 
rural area as it is in a large metropolitan city? Do reactions 
differ if the event is preceded by a prediction or warning? 
Are there measures within a particular organisation or community 
that indicates any level of preparedness for such an event; do 
societies have a defence organisation (such as the New Zealand 
Ministry of Civil Defence), established to help mitigate 
and co-ordinate action in a disaster? Which leads one to ask 
whether there is any established public policy in use to 
mitigate disasters, and what are the present adjustments in 
existence that can alleviate, deflect, absorb or buffer 
disaster effects? Also, what socio-economic mechanisms are 
available; what technological knowledge and capabilities are 
available to prevent disaster or to mitigate against the 
hazard? Do different cultural groups exhibit distinctive 
patterns of behaviour in times of crisis, as Wolfenstein 
suggests (1957). 
Similarly, the consequences of a natural disaster may be 
sectorized to study such aspects as the economic consequences 
of disaster; what effect does an earthquake have on the 
insurance industry; what is the effect on the production and 
distribution of goods and services in the impact community with 
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the onset of a particular hazard or series of hazards? Who is 
responsible for problems of equity and reimbursement relating 
to the consequences of a hazard? This leads to the question of 
legal and political considerations of the consequences of a 
disaster. Consequences may also be dealt with from a 
psychological perspective; what stress does such an event 
incur for the individual? On a community level, how does a 
community organise its members to cope and counteract a 
disastrous event; what effect does a natural disaster have on 
the existing social processes; are they sufficient to cope with 
a disaster? 
Finally, disasters, if they occur frequently or if they 
are of extreme severity, are inclined to have a modifying 
effect on the community, although people, especially those in 
positions of power and influence, seem to be disinclined or 
oblivious to the reorganisation and the implementation of 
extra (costly) hazard-reducing measures. Apart from the 
obvious immediate response of restoration and rehabilitation, 
it is doubtful whether a community ever regains its exact pre-
disaster situation. By a process of evaluation of existing 
adjustments, policies or technology may be revised, renewed, 
or created, thus more adjustments and new measures may be 
introduced. The scientific development of predicting hazards 
may modify future situations. In Seismology and other 
related geophysical sciences, researchers are trying to achieve 
methods of predicting earthquakes and to produce forewarnings 
of earthquakes (refer Evison 1977A, 1977b, 1977c). The 
occurrence of more earthquakes will advance the state of 
prediction; with each observed and monitored earthquake, there 
is an increased likelihood of more being known and understood 
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about the processes and characteristics of earthquakes, thus 
gradually knowledge is built up to aid accurate prediction. 
With each exposure to disaster, more and new experience 
is gained, both on an individual and on a collective basis 
through the process of internalization (for example, the 
internalization of a disaster subculture) or through the 
general process of mass education. This results in a change 
of effects or a reduction of the effect on the individual/ 
collective. The ~ffect of geophysical events can also be 
physically reduced through the modification processes_described 
above. 
Figure 10 shows these same sections in another 
diagrammatic form, illustrating the interdependency of the 
sectors, showing how essential it is to integrate all the 
above (and more) features in order to gain an understanding 
on how natural disasters affect human behaviour. This 
diagram (Figure 10) does not purport to be an all-inclusive 
one; this is not the purpose of the creation of the schemata. 
What the schemata does try to illustrate is the complexity 
involved when a natural ·hazard agent strikes a community. The 
social scientist who is interested in disasters and the con-
commitant social disruption and organisation needs to consider 
these aspects and their interrelationships. 
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3.3 Sociological Models of Disaster-Time and Disaster-Space 
Although every natural disaster is a unique event - the 
type of geophysical agent, the timing, severity, duration, 
areal extent, and the frequency of events differ - one can 
generalise and comment on the overall dimensions of a natural 
disaster and the effect they have on the target community. That 
is, a comprehensive eclectic model can be used to explain the 
series of events that lead up to a disaster, the disaster 
period itself and the post-disaster phase. There have been 
several studies by various researchers to categorize the 
dimensions of a natural disaster, to itemize the consequences 
of events, both on a temporal and a spatial scale. 
The present development of disaster time models does 
not have a fixed date, therefore any discussion would 
necessitate some arbitrary selection of dates of salient works 
and major contributions in this area. In 1932 Carr 
conceptualised disaster as a time sequence pattern of different 
stages, but little follow-up to this approach occurred until 
after World War II. Carr's model (1932) of a systematic study 
of natural disasters is as follows: In every disaster there is 
a preliminary period during which the forces which are to cause 
the ultimate collapse are getting under way. Carr calls this 
period the "preliminary or prodromal period" (1932:211). Of 
course, in some natural disasters these preliminary periods 
will remain undetected, thus societal members cannot prepare 
for all prodromal periods. 
A second phase begins with the actual onset of the 
catastrophic forces. But not every windstorm, earth-tremor 
or rush of water is a catastrophe. A disaster is known by 
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its works, that is, the disruption of the social processes and 
social structure such that the normal, everyday social life of a 
community is hindered. So long as a city resists the earth-
shock, there is no disaster. It is the collapse of cultural 
protections that constitute the disaster. The deaths, injuries 
and other losses that follow this collapse are integral parts 
of the calamity. This phase is the "dislocation and dis-
organisation phase" (1932:211). The dislocation and disorganis-
ation phase tends to pass into a third phase, the phase of 
"readjustment and reorganisation" (1932:212). From the time of 
the catastrophe until the emergency plans begin to operate 
is the time of the "confusion delay". This is a marked phase 
of every diffused disaster (i.e. a disaster that is spatially 
extensive) and is disruptive. This suggests an important 
difference between the diffused and focalized disaster: in 
diffused disaster the co-ordination of community life is one 
of vital cultural elements disrupted; in focalized disasters 
community co-ordination remains relatively unaffected, and the 
main problem, aside from the rescue, is to concentrate on the 
point of breakdown. Carr suggests that disasters should not be 
distinguished only' on the basis of the consequences but also 
on the basis of: 
1) the character of the precipitating event or 
catastrophe (type, frequency, spatial extent, etc.); 
and, 
2) the scope of the resulting cultural collapse. 
On this basis, there are at least four types of disasters: 
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(a) an instantaneous-diffused type: one which was over 
before one could do anything about it and wreaks 
its effect on the entire community (e.g. the 
earthquake in the Yugoslavian to~m of Kotor in 1979, 
which completely devastated the town and killed 
200 people); 
(b) an instantaneous-focalised type: one which wreaks 
havoc on a local specific area instantly, yet leaves 
the rest of the geographical/social area physically 
intact (e.g. the October 1966 Aberfan slag-heap 
disaster in Wales (refer Bolt et al. 1975: 183; 
Miller 1974). 
(c) a progressive-diffused type: crises which last 
several hours to weeks which affect the whole 
community (e.g. the 1978 Southland floods, New 
Zealand);. and, 
(d) a progressive-focalised type: a disaster which lasts 
for a period of time but is localised (e.g. the 
sinking of the 'Titanic'). April 14-15,1912 (Carr,1932; 
Carr's sequential approach became the groundwork for 
the extensive use of time models currently prevalent in 
disaster research. 
Sorokin (1942) did some pioneer work on 'human calamity' 
but a theoretical model for scientific disaster studies is not 
available from him. Fritz used Carr's concept to investigate 
factors present in disasters. He later extended these into 
the following list of crucial factors which must be considered 
in a scientific analysis of the various types of catastrophic 
occurrences: 
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1) the speed of onset of the precipitating agent and 
the length of forewarning; 
2) the nature of the destructive agent; 
3) the physical scope and destructiveness of the 
disaster: and, 
4) the length of the threat 
Marks and Fritz have defined a disastrous event in 
systematic terms: 
1) the event affects a community of persons, that 
is, a collection of people who occupy a common 
territory and are bound together in relatively 
2) 
3) 
permanent social relationships; 
the event confronts a large segment of the 
community with actual danger or threat of danger 
and loss of cherished values and material objects; 
the event results in deaths, injuries, the 
destruction of property and other losses and 
deprivations to the population (e.g. the 
disruption of community utilities and other 
community services); 
4) the direct or indirect consequences of the 
disa9ter affect a large proportion of the popul-
ation in the community (that is, the repercussions 
are diffused throughout the community compared to 
being focussed on a particular group or collection 
of individuals). 
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According to Marx and Fritz, if an event achieves these 
four characteristics, it can then be defined as a disaster 
(1954)(Note that these variables are not characteristic of 
natural disasters, but for disasters both man-made and 
natural). 
Moore, using Carr's macro-distinctions, made further 
temporal distinctions, but without making them explicit temporal 
categories. Moore gathered catastrophe reports from his own 
tornado research and other sources and co-ordinated them into 
an ordered approach toward a theory of disaster (1956: but 
Stoddard suggests that although his studies fill a void in 
understanding the post~emergency phase over an estimated time 
period, it fails as a comprehensive, integrative tool for all 
types of disaster (Stoddard 1968:15). · 
Form and Nosow stated that there were three stages of a 
disaster that may be distinguished: 
1. The pre-disaster stage, which highlights the normal 
functioning of the community before the impact of the disaster. 
"Too often the study of the pre-disaster stage 
has been concerned only with the preparation 
or lack of preparation for the disaster. However 
much may be gained by defining the pre-disaster 
stage as a normal period in which the community 
is functioning according to traditional 
expectations and values, and people are playing their 
traditional roles. This condition obtains whether or 
not the disaster is anticipated and whether or not 
preparations are being made for it. (Thus) the 
behaviour in disaster may be understood better if 
studied from the point of view of a functioning 
system that has become disrupted". 
(1958: 13-14) 
Form and Nosow suggest that unless the pre-disaster phase is 
seen by researchers as an ordinary, normal and typical everyday 
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functioning entity, then the researchers are not seeing the 
disaster and its consequences in the right frame of reference. 
For a disaster to be a disaster, one has to, as Kastenbaum 
stated (1974), regard the pre-disaster period/community as a 
normal functioning entity. 
2. The emergency phase/stage which is the period when the 
serious disruption occurs. The activities and relationships 
that develop to meet the disruption may be referred to as a 
"disaster system". Ultimately the emergence of new social 
relationships is realised. These relationships contain certain 
elements of the pre-disaster organisation as well as new 
elements. 
3. This is the post-disaster stage, which usually 
represents a new stable and enduring structure of community 
relations. 
Lang and Lang presented a typology of disaster based 
on three dimensions. The first dimension refers to the 
distribution of effect. A disaster may be discriminating or 
undiscriminating in its effect. A discriminating disaster 
is one in which certain classes or groups are more vulnerable 
than others. For example, poor people have flimsier houses 
than wealthy people, who are more likely to live in well-designed 
houses. An earthquake will affect the structures of the 
poor people more than those of the rich (refer Davis 1978; 
Mitchell 1977:240; Taylor 1978). Thus there will be 
discriminating effects when an earthquake occurs in a 
stratified community. A bomb, on the other hand, will be 
undiscriminating in its immediate effect. 
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The second dimension distinguishes between anticipated 
and unanticipated disasters, depending on whether they were 
preceded by a warning period. The third dimension distinguishes 
between unprecedented and recurring disasters, depending on 
whether similar disasters have struck a particular population 
before and have left traces in the social organisation. Lang 
and Lang have developed a psychological concept, "morale", 
to account for the relationship with which they are most 
concerned; the effect of impact on behaviour. They define 
morale as "continued performance and co-ordination of roles 
in situations of stress" (in Brown and Goldin 1973:57). In 
terms of their causal scheme, in which morale mediates between 
impact and effect, the typology of disaster proposed by Lang 
and Lang allows them to say that undiscriminating, 
unanticipated, unprecedented disasters will probably pose the 
greatest threat to morale. As such, it will result in the 
greatest amount of social disorganisation. But discriminating, 
anticipated and unprecedented disasters, given adequate 
resources, will generally lead to well-organised and highly 
functional behaviour. 
Most contemporary evidence however is 
" ••• directly opposed to the portrait put forward 
by Lang and Lang of disorganised, chaotic and 
atomized populations in situations of undiscrim-
inating, unanticipated and unprecedented 
disasters". 
(Brown and Goldin 
1973:58) 
The chaos Lang and Lang postulate would only occur if there 
was no basis for the local integration of the population. It 
would have to assume that people are social and orderly only 
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in reference to the most abstract and inclusive system of which 
they are members. Lang and Lang's causal model does not allow 
for the most important features of disaster that have been 
observed, such as altruism, cooperation, inter-group conflict. 
phases. 
Beach, in his paper distinguishes five major time 
"The reaction of people in the different zones of 
disaster space is a function of the particular time 
phases in which they happen to be observed". 
(1967:18) 
The first phase, the Pre-Disaster Phase, is really the period 
before the disaster. It is included in the scheme be~ause of 
its importance in determining the effect and response to the 
disaster. 
"The pre-disaster conditions include such factors 
as the nature of the buildings in the area, the 
availability of shelter and communication 
facilities; the population's previous experience 
with disasters, and the availability of organised 
and trained personnel with appropriate resources". 
(Beach 1967:18) 
Additional factors include such things as the time of day 
the event occurs and the chance presence of special services 
(e.g. the presence of the Armed Services). With such services 
present on the scene, Beach postulates that the disaster-stricken 
community has a quicker chance of recovery. 1 An example of 
1In the case of tne Armed Services being present, in or near an 
impact area, the command structure within the Armed Services 
organisation can augment and accelerate the recovery of a 
community because military organisations have established 
chains of command and divisions of labour that enable these 
organisations to co-ordinate and control the activities of 
large forces of men. This ability to co-ordinate and 
control large forces of men means that the Armed Services 
can mobilise very quickly, organised and disciplined 
personnel into a disaster area who can carry out rescue, 
relief and remedial activities at a level much greater 
than the 'civilian' impact population. 
this particular service can be illustrated in the 1964 Alaska 
earthquake and the presence of the Armed Services stationed 
nearby (refer Anderson 1969)1 • 
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The second phase is the Warning Phase. This covers the· 
period from the first appearance of possible danger signs to the 
moment of impact. It may be sub-divided into early warning, or 
an Alert Phase and a late warning or Threat Phase. The Alert 
Phase typically involves 
" ••• vague and ambiguous signs and partial 
information indicating the possibility of a 
disastrous event at some time and some place". 
(Beach 1967:19) 
Warnings may turn out to be true or false. They may be noticed 
by a small or large proportion of the population and they may 
be taken seriously or ignored. The late warning or Threat 
Period involves cues and information which is not ambiguous, 
at least to most people. This Phase is usually short and is 
followed by impact or by awareness that the danger has passed. 
Threat cues are typically an urgent indication for immediate 
protective and survival action. Also the threat is usually 
localised as far as disaster space is concerned. 
The Impact Phase is the period in which the disaster agent 
causes death, injury and destruction. The force of the 
destructive agent is usually confined to a particular area. 
"Impact may last for only a few seconds or minutes 
or may be prolonged as in the case of floods or 
snow/wind storms". 
(Beach 1967:19) 
The Emergency Phase begins at the end of impact and 
continues to the time when the dead have been removed, the 
The presence of the Navy was also instrumental in rescue and 
relief work in the 1931 Hawkes Bay earthquake. 
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injured cared for, secondary threats (fires, hot wires etc.) 
have all been dealt with, and survivors temporarily cared for. 
The emergency period may be divided into two parts: the 
Isolation Phase and the Assistance Phase. The Isolation Phase 
is the period during which the survivors are on their own. 
It l~sts until organised and professional assistance comes 
from outside the impact zone, marking the beginning of the 
Assistance Phase. The Isolation Phase may be prolonged by 
one or more of several conditions. First, the outside world 
may lack information about the location and conditions of the 
survivors. Second, access to the impact zone may be 
hazardous and extremely difficult. Thirdly, communities 
adjacent to the impact zone may be ill-prepared to offer 
emergency assistance. Finally, a situation may arise in which 
potential helpers from adjacent areas may fear to enter the 
impact zone because of continued danger (for example, after 
shocks from earthquakes; swollen rivers from floods; lava 
flows from volcanoes). 
The Recovery Phase 
" ••• begins approximately when the emergency tasks 
of search, first aid and emergency health and 
welfare cases have been provided with temporary 
shelter, food and facilities. At this point, 
emergency agencies typically turn their 
authority over to the local officials". 
(Beach 1967:20) 
The primary tasks of the recovery period are relief, 
relocation, reconstruction and general rehabilitation. 
states that it is difficult to determine the end of the 
Recovery Period. Probably the community that has been 
Beach 
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devastated by a disaster will never be quite the same again. 
However, when the social and economic system is back to its 
pre-disaster level of functioning, Beach assumes that Recovery 
is said to be complete in the sense that the effect of the 
disaster has ceased to have repercussions on the remainder 
of society. 
~arton refers to a five-phase typology of disaster 
time, but he states that the labelling of such phases is only 
a quantitative step toward more precise methods in analysing 
change in a system of variables (1969:49). Thls 
classification, like the studies Barton used as a base, is 
oriented mainly to the situation of a community disaster in 
which individuals, small groups and organisations are 
participants and to which the undamaged regional or national 
system provides help. Barton's five phases are: 
1) the pre-disaster period; 
2) the period of detection and communication of 
warning of a specific threat (which is absent or 
t~uncated in sudden disasters); 
3) the period of immediate, relatively unorganised 
response (which is a very important phase in sudden 
disasters, but less so in the gradual or long-term 
impact); 
4) the period of organised social response (which may 
cover days or weeks of lesser intensity and scope, 
and may require years in the case of very heavy 
impacts or long-continuing stresses); 
5) the long-run post-disaster equilibrium when the 
system has completed such reconstruction as it can 
achieve and has incorporated the 'permanent' effect 
of the disaster (this long-run situation may or may 
not represent a restoration of the status quo). 
Many of the contributors to disaster literature have 
set out developmental sequences relating to di-sasters, but 
because of the emphasis upori problems of rescue and recovery, 
and possibly too, as Kastenbaum has stated (1974), because 
disaster researchers are preoccupied with the "bolt from the 
blue" hypothesis about disasters, these sequences virtually 
without exception, according to Turner (1976), start from the 
onset of a disaster, treating any prior events in a cursory 
manner, if at all (Turner 1976:753). Typically, such 
consequences begin with a warning of danger and move through 
the onset of danger to the problems of alarm, panic, and 
rescue (1976:753). Consequently, none of these sequences 
is particularly useful in gaining an understanding of the 
events which lead to the disaster, nor are they helpful in 
enabling the researcher to identify specific features of the 
_pre-disaster phases ~hich might make such phases recognizable 
to the occurrence.of disasters. Turner's model lays equal 
emphasis on the pre-disaster context and the post-impact 
period: 
Stage 1: Notionally normal starting points 
a) initial culturally accepted beliefs about 
the world and its hazards. 
b) associated precautionary norms set out in 
laws, codes of practice, mores and folkways. 
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Stage 2: Incubation Period - The accumulation of an 
unnoticed set of events which are at odds 
with the accepted beliefs about hazards and the 
norms of their avoidance. 
Stage 3: Precipitating Event - Forces itself to the 
attention and transforms general perceptions 
of Stage 2. 
Stage 4: Onset - The immediate consequences of the 
collapse of cultural precautions become 
apparent. 
Stage 5: Rescue and Salvage - first stage adjustment. 
The immediate post-collapse situation is 
recognised in ad hoc adjustments which permit 
the work of rescue and salvage to be started. 
Stage 6: Full Cultural Readjustment - An inquiry or 
assessment is carried out and beliefs and 
precautionary norms are adjusted to fit the 
newly gained understanding of the world. 
Turner's model cannothoweverbe applied to such natural 
disasters as earthquakes because it disregards those disasters 
that 'spring into existence' immediately and in a fully 
developed condition. By drawing attention to the 'Incubation 
Period' this model is more appropriate to those disaster 
situations which have a recognisable build-up period (for 
example, hurricanes, cyclones and floods (not though flash 
floods). Since most disasters are unpredictable 
(Drabek 1970), it may be unrealistic to claim that an 
incubation period, as described by Turner, is an integral part 
of the disaster analysis of analysis in all disasters. 
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Before the Disaster-time model that has been used in 
the study of the 1968 Inangahua Earthquake is considered (i.e. 
Powell and Rayner's (1952) model), it might be useful to turn 
attention to the spatial aspects of disaster. Wallace (1956a) 
provides a model (Figure 11) of disaster-space. The disaster 
space has been divided into five zones depictedby concentric 
circles (it must be remembered that this is a highly schematic 
portrayal of disaster space; for instance, in a tornado, the 
path of the wind-tunnel may sweep across a saction of the 
community, leaving areas on each side of its path relatively 
unscathed. Hence the disaster space in this example would 
not be concentric). This schematic representation may also 
be too generalised for earthquakes; the underlying 
geomorphological conditions may in effect allow the shock to 
be absorbed in some areas and thus suffer little damage, whilst 
other areas equi-distant from the epicentre may have greater 
damage. 
Central in Wallace's diagram is the area of Total Impact, 
not total destruction, but the area that received the full 
fury of the disaster agent •. However, there is usually much 
more destruction in this area compared to adjacent areas. 
Moreover, the area of impact is usually fairly clear to the 
victims as well as the outside helpers and onlookers. The 
second, or Fringe Impact is closely adjacent to the area of 
total impact, and is distinguishable in that it has usually 
suffered only minor damage and few, if any, casualties. Some 
people in the fringe area may also think that they have been 
in the centre of impact at least for a short time. 
"Their first reactions following impact is usually 
to check their families, after which they may 
investigate the impact area and begin rescue work. 
If the impact area is a continuing source of 
danger (e.g. fire or flooding) they may evacuate 
their families". 
(Beach 1967:18) 
The third, or Filter Area is the next adjacent area 
which has suffered no damage or casualties. It is typically 
a source of help and services, '~s well as the area through 
which traffic and information pass back and forth from the 
impact area to the outside world" (Wallace 1956b:5). This 
presumably, is also the case with the fringe impact area, 
but not as intensively, because the fringe area will have 
suffered some damage, while the filter area has not. People 
in the filter area will usually be aware that disaster has 
occurred and have a fair idea of its location. As the name 
suggests, the filter area is permeable to some inputs and 
outputs but not to others, (for example, roadblocks set up 
to enable emergency services to pass through -and keep 
onlookers out). There is also a convergence of messages 
from the outside world so that almost every disaster involves 
an overloading of, whatever channel may be operating. Requests 
for information, attempts to reach family or friends, offers 
of assistance and so forth flow into the stricken area and 
require filtering. 
FIGURE 11 : GRAPHIC 
ILLUSTRATION OF ZONES 
INVOLVED IN DISASTER 
Source: Beach H.D. et al in 
MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR 
IN DISASTER 
E 
(EMERGENCY HEALTH SERVICES) 
1967:17 
Figure .Graphic ill.ustration of zones involved in disaster. (Adopted from Wallace, 1956) 
The fourth and fifth areas, or Organised Community 
Aid Areas and Organised Regional Aid Areas are not directly 
affected by the disaster socially in the sense that this area 
is not affected by family disruption or confusion and 
disorganization (although economically it is assumed that every 
region will be affected in some way, even if it is only in the 
relocation of resources and money to the impact area). These 
areas are the primary source of organised emergency personnel 
and services "in the form of police and fire departments, 
medical and hospital services and relief agencies" (Wallace 
1956b:5). At the time of impact, the community and regional 
areas may be largely unaware that a disaster has occurred 
and are seldom aware of its precise location. There is 
typically a time lag before they receive the relevant 
information which will enable them to mobilize their resources 
and move in to provide emergency services. 
Wallace suggests that in any disaster the above 
categories of spatial dimensions can be mapped and 
distinguished by the various behaviours of the occupants and 
the physical effects of the disaster agent with respect to the 
disaster event. 
3.4 The Powell and Rayner Model of Disaster Time 
Powell and Rayner in 1952 proposed a descriptive 
scheme for a disaster, based on a formulation in terms of 
development stages. They characterised each stage by its own 
integrative mechanism, distinctive variables and a set of 
unique tasks for each of the various actions of the affected 
social system. 
Compared to Carr's (1932) typology, Powell and 
Rayner's scheme exposed a number of different processes by 
which an occurrence is defined and takes shape as an 
occasion for social action. Form and Nosow's (1958) model 
is related entirely to the functional perspective and regards 
the situation as a functioning system that has become 
disrupted due to the input of a disaster agent. It is, 
therefore, restricted in its application mainly because it 
does not acknowledge the activities, interactions and 
meaning of the situation by members that become apparent in a 
disaster situation. Form and Nosow's typology is 
reminiscent of an organic analogy of society and tends to 
view the disaster agent as a pathological condition which 
the 'system' will rid itself of with a restructuring of the 
social structure (refer RubingtonandWeinberg 1977:19). Lang 
and Lang (1964), on the other hand, have developed a typology 
of disaster behaviour from a psychological perspective. The 
underlying assumptions inherent in this model though have 
been questioned and opposed, thus reducing the validity of the 
model (refer Brown and Goldin 1973). Besides this 
opposition, however, Lang and Lang's model is narrow in its 
focus, and does not explain collective behaviour, being 
concerned only with individual, psychological behaviour. As 
such, this typology is devoid of utility for an extensive 
elaboration of the periods of a disaster siatuion. 
Beach (1967) and Barton's (1969) models are based on 
the format developed by the Powell and Rayner model (1952), 
as will be seen below. Barton's emphasis is placed on the 
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social system and its ability to organise its constituent 
parts and to function in an appropriate manner to lessen the 
effect of the disaster agent. It is orientated towards a 
macro-sociological perspective and views the disaster 
situation as it affects the mechanisms of the social system. 
Beach's model pla~es less emphasis, compared to Powell and 
Rayner's model, on the inter-relationships of the disaster-
victims within the impact area, and less emphasis on the 
phenomenology of the disaster situation, with more attention 
and stress placed on the disaster as a social process. 
Turner's (1976) model also places emphasis on the 
disaster as a social process. No stress is placed in this 
model on the phenomenology of the disaster-event (although 
the meaning of the disaster is seen in terms of cultural 
mores, folkways and beliefs; the emphasis is on the cultural 
indoctrination of disasters as a social phenomenon). Turner 
describes the process of a disaster event in terms of the 
re-appraisal of cultural beliefs previously internalized 
within the social members; beliefs which they now find 
inappropriate. 
Powell and Rayner's analysis allows the conclusion, 
according to Brown and Goldin, 
' 
" ••• that many of the phenomena associated with 
a disaster can only be understood in terms of 
their meanings for the affected collectivities". 
(1973:60) 
Powell and Rayner's typology is, according to Brown and 
Goldin, a phenomenological view of disaster (1973:66). 
This phenomenology of disaster can be usefully systematized 
by reference to typical periods of time within the course of a 
disaster since these periods are presumably related to types 
and problems of behaviour. Powell and Rayner proposed the 
division of disaster into seven phases, preceded by a Pre-
warning phase: 
1) Pre-Warning Phase 
While not technically a 'stage' of disaster, the prior 
cultural conditioning of a disaster population has to be 
taken into full account in studying or evaluating given 
responses, or in predicting major patterns of behaviour under 
anticipated stress. This includes all the conditioning, 
internalization and socialization which form the cultural 
matrix into which the disaster strikes. Major factors 
are the knowledge and folklore about the given thneat/agent, 
its sources and consequences and the familiarity and 
attitudes towards the disaster agent. Such preconditioning 
also includes culture-borne group traits such as stoicism or 
extreme emotionalism, cooperativeness or rebelliousness, 
cohesiveness or disorganisation1 , and religious values or 
cultural values-systems involving, for example, attitudes 
towards authority and towards death. Finally, preconditioning 
must include the growth of the personality structure which 
dictates the response of the individual to disaster stress; the 
development of the personality pattern within each involved 
individual is part of this cultural preconditioning. The 
1
refer M. Wolfenstein, Disaster: A Psychological Essay (1957), 
for a full discussion of the traits of various cultural 
groups. See also Britton 1979:29-30. 
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Pre-Warning phase is suggestive of what Kastenbaum calls a 
'period of non-disaster' (1974:66), that is, a situation 
in which the social system is in a state of (relative) 
environmental equilibrium. Without periods of stability or 
non-disaster, which in effect highlight a disaster period 
(because the disaster period is then regarded as atypical 
or an abnormal social condition), the disaster period would 
become the normal situation. 
2) Warning Period 
At this stage there arises some apprehension based 
on conditions out of which danger may arise. This 
apprehension may not necessarily be based on empirical 
evidence. Precipitate disaster, like those involving sudden 
explosions and (at present) earthquakes, may not be preceded 
by any period in which the victims are aware of mounting 
danger. But in disasters whose slower approach gives cues 
and opportunities for public apprehension (for example, a 
mounting flood or a cyclone/tornado), the period of warning 
is one in which, because of the fragmentary and ambiguous 
signs of danger, minor changes in the stimulus situation can 
in turn alter or reinforce interpretations of what little 
information there is available, (Chapman 1962:10) 
"It is clear as a practical matter that the 
prevailing situation in the period of warning 
is that of human search for certainty in the 
absence of reliable information. Whenever 
officials have failed to structure this period 
as soon as possible by explicit warnings and 
relevant information, the studies of disaster 
have found the consequences are public 
confusion and over-anxious behaviour". 
(Chapman 1962:10) 
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This behaviour seems a natural consequence of a period 
of warning. Alternatively, it is a situation in which no 
one will take any notice, thus social life will remain as 
it was before the warning phase. The warning phase itself 
is usually one which is produced by those in positions of 
authority; it is usually through some official channel that 
warnings are issued. This is because the warning phase 
carries with it a period of inactivity on the part of the 
phenomenon; it has not yet manifested itself, or it has not 
yet imposed itself on the community. When it does it 
becomes a threat. 
3) Period of Threat 
People are exposed now to communications from others, 
or to signs from the approaching disaster-force itself 
indicating specific imminent danger. In this phase of 
approaching danger, human beings face more urgently the same 
problems of resolving perceptual ambiguity thatwere experienced 
the "Warning Phase•'. Threat usually involves what 
Shibutani (1961) referred to as improvised processes of 
communication or rumour as people receive and share news 
of the impending occurrence. As a result, the organisation 
of social action at this stage of disaster is largely 
decentralised and· interpersonal; that is, a threat is seen 
as something affecting everybody, not just the single person; 
a contrast to how people regard the disaster after impact. 
Some theorizing, although not much empirical research, 
has approached the decision-making of individuals in the period 
of warning and threat as a problem in game theory (Chapman 
1962:11). It is ,plausible, according to Chapman, to think that 
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personal decisions about what to do in the face of danger 
take place within a complex of implicit personal estimates: 
1) how likely the threatening even is to occur 
and how soon; 
2) how great a loss the person will suffer if it 
does and if no countermeasures are taken; 
3) what measures of protection are open to him; 
4) how effective each measure will be; 
5) the cost of such measures in money, effort, 
anxiety and other deprivations. 
A change in any of these estimates should be reflected in what 
the individual will do in response to the warning and how 
quickly he will react. 
4) Period of Impact 
It is during this phase that the disaster agent strikes 
with concommitant death and/or injury and destruction. During 
the period of impact, the disaster situation is acknowledged 
and defined. The boundaries of the affected social system are 
established as are material limitations on collective and 
institutional behaviour, the status of individuals and groups 
in relation to disaster and the priorities of official agencies 
concerned with rescue and recovery. It may be noted that the 
period of impact is not the period of maximum destruction 
of normal modes of behaviour. In fact, 
" ••• all stages of disaster listed by Powell and 
Rayner involve action that is strikingly different 
from that found in other social institutions. What 
is unique about each stage is the mode of social 
organisation it implies rather than the degree 
to which behaviour is or is not socially organised". 
(Brown and Goldin 1973:63) 
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Research has furnished several important descriptive 
generalizations about the behaviour of people at the moment 
of actual impact from natural disasters, and some of these 
generalizations differ sharply from the pictures often given 
in fictional and journalistic accounts (see for example 
Noll 1976; Fritz 1961). The folklore of cataclysm 
frequently asserts that panic, in the sense of wild terror-
stricken behaviour, is natural and commonplace in a natural 
disaster. But quite to .the contrary, panic has seldom 
been found in the study of actual disaster (Smelser 1963:136). 
The accumulated mass of interview data from survivors 
concerning what they themselves did during acute dang~r, and 
what they saw others doing shows that behaviour under the 
impact of natural disaster is surprisingly ration~l, 
courageous and calm. Panic behaviour has consequently come 
to be recognized as an exceptional phenomenon arising under 
exceptional conditions. 1 
Despite its heuristic, educational value, the term 
'impact' is ambiguous. A tornado sweeps across a region, 
severe earthquakes may be followed by fires. It is generally 
impossible to determine the period of maximum destruction 
except in retrospect. The ambiguity of the term lies in 
the failure to sp·ecify the perspective, including the values 
and principles of assessment from which a period of impact 
is determined. 
1 For a good description of panic behaviour, refer Smelser, N. 
1963, pp. 131-138; and Wolfenstein 1957, Chapter II. 
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5) Period of Inventory 
In this period, those exposed to the disaster begin to 
form a preliminary picture of what has happened and of their 
own condition. Following the impact with its numerous 
problems of definition and description, the inventory stage 
is more clearly defined. This is the period in which official 
and unofficial social units establish rules of action based 
on the boundaries, the social divisions and the priorities 
established by the impact. According to Brown and Goldin, 
the period of inventory is the mature stage of a political 
process. The jurisdictions claimed by social units and the 
relationships among them begin to appear as matters for 
negotiation. The rules of action and the situations to which 
they apply delineate a new order at the local and super-
ordinate levels of a community (1973:63). 
Stock-taking begins after the strike of a disaster, 
with the efforts of the stunned individual survivors to 
come to an understanding of the catastrophe that has just 
taken place. The evidence shows that an immediate effect 
of the impact is to produce a momentary fragmentation of the 
social· scene into isolated individuals, each overwhelmed by 
the event and each believing for the moment that he and only 
his immediate companions have been the victims. As the 
survivor struggles for a comprehension of his condition, he 
comes rapidly to some realisation of the mass destruction that 
has taken place. As the survivor begins to find that there are 
others who also felt and survived, these feelings give rise to 
a powerful sense of gratitude at still being alive, and of 
concern and warmth for other survivors. 
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It has been pointed out that the apparent confusion of 
activity that the unpracticed observer sees immediately after 
disasters is not aimless for most of the persons involved in 
it. Individually they are acting in highly purposeful 
directions. It is only because their activities are not 
socially coordinated at first that the appearance of random 
confusion arises. It follows that the first acts of rescue 
by survivors are often heroic, typically rational and sometimes 
successful - but also relatively unorganised and inefficient. 
6) Period of Rescue 
Activity now turns to immediate help for survivors, 
first aid for the wounded, freeing trapped victims, fighting 
fires and the like. The phase of rescue is divided from that 
of the preceding impact by "naturally indistinct boundaries" 
(Chapman 1962:17). Most people in the impact area of a 
forceful disaster agent are momentarily stunned. But most of 
them soon recover mobility and, as they start to assess their 
situation and take steps to cope with it, the rescue phase may 
be said to begin. Although rapid recovery from the immediate 
shock of impact is the rule, a number of survivors manifest 
what has come to be known as the "disaster syndrome" (Wallace 
1956b:l09-66). They do not quickly emerge from the stunned 
condffiions but continue to act in a dazed way, withdrawn and 
relatively immobile; or if they do move about, they do so in 
an aimless, abstracted manner. 
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7) Period of Remedy 
More deliberate and formal activities are undertaken 
toward relieving the stricken and their community both by 
survivors and outside relief agencies that have now moved 
into the scene. Now the community begins to reorganise. 
Specialists take charge in their spheres of competence and 
Government officials resume their authority. Chapman states 
that 
" ••• the flowing in of relief to a disaster-
stricken community is the beginning of that 
healing period in which the community moves to 
planful and longer term measures of 
recuperation. In some cases such a process 
may presumably last for years, particularly if 
one includes in it such slow recovery as the 
building of obliterated areas or individual 
adjustment to the death of a relative or friend "• 
(1962:19) 
During the stage of remedy, efforts are made to deal 
with the effect of disaster beyond the immediate requirements 
of the victims. This stage involves attempts to 
reconstruct basic social and material conditions of life 
along predisaster lines. The success of these efforts 
depends to a great extent on the co-ordination of the official 
and unofficial practices because by this time, as mentioned 
earlier, both types of organisation will probably be working 
in the area. 
8) Period of Recovery 
For an extended period, the community and the 
individuals in it recover their former stability. The 
priorities for officially instituted change reflect political 
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as well as other considerations, such as economic policies 
and new priorities which may explain why disaster rarely 
leads to significant changes in a social order. We do not 
know much about the long-term changes that may be brought 
by disaster because, according to Powell and Rayner, almost 
no research has been undertaken to follow a stricken community. 1 
Powell and Rayner's disaster-time periods have been 
found to evoke typical behaviour, and their usefulness as a 
basis for suggesting research has been great enough to have 
brought about this time scheme and others that are based on 
the Powell and Rayner typology (refer Beach 1967, Barton 1969, 
Wallace 1956). 
Powell and Rayner's periods of disaster-time were 
used as a framework to study the effects and results of 
the 1968 earthquake that occurred 15 kilometres north of the 
South Island township of Inangahua, New Zealand. The 
following study is the result of an analysis of the earthquake 
and its effects on the townfolk and the social networks 
within that town, the research based on the model devised by 
Powell and Rayner in 1952. 
1
up to the present, this situation has not changed significantly. 
There are studies that have focussed on the post-disaster 
period, especially for example Haas et al (1977). Generally 
however, this area of disaster research remains relatively 
untouched. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY IN DISASTER RESEARCH 
4.1 General 
A disaster is almost by definition a trigger for 
alterations of the social landscape. Because disasters are 
often succeeded by spectacular social transformations, they are 
of considerable methodological importance, for here certain 
social processes, unnoticed in more normal circumstances, 
appear in exaggerated or highly accelerated forms (Dynes 
1976:7; Killian 1956; Shader and Schwartz 1968:99). Strictly 
speaking, we cannot talk of the methods of disaster research 
for there are no special methods unique to this field. Its 
methods are the methods of social research, the available 
techniques are those of social research, the essential logic 
is that of social research. Interviews, observations, surveys, 
questionnaires, use of documents, sampling and experimental 
laboratory techniques are all methods that can be used by the 
researcher to study the social effects of disaster. Conducting 
research on communities just struck by a disaster confronts 
one with special problems. Since most disasters are 
unpredictable, one never knows where or when the next research 
opportunity will appear. Failure to begin data collection 
immediately may reduce its validity. Rarely is pre-impact 
data available, a necessary prerequisite for the observation 
of change induced by a disaster and a necessary ingredient to 
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recording the full impact of the disaster-agent on the 
community. Local co-operation may be adequate at the outset, 
but as more outsiders arrive with insurance, sales, welfare, 
news media reporters and other types of enquiries, research 
interviewers can become increasingly suspect in the eyes of 
the victims, and can become a 'nuisance' for the authorities 
who are attempting to control and organise activities to 
mitigate the impact of the disaster. For these and other 
numerous reasons, Drabek states that most disaster research 
has lacked much methodological sophistication (1970:331). 
In general, the validity of the conclusions drawn from any 
research rests upon the scientific adequacy of the methods 
by which the data are collected and analysed. 
Killian states: 
But, as 
"The use.of standard, proven methods does not 
in itself guarantee the production of valid, 
significant results. Much social science has 
been done which is methodologically impeccable 
but theoretically_and pragmatically insignificant 
because methods have been used mechanically and 
indiscriminately. Whatever the subject, methods 
should be carefully selected and skilfully adapted 
to meet the requirements of the particular area of 
research". 
(1956:1) 
Killian has said, 
t'There is no area of social research in which the 
scientist must operate with less freedom than in 
the field of disaster study. Controlled 
experiments, except in small-scale, simulated 
models, are forbidden the investigator. Since 
disasters are highly unpredictable, he rarely has. 
the opportunity to select the locus of his study 
before the disaster has occurred". 
(1956:4) 
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Usually the locus is determined for him by the unpredictable 
forces that produce disasters. Cases must be selected on the 
basis of the few variables that can be controlled, not in 
terms of the wide range of variables that it might be 
desirable to control. Indeed Killian states that "insistence 
on a large number of variables may lead to no research at all 
(1956:4). Killian is not advocating less rigorous models 
when the application of those models are oriented towards 
disaster research; he is pointing out that the lack of knowledge 
as to the time, place, and nature of the disaster means that 
"a specific research must be crystalized'hastily, with a 
limited knowledge of the situation" (1956:5; Cisin and Clark 
1962:25). 
Critical factors determining what actually happens 
when a given impact strikes a community are likely to include 
elements of geography, culture, demography, ecology and 
particularly social relationships and personalities which have 
their origin considerably further back in time than the week 
or two preceding the impact itself (Wallace 1956a:24). For a 
better overall understanding of the community in the disaster 
situation,a historical concept is beneficial so that the 
researcher can p~t the behaviour induced by disasters in 
context by comparing the new social system to the normal pre-
disaster scene. Basically, the methodological problems of 
field studies in disaster are those common to any effort to 
conduct scientifically valid field studies in the behavioural 
sciences. The disaster situation itself, however, creates 
special or aggravated problems for field studies. 
UHIVE!zs:rr o: C/.i·IITfHJURY 
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The initial entry into disaster research must be a 
set of descriptive studies, detailing the behaviour with which 
disaster research is concerned. Descriptive studies tend to 
be informal observational studies that attempt to answer the 
question: "Just what exactly happened?" Since, in any 
disaster, a great many things happen, it is perhaps inevitable 
that any descriptive studies characteristically reflect the 
selective perception of the observer. The newspaper 
reporters see one thing, the psychologist sees another, the 
sociologist still another. The descriptive studies serve 
the principal scientific purpose of introducing the researcher 
into an unfamiliar area and of steeping him in the phenomena 
to be studied more formally in the future. 
"The principal purpose of descriptive studies 
is the generation of hypotheses, the encouragement 
of insights and the beginnings of explanations". 
(Cisin and Clark 1962:38) 
Descriptive studies, particularly those employing formal 
survey methods, and structured interview techniques, tend to 
develop into analytic studies; studies reporting relationships 
between disaster behaviour as a dependent variable and other 
characteristics of the individual, family, community as 
independent vari~bles. To accomplish the purpose of reporting 
correlation coefficients, differential probabilities or 
distribution of proportions of people who behaved differently 
during a disaster, these analytic studies must forego the 
artistic insight-making of the descriptive studies and adopt 
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more formal ·:methods so as to ensure, for example, that every 
respondent is asked for information on the characteristic 
to be reported ·in relation to the disaster behaviour. 
Similarly, for dependent variables, the forms of disaster 
behaviour must be standardized so that relationships may be 
shown unequivocably. In planning such studies employing 
sampling survey methods and structured interview techniques, 
the researcher is obligated to decide in advance what items 
will be placed in the questionnaire, and is restricted to 
those items throughout his analysis. This rest~iction is the 
price paid for taking the next step toward hypothesis generation 
beyond that which one is able to accomplish in descriptive 
studies. The results of the analytic studies must be 
regarded as hypotheses rather than conclusions. 
'~t best an analytic study can be said to test 
hypotheses of relationship rather than hypotheses 
of explanation or causation. But without going 
through this step of observing relationships, it is 
extremely unlikely that an explanatory model can 
be constructed and explanatory hypotheses tested. 
(Cisin and Clark 1962:40) 
Research planning takes time, and as Killian points 
out (1956) time is what the researcher has least of in many 
disaster studies. Difficulty piles on difficulty at each step 
of the research, and the researcher often finds himself 
incapable of applying the rules he knows so well. 1 
1Refer, Bell, C. and Newby, H., Doing Sociological Research, 
(Allen and Unwin, London) 1977:10, for a discussion of the 
problems of normative and actual methodology in research. 
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"The carefully defined population that he would 
like to study is thoroughly disrupted; his 
sampling plan may be no more than a nonrandom 
selection of the personnel he can locate; his 
data-collection procedures suffer from trans-
portation and communication troubles. In short,im-
provisation has replaced method, and the quality 
of the results seem to depend on the researchers 
ingenuity rather than upon his scientific skill". 
(Cisin and Clark 1962:23) 
Perhaps the greatest problem in disaster research stems 
from the lack of time for careful investigation of the 
particular situation prior to data collection in the. field. 
This leaves the investigator with no choice but to work out a 
basic design for the disaster. Killian examines this 
question of determining whether the •availabl~ disaster will 
permit the application of the prepared design and recommends 
that the investigator keep not one, but several suitable, 
flexible designs in readiness. Then, 
" ••• if he has a more general model and set of 
hypotheses about the effects of different kinds 
of warnings ••• he can go into a wide variety of 
disasters and test some of his hypotheses". 
(Killian 1956:13) 
A preliminary reconnaissance of the disaster situation 
sho.uld always be made. This reconnaissance may be made by 
members of the r~search staff who can reach the scene quickly. 
News reports, particularly early bulletins, cannot be relied 
upon, for often they provide an incomplete, distorted picture 
of the situation. Hence, they should be supplemented by 
interviews with a few key personnel who are believed to be in 
a position of authority, even if they provide incomplete 
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information; these should be augmented with interviews and 
the observations of the victims themselves. To gather as 
complete information as possible, Killian also suggests that 
personnel to be interviewed should come from different levels 
of the hierarchy of the same organisation, as well as from 
different organisations, and a cross-section of the community 
should be attempted. 
No matter how 'open-ended' his research design and his 
data collection procedure, the investigator will be selective 
to some extent and he must have some general assumptions or 
hypotheses to guide him in the search for new variables and 
relationships. These should be explicitly stated, both to 
protect the investigator against his own biases and pre-
conceptions, and to guide him in the search for significant 
data. 
"The procedures for analysing disaster field-
study data are the ones a competent 
investigator would normally select to suit 
the research design and the data collected". 
(Killian 1956:32) 
This is not a special problem. A few of the customary 
problems tend to become exaggerated in the analysis of 
disaster studies however. 
"The first point is to urge the investigator 
to give very careful consi.deration to situational 
variables and matters of context in building a 
code or other analytical scheme ••• An analysis of 
the perceptions, motivations and actions of such 
subjects may be quite misleading if the code does 
not account for the possibility that some actions 
or some sources of information were physically 
unavailable to the actor". 
(Killian 1956:32) 
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The investigator will probably be unable to include all of 
the factors of situation, context and background in his code 
and keep it manageable, but he should make as certain as he 
can that he has included relevant variables to the particular 
hypothesis and relationships he wishes to analyse. 
4.2 Techniques of Obtaining Data 
1) Interviews 
The method which has been most widely used in disaster 
field-studies is the personal interview. Some researchers 
suggest that interviews must be used in such circumstances. 
Baker says, 
"In order to gather factual information, 
attitudes and opinions in communities ••• 
interviews should be administered". 
(1964:325) 
And, according to Baker, interviews should be administeTed: 
a) during the period when there should be a9 awareness 
that an impending threat could occur (for examp;J..e, in 
the case of tornado and hurricane-affected arefls, 
interviews should be conducted approximately ,six months 
before the season normally begins. When earthquake 
prediction becomes a reality, 'interviews should be 
conducted,when the prediction is publicised (refer 
Turner et al, 1979 as an example of interview data 
on the 'California Bulge'). This is the time when 
individual and group definitions of a disaster and 
their plans for coping with it can appreciably 
contribute to realistic and purposive behaviour at a 
later date. 
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b) at the time of disaster impact or as soon 
thereafter as a research team can move into the 
area. During this phase, the 'false alarm' can be 
studied if it is feasible and appropriate. 
c) about six months after the impact, the recovery and 
rehabilitation process of the community should again 
be studied, and this procedure should be repeated a 
year or so later. Ultimately, a third follow-up 
three to five years after the disaster should survey 
selected events. This plan is essential to an 
understanding of the effects of a disaster on social 
change. 
According to Killian, unless the research topic is very 
narrow and specific, the schedule and the questions which 
compose it should not be rigidly structured (1956:22). The 
extensive use of open-ended questions is usually desirable. 
The experience of disaster victims usually contain many 
detailed incidents of which the subjects recollection may be 
comprehensive but somewhat disorganised: "His (the victim) 
reactions may have many nuances, some of which are revealed 
in fugitive, oblique remarks" (Killian 1956:22). The use 
of limited-choice, direct questions may obscure some other 
significant material or deta.il. Furthermore, the subject 
may find it difficult to describe his experiences and 
reactions in precise terms. He must be given freedom to try 
out different responses as he gropes for one that 
satisfactorily expresses the thing he is trying to convey. 
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"If the researchers enter the field while rescue 
and clean-up operations are still in full-swing 
they are likely to find that many people do not 
have time to be interviewed. They may also find 
that there is pressure on them to become 
participants in these operations since the role 
of the scientists may appear callous and un-
sympathetic", 
(Killian 1956:30) 
or may be misunderstood by the victim population, and the 
scientist may be mistaken as another relief worker. Later 
in the emergency phase or early in the recovery stage, 
certain advantages accrue to the researcher from a reasonably 
early entry into the field, By this time many people have 
the time, particularly in the final recovery stage, to co-
operate as subjects, and the role of the scientist may be 
more acceptable to them. More importantly, there are 
indications that this is.the time when it is easiest to gain 
rapport wi~h the victims. Time and time again survivors of 
disasters have shown themselves eager to talk about their 
experiences in the recovery stage. The primary research 
tool here would be the interview, ranging from the structured 
and precoded instrument to the informal and unstructured one. 
There are no special problems in the interview technique that 
cannot be overcome with careful attention to the effectiveness 
of the schedule and the skill of the interviewer in obtaining 
and recording the data. Killian notes that 
"The greatest danger is not that the interviewer 
will appear unsympathetic to the respondent, but 
that he will become so identified with him that 
he drops the role of the scientific observer". 
(Killian 1956:23-4) 
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A further caution that Killian emphasises is that if 
researchers wish to gather material as accurately as they 
can, they must get to the disaster scene and commence research 
as soon as they can. People who have discussed their 
experiences with others (victims) in the community can rapidly 
assimilate inaccurate versions of the disaster. These 'group 
versions' may quickly become accepted by a large segment of 
the population (1956:30). 
2) Use of Documents 
Documents, both private and public, constitute an 
important source of data in the study of disasters. The use 
of public documents however (for example, newspaper reports) 
must be used with care. They are most useful when treated 
as sources of data complementing and supplementing first-
hand data collected from the subjects themselves. News 
stories are useful, particularly in the early stages of a 
study for the general, though tentative, description of the 
disaster which they provide. Although the bias of writers 
must be kept in mind, use may also be made of official 
records and reports of operations prepared by public and 
private organisations. Information can be gleaned from such 
documents as newspapers and radio reports, personal documents 
-
such as diaries and letters, and the reports of surveys and 
investigations made by police, insurance agents, relief 
agencies. 
3) Questionnaires 
"Perhaps it is because of the need for such a 
careful approach to the subject that 
questionnaires have been little used in 
disaster field studies. 
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(Killian 1956:21) 
The questionnaire method is inherently more impersonal than 
is the interview (the interview permits much more interaction 
between the interviewer and the subject). There is no 
reason, .however, why questionnaires should not be used more 
frequently if: 
"1) a clear convincing covering statement indicating 
the sponsorship, the purpose and the possible 
significance of the research accompanies the 
questionnaire; 
2) the research objectives are specified enough to 
permit the requisite data to be obtained with a 
brief instrument consisting of limited-choice 
questions; and 
3) the sample or entire population can be reached 
more easily, efficiently and quickly through the 
distribution of questionnaires than through 
personal interviews". 
(Killian 1956:21) 
The problems associated with questionnaires though may 
preclude the utility of them as a research method for 
obtaining precise data. The data obtained from questionnaires 
may only be a reflection of the attitudes of the respondents 
or, which is more likely to be the case, the response given in 
the questionnaire will be what the respondent thinks he should 
put down, or what he thinks the interviewer wants to receive. 
The probability that questionnaire responses will be an 
indication of the actual behaviour of the respondents is some-
thing that Oppenheim suggests is problematic when this 
technique is used to obtain social behaviour (refer 
Oppenheim 1972:7). 
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4) Probability Sampling 
This technique has been used less frequently in 
disaster research than in other social science field studies. 
This is largely because conditions make it difficult to 
define, locate and reach the population to be sampled. In 
spite of the problems of sampling in a disaster area, 
probability sampling should be used as fully as possible 
whenever conclusions are to be stated in quantitative terms, 
for generalisation to any entire community or other known 
problems. This is particularly true when the findings relate 
to the frequency and distribution of various types of 
individual behaviour, attitudes or emotional reactions. More 
frequent use of rigorous sampling procedures is nee~ed before 
the knowledge existing about the types of behaviour and 
events which occur in disasters can be translated into the 
knowledge about the frequency with which they ocpur under 
specified conditions. However, the use of sa~pling 
procedures is dependent on such variables as the size of the 
population in the impact area, the nature of the disaster 
community, and the hypotheses the investigator is testing. 
Where physical destruction or evacuation have resulted 
in displacement of portions of the pre-disaster population, 
special problems arise. In this case it is necessary to 
reconstruct the composition of the pre-disaster population 
from available records. 
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5) Experimental Laboratory Techniques 
Disaster is often said to constitute a 'unique 
laboratory' for the study of individuals and group behaviour 
under extreme stress. But a laboratory is useful only if we 
know what we want to study in it, and if we make observations 
and measurements systematically and relate them to hypotheses 
and theoretical models. 
"The 'disaster laboratory' has not been 
adequately utilized because little attention 
has been paid to the development of sets of 
propositions that can be tested as further 
disasters are studied; and because the methods 
used have not progressed from the laboratory 
to the systematic". 
(Merton 1969:LVI) 
The reason why this is so could be because of the 
moral and ethical issues associated with laboratory 
experiments using humans as guinea pigs (refer McGee et al 
1977:40-43). 
Exploratory studies alert us to what we should measure 
and explain, but it requires quantitative surveys to tell us 
how 'typical' certain tYPes of individual behaviours are and 
to show their relationships to social background and 
situational factors. 
Experimentation is necessarily sharply limited by the 
fact that the extreme stresses of disaster situations cannot 
in practice be reproduced under controlled conditions. In the 
laboratory one can produce very frightening (and even 
traumatic) experiences, but must stop short of those which 
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constitute a real threat to the existences and health of the 
subjects involved; actual disasters do not •stop short•. An 
experiment cannot introduce the disaster stresses of over-
whelming threat of life and limb, or sudden destruction of kin 
and intimates, of the pain and shock of personal serious 
injury and loss of homes and possessions. 
The laboratory, however, 
" ••• makes it possible for researchers to test the 
adequacy of conceptualization by making the 
relevant processes happen under conditions of 
careful control and measurement. Although it is 
not always strictly the case, laboratory 
experimentation usually depends upon the 
definition of problems originating in our 
observations of nature and the development of 
theories about the processes that underlie what 
is observed". 
(Lazarus 1964:35) 
4.3 Limitations on Disaster Research 
The securing of data relatively free from bias is 
important to all social research, but the great emotional 
impact of disasters may bring about greater distortions than 
are found in most situations. The problem of securing the 
co-operation of the subjects does not seem to present great 
difficulties. Killian points out that "people are generally 
willing to speak of their disaster experiences if they feel 
that these experiences are not exploited" (Cisin and Clark 
1962:27). Disaster field studies are beset with one 
particular problem probably even more than in most social 
science field studies. This is the difficulty in establishing 
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controls over the variables to be investigated, either 
through experimental control, statistical inference or 
exhaustive in-depth study. There are a number of factors 
which operate to reduce both the quantity and quality of 
research on disasters and which, as a practical matter, can 
only partially be overcome. Wallace lists five factors: 
unobservability; interviewing the dead; time lag; relevance of 
clinical and laboratory observations; and the emotional 
resistance of researchers. 
(1) Unobservability - Many types of disasters ~ave 
inherent relative unobservability. Disasters, generally 
speaking, are so unpredictable as to place ~nd time, that it 
is unlikely that any given team of trained observers will be 
in an impact area before and during an impact of tne 
appropriate type. However, some disaster~agents can be 
predicted, for example floods, or else the period of impact 
is so long, for example epidemics, that observers can reach 
the impact area during the impact. Furthermore, an extreme 
situation is likely to be as extreme for the participant-
observer as for anyone else, and if it is, he may be unable to 
make the desired observations or to preserve his records. 
(2) You Cannot Interview the Dead - Those who did 
not survive an extreme situation are as important subjects of 
investigation as those who did, and in order to answer the 
question "Why did group A survive and not Group B?" some 
account ought to be taken of the behaviour of the dead prior 
to their deaths, if it can be obtained. 
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(3) Time lag- In order to make an adequate study of 
a disaster, more information is likely to be required than 
can be obtained during the period of disaster itself, 
especially if entry into the impact area and access to local 
informants cannot be obtained immediately. Hence, any 
disaster study becomes in part an historical study, with some 
resulting advantages but some obvious disadvantages also, such 
as loss of records, defects and distortions of memory and 
dispersal .of informants. 
(4) Relevance of Clinical and laboratory Observations -
Generalizations from clinical and laboratory experience·to 
practical disaster situations can undoubtedly contribute much, 
but the extent and relevance of clinical/laboratory findings is 
difficult to estimate because the total extreme situation 
cannot usually be reproduced in laboratories or clinics, and 
the usefulness of analogies is often a matter of opinion, not 
demonstration. 
(5) Emotional Resistance of the Researcher - Extreme 
situations elicit extreme emotions and extreme behaviour. The 
researcher runs the gauntlet between being effectively swamped 
in the field situations and over-intellectualizing his 
approach. Any sort of field-work has emotionally strenuous 
moments and aspects: rejection by the subject; guilt over 
playing a passive role or an impersonal role in a situation 
where active assistance would be more appreciated (role 
conflict); misunderstanding and mis-handling the subject. On 
the other hand, over-intellectualizing either by way of quasi-
obsessional efforts to 'interpret' behaviour in terms of some 
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system or psychiatric terminology, or a retreat 
behind a facade of methodological pseudo rigorousness and a 
refusal to observe any but the grossest and least emotionally 
tinged dimensions of the event, can result in virtually 
useless work. 
"Research on human behaviour in extreme 
situations requires a delicate balance of 
identification with the human object of 
research and of intellectual detachment". 
(Wallace 1956a:27-8) 
One further point to note: No matter how narrow 
the interest and how well crystallized the design, every 
disaster field-study should make provision for securing an 
adequate description of the overall situation and sequence 
of events. 
"This is particularly important in disaster 
because situational variables are so often 
important in determining human behaviour; 
when it struck, what was destroyed or 
damaged; casualties, conditions of routes 
of egress and ingress; and similiar detail 
should be established. The general sequence 
of events should be discovered". 
(Killian 1956:7) 
4.4 Methods in the Analysis of the 1968 Inangahua 
Earthquake Study 
Research into the Inangahua earthquake began in 1978 
and was conducteq primarily by the use of two data-collecting 
techniques. The first involved a ten month period of document 
research into the earthquake, reading and taking notes from all 
the available literature published on the earthquake. 
Included in this ten month period was the gaining of access to 
and recording relevant information from Government and other 
organisational files and reports, not previously published. 
The second approach to obtain data began in October 1978 
with a series of trips to Inangahua, Reefton, Westport, 
Greymouth and within Christchurch to interview people who had 
been living in Inangahua at the time of the event, or had 
been involved in the rescue/recovery of the township of 
Inangahua after the earthquake. 
(1) Use of Documents 
There were many publications on the Inangahua·earth 
quake which concentrated on the geophysical, geological and 
seismological characteristics, and on the physical damage 
sustained during the earthquake (refer Bird 1969; Adams et al 
1971, 1968; Shepherd et al 1970; New Zealand Society for 
Earthquake Engineering Journal 1969; Randal 1970; New Zealand 
Official Yearbook 1969; Westport Borough Council 1969). These 
provided useful sources for gaining a background and a working 
knowledge of the physical effects that the earthquake had upon 
the landscape, the building structures, and communication 
routes. The Ministry of Civil Defence, the Regional Civil 
Defenc.e Organisations and Parliamentary papers provided initial 
information on the Government Departments' roles during the 
emergency and presented some preliminary insights into the 
social effects of the earthquake (refer N.Z. Ministry of Civil 
Defence 1970; House of Representatives 1968; Buller Combined 
Civil Defence District 1968). Publications presenting a 
generalized picture of the earthquake and the physical/social 
consequences were also available (refer Grayland 1978; 
Milne 1974). 
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Based on information extracted from the above sources, 
letters were written to the executive officers of Government 
Departments, organisations and associations that were actively 
involved in assisting the earthquake-stricken town of 
Inangahua, either by providing personnel or by deploying 
services, finance or plant to that town during the emergency 
or post-emergency period. These letters requested access to 
files on the earthquake and the names of any key personnel 
who were engaged on behalf of their Department/Organisation 
(see Appendix for a copy of the letter). 
Response was exceptional; all the recipient.s ryplied to 
the letter of request (only one letter to each re~ipifnt was 
necessary before a reply was received), informing that 
documentation of their involvement in the In~n~ahua earthquake 
was available for research purposes; or that ·.t-heir 
participation was minimal and they housed /qo record~ 
concerning the earthquake. In all cases, the re9iBients 
provided names of key personnel, either within th~ir own 
organisation, or of those persons in other organisations whom 
they believed could be of assistance. As a result of this 
exercise, files, reports and other documentation (for example, 
letters, newspaper clippings) were obtained from the 
following sources:· 
Civil Defence Organisation: The Ministry of Civil Defence, 
Wellington 
The Southern Regional Headquarters, 
Christchurch 
Reefton Civil Defence 
Westport Civil Defence 
New Zealand Police Department: Christchurch 
: Greymouth 
New Zealand Red Cross Society (Inc.): Wellington 
: Westport 
Ministry of Works: Christchurch 
County Council Offices: Reefton 
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: Westport (Buller County Council) 
: Greymouth 
Department of Education: Christchurch 
: Nelson 
Internal Affairs Department: Wellington 
Ministry of Transport: Greymouth 
Letters were also written, and interviews were held 
with specialists and experts for information.not avai~able 
in publications or files, that was necessary ·for obt~ining 
precise details on some matters. Newspaper reports were 
obtained from the University of Canterbury Library, the 
Library of the Christchurch 'Press' Office, and from private 
individuals, which augmented data on the earthquake. These 
sources (the published articles, monographs, documents and 
files from organisations, letters and interviews, and 
newspaper reports) provided the framework from which the 
chronology of the earthquake, the effect of the earthquake 
and the stages of the recovery/rehabilitation were 
established. 
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(2) Interviews 
In September 1978, a letter (see Appendix) was sent to 
fourteen (14) residents who were living at Inangahua in 1978 
who were known to have lived in the area in 1968 at the time 
of the earthquake (these residents were selected by going 
through the 1968 Telephone Directory and the 1978 Telephone 
Directory; those names that appeared in both Directories 
were sent a letter). Of these 14, eight (57,&) replied via the 
stamped return-address envelope provided, stating they would 
be willing to talk about the earthquake. A month later 
in October 1978, a further letter was sent to these eight 
people, thanking them for their reply and informing them 
that I would be in Inangahua the following week (see Appendix). 
The first trip to Inangahua lasted four days, in which 
time the eight respondents were interviewed, using an 
unstructured interview technique conducted in the respondent's 
own home. Allmterviews were tape-recorded. The technique 
of data-collection was as follows: 
1) I elaborated on the purpose of my visit, expanding 
the information which I had written in my letter 
to them, indicating the purpose of my visit and 
the interview. 
2) I then asked the respondent to recall, in their own 
words, what they could remember about the earth-
quake. The purpose behind this strategy was to 
get the respondent to 'relive• the earthquake 
experience and to get them back into the situation 
which they had been in a decade before. I did not 
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interrupt or direct this period of the respondent 
recalling the earthquake in any way, but let the 
respondent feel his/her own way back into the 
earthquake situation. 
3) After the respondent had exhausted his/her immediate 
recollection of the situation, we then went back 
over the period of the earthquake and the post-
impact stages in a more structured format, with 
the respondent answering pre-determined questions. 
The questions were not asked in any order, but 
were put to the respondent in the sequence in 
which the conversation/interview was proceeding. 
The above technique was used because of the long time-
gap between the onset of the earthquake in May 1968, and the 
time of interviewing, which extended for months (October 1978 -
August 1979). An interview technique had to be developed 
which allowed the respondents to recall the events that had 
happened a decade before with a high degree of accuracy and 
a well-developed chronology. 
·These intervi.ews were then typed in full and were used 
as a guide to test if all the relevant information was 
gathered that was considered necessary for the completion of 
the study. Key personnel from Government departments and 
organisations were also interviewed, based again on the 
unstructured interview, either in the respondents home or 
place of work. These respondents were asked different 
questions from those that were posed to the Inangahua 
residents; information from these personnel was required on the 
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basis of their prescribed roles as well as their personal 
experience in the disaster situation. 
Based on Coleman's "snow-ball sampling method" 
(1970:520), a resident of Inangahua,whom !came to know fairly 
well in the initial interview period, was contacted and asked 
if she could supply me with the names of as many people as 
she could, who had been in the 1968 earthquake at Inangahua, 
who I had not already interviewed, and who would consent to 
talk to me about the earthquake and their experiences at the 
time of the event. As a consequence, a further sixteen (16) 
Inangahua residents were interviewed, again using the 
unstructured interview technique applied in their own po~es. 
In all, 24 people from Inangahua, representing 72 residents 
who were in Inangahua at the time of the earthquake (spouse 
and children), or 24 per cent of the to~al lnangahv.a township 
and surrounding farming homesteads were intervi~wed. A 
further eleven (11) respondents, representin~. various 
Government departments and organisations were interviewed,.a 
total of 35 people. A list of the interviewees, along with a 
brief biographical sketch is attached (see Appendix). 
· All subsequent interviews were tape-recorded and trans-
cribed in full. The task then, was to see if, and how well, 
the respondents experiences and actions at the time of the 
earthquake, and immediately after the disaster, fitted into 
Powell and Rayner's model of disaster-time. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE INANGAHUA EARTHQUAKE 
5.1 Introduction 
Almost all of the literature on natural disaster 
research refers to disasters that are large-scale, either in 
terms of geographical area, monetary and material (physical) 
loss, human loss of life and/or injury, or a combination of 
the above. The propensity of large-scale disasters pre-
dominating in the literature leads one to question whether the 
use of models and general observations that have been proposed 
will have applicability for those disaster situations that are 
not 'Large' in terms of geographical area, economic cost 
or human loss. 1 
The 1968 earthquake, although it was felt throughout 
New Zealand, was relatively confined in its destructive 
damage. The focal area was the West Coast, South Island 
township of Inangahua, a settlement of about one hundred 
dwellings and buildings with a population of about 250. 
Reefton, Greymouth, Westport and Hokitika (the principal West 
Coast population centres with a combined population of 17,130 
in 19682 ) felt the effect of the earthquake to some extent, but 
damage in these areas could in no way be considered 
disastrous or completely destructive. 
1A disaster may occur in accordance with the definition of 
disaster proposed in Chapter I, yet may not be large scale in 
terms of the characteristics above. 
2New Zealand Official Yearbook 1969, pp. 67-68 (Government 
Printer, Wellington). 
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In terms of money loss, the Inangahua earthquake 
(Richter magnitude 7) disaster, even by New Zealand standards, 
was relatively small. The cost amounted to $NZ 4.2 million. 
Compare this with other 'large-scale' earthquake disasters 
throughout the world - the 8.3 Richter magnitude 1906 
San Francisco earthquake which cost $US 350 million; 
$US 190 million for the Anchorage (Alaska) earthquake, which 
registered 8 on the Richter scale; and $US 500 million for the 
1972 5.6 Richter magnitude earthquake in Managua (Nicaragua) 
(Haas et al, 1977). 
In terms of human life lost, the 1968 Inangahua earth 
quake had minimal loss of life - one dead as a direct result of 
the earthquake, two more indirectly, and another three as a 
result of a helicopter accident in the recovery period: a total 
of six dead. This represents 0.6 per cent of the total 
population of the Inangahua township area. The 1972 Managua 
earthquake left 1 per cent of the 405,000 people dead (over 
4,000) and 16,000 injured; the San Francisco earthquake left 
550 dead and 220,000 homeless in a city of 400,000 (app-
roxima te ly 0.1 per cent of the population dead) • The 1976 
Tangshan (China) earthquake (7.8 Richter magnitude) left an 
unknown number of dead (statistics have been unavailable from 
official sources); but it is believed to run into the tens 
of thousands; in the 1979 Yugoslavian earthquake, the resort 
town of Kotor was completely devastated with the resultant 
loss of 200 lives. 
On the scale of the above earthquake disasters, the 
Inangahua earthquake was not large scale. But nevertheless 
it was one in which a habited geographical area was devastated 
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by a natural disaster. The differences between Inangahua, San 
Francisco, Managua, Anchorage, Tangshan and Kotor are 
differences in scale (both in terms of the magnitude of the 
earthquake, but more importantly, in terms of population 
density, and type of buildings), not kind, and unless it can 
be proved that scale affects individual attributes in a 
disaster situation, the research that has been carried out in 
this area of natural disaster research should be appropriate 
for the analysis of small-scale disasters such as the 1968 
Inangahua earthquake. 
Some features are bound to be different because of 
the number of people living in the area and the life-styles 
that the people have'adopted. Inangahua, for example, has 
no multi-storeyed apartment .buildings or large commercial 
buildings; no major industrial, commercial or residential 
area; no major internal motorways or complex transportation 
systems, nor a dense vehicle population (all characteristics 
of large cities); it has no industrial plant to shut down; and 
most of the population in the Inangahua district are involved 
in primary as opposed to secondary interactions. 
There are other conditions that may affect the responses 
of people living in small rural communities that are 
different in kind t9 those that are believed to exist in larger 
communities. For example, it is probably more universal that 
family members are greater distances apart at certain times of 
the day in large cities than they are in smaller communities, 
and the members who are separated from the family will be 
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different (for example, in the city, the working father is 
more likely to have to travel greater distances from his home 
to his place of work; whereas in the rural communities it is 
the children who have to travel further from their homes to 
school - a 50 kilometre round-trip each school day for the 
post-primary school children living in Inangahua). The 
relative isolation of the farming homesteads, combined with 
the greater primary interaction that is characteristic of 
rural communities may compound anxiety levels if the family 
units are _cut off from their neighbours by the disaster agent. 
No research has been undertaken to determine whether 
these differences do exist and if they play any role in the 
social behaviour of people in small communities that have 
undergone a 'crisis situation' (Stallings 1973:318). The 
Inangahua earthquake study may provide the initial findings 
for such comparative research. 
5.2 Pre-Emergency State 
5.2.1 Pre Warning. The Inangahua Area Before Impact 
A) A Short History of the Inangahua Junction Region 
To the average New Zealander, mention of the West Coast 
conjures up visions of rugged mountains, forests, rain, gold 
and coal. Inevitably the mind seems to drift back to the past, 
especially to the 'Golden Era• of the 1860's, with visions 
comparable to the American 'wild west• at its best. 
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The early history of the West Coast goes back to the 
middle of the seventeenth century when Tasman sailed along 
part of the coast and reported a "large high-lying land". Not 
until Cook sailed past in 1770 was the West Coast again seen 
by European eyes. His summing up - "No country on God's earth 
can appear with a more rugged and barren aspect as this" - gave 
little incentive for further investigation. 
In 1846 Charles Brunner set out from Nelson settlement 
to explore the West Coast and to investigate its resources 
and potentialities for settlement. Brunner passed through 
the area now known as Inangahua on April 10, 1847, when he went 
through the junction of the Buller and Inangahua Rivers. He 
was the first to report on the coal deposits of the area, but 
his main impression was of bush-clad mountainous country with 
few resources, and no prospects for settlement. His report 
aroused no interest in the area, and it was over ten years 
before further investigations were carried out. In the 1850's 
explorations, coal, timber, gold and open land supposedly 
capable of agricultural development were reported. 
The beginning of the gold industry in New Zealand may 
be dated from 1857 (Harrop 1923:41). In 1864-5, 6,000 diggers 
left the Otago region and the majority crossed over the 
Southern Alps to the West Coast. From 1865 Westland ranks as 
a great gold-producing region, and in 1866 mining was 
beginning in Inangahua. In December 1862, Simon Epapara, a 
Maori, discovered gold at the Lyell which led Europeans to the 
area. They would have had to pass through the area of the 
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junction of the Buller and Inangahua Rivers to get to the mine 
area. John Redman discovered gold in the Inangahua Valley 
in 1866, near Cronadun at Redmans Creek. This led to a rush 
into the area. The alluvial mines were supplied by boats 
coming up from Westport through the river junction to Inangahua 
Landing. 
A thousand men were working in the tributary creeks 
of the Inangahua searching for gold (see Map I) in 1866. 
But the Inangahua area had poorer fields than other Westland 
areas - by 1870 the area was almost deserted. This was 
compounded by the fact that there was a high cost of bringing 
in supplies by packhorse or canoe to the Inangahua Valley. 
Boat traffic up the Buller River and the Inangahua as far as 
Emmanuels Flat (The Landing) started. In favourable conditions 
boats could work the Buller up to the Landing confluence, then 
up the Inangahua River to the Landing, the farthest that a 
small boat could reach (refer Map II). 
In 1867 William Lloyd was granted a free Publican's 
licence at Inangahua Junction provided he kept a ferry-boat 
available at all times. He was probably the first in this area 
with a hotel. From the list in the Sale of Spiritous 
Liquors, under the 'Goldfields Licensing Act 1872' comes the 
following information about the Inangahua Junction area: 
- Inangahua crossing - G.W. Thompson, Fee 15/-. Conditions: 
good accommodation for travelling. Good lamp to swim horse 
over the Inangahua. 
- Half a mile below the Junction of the Inangahua and Buller 
Rivers is William Stewart. Fee 5/-. Conditions: Good 
accommodation for the traveller. 
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- At the junction of the Inangahua and Buller confluence 
is Reuben Waite. Fee 10/-. Conditions: Ferry boat over 
the Inangahua. 
- Crossing .of Inangahua to Lyell by Christian Minderman. 
Fee 10/-. Conditions: Good accommodation. Good lamp. 
Ferry boat on Inangahua River. 
The Inangahua Junction is at the confluence of the 
Inangahua and the Buller Rivers. Inanga means 'whitebait' 
in the Maori language; hua probably refers to the preserving of 
the fish by drying in the sun and packing into hermetically 
sealed containers. The settlement was once known as Christy's 
Junction. Christy's Junction was named after Christian 
Minderman and most maps around 1872 show it as such. Christian 
Minderman emerged as the key personality of the area. 
It seems that the Junction of the Buller and the 
Inangahua was also given the ti~ of Charles Junction (date 
unknown). This would appear to be after 1872 because Charles 
Broad, who was the first Warden and resident magistrate of 
the Inangahua Goldfields, paid regular visits to the Lyell 
to hold court after this date. This must have only been a 
local name for the area because Christy's Hotel was the site 
of a few court sittings under Dr. Joseph Giles, Warden and 
resident magistrate of Westport in November, 1870. These 
sittings were given the official title of the Inangahua 
Junction Warden's Court. 
The Inangahua River also has had a name change, the 
river was first named the Thackeray, but this name was soon 
dropped. 
Inangahua Junction is a farming and mining district 
at the- confluence of the Inangahua and Buller Rivers. The 
settlement is on the south bank of the Buller and on the 
west bank of the Inangahua. It is in Boatman's Riding of 
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the Inangahua County in the electoral district of Nelson. The 
Junction is 26 miles (41 Km) from Westport, 12 miles (19 Km) 
from Lyell, and 111 miles (177 Km) from Nelson (refer Map III). 
Around the early 1860's roads and tracks permitted a 
six-day journey from Nelson to Westport, a distance of 150 miles 
by dray. This communication link went via Inangahua. Junction. 
The Junction was established because of the coaph road to 
Westport. Coaches arrived daily from Reefton and Westport, 
a·nd twice weekly from Nelson. Earlier, John Blacket, a young 
and vigorous Provincial Engineer, presented a report on a 
special survey of the whole of the }3uller regioi).. His plan 
called for the laying out of a township where the Inangahua 
joined the Buller River, and a ferry for the ford so that 
prospectors could carry on up to the Lyell Creek digging area. 
The road to Reefton was constructed in 1872. 
In the closing months of 1867 a reconnaissance survey 
had begun for a railway line down the Buller Gorge to Westport 
with another by w~y of Inangahua, Little Grey River and the 
Grey Valley to Cobden. During the development of the railway 
on the West Coast there have been shifts of emphasis in the 
commodities carried and the importance of various stations. 
The three main stations, Greymouth, Hokitika and Westport, 
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serve as rail depots with a minor depot at Inangahua Junction. 
The Reefton-Inangahua section of the railway was commenced in 
1903 and completed to the Junction in 1914. The Westport-
Inangahua Junction line was completed in 1940. Today, much 
produce, including all the export butter produced in this 
region, is sent by truck to the Junction, then by rail to 
Lyttelton (Christchurch) or to other South Island outlets. 
Road freight volumes through the Junction have increased over 
the years. 
The Inangahua township is surrounded by State Forest. 
This region, in its heyday,produced almost 12 per cent of the 
West Coast Timber. The economic function of the Junction area 
in the 1960's, apart from the farming interests were:- most 
employment was provided by the Ministry of Works,two sawmills, 
a New Zealand Electricity Department substation, plus 
the Railway Department, a truck depot, a hotel and two 
contracting firms. There was also a Post Office, a two-teacher 
primary school, a butcher's shop and a church. In 1968 
the population of the township was approximately 240 (in 1901 
the census figure was 98). In 1968 Inangahua was really 
two settlements: the Junction and 'The Camp'. They are 
exactly one mile apart with the Inangahua River running between 
them. The Junction's centre is around a hotel, a Post Office, 
the local primary school and a store. The 'Camp' is the 
popular (Map IV) name given to the Ministry of Works 
residential settlement. Shortly after the 1968 earthquake 
the two sawmills closed down, the hotel closed, as did the 
tearooms. The 1979 population stands at 135. 
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B) Counter-Measure Agencies in the Inangahua Area 
Agencies or organisations, part or all of whose mission 
is to prevent, mitigate or relieve physical disaster, are 
usually found in most areas of large population settlements. 
This includes such agencies as the Police Department, the Fire 
Department, hospitals, ambulance services, doctors, Civil 
Defence, Red Cross, the Salvation Army, Church organisations 
and other. volunteer organisations. 
Because of the population size, the township of 
Inangahua Junction had no institutionalised agencies for the 
prevention, mitigation and relief of disasters, All these 
services, if needed, had to come from outside the township. 
The township was too small to have its own police force. The 
policeman stationed at Murchison, 50 kilometres away, had 
Inangahua township within his jurisdiction, and he visited 
the settlement every week. The nearest fire station, a 
volunteer organisation, was situated at Reefton. The nearest 
permanent fire station personnel were at Westport, 50 kilometres 
to the west. Inangahua Junction had no doctor, but one of the 
residents was a qualified nurse, who proved invaluable as the 
drama o·r 24th May unfolded. 
Reefton Hospital was the closest medical centre for 
Inangahua. There was no Civil Defence organisation in the 
Inangahua community; in fact the Civil Defence organisation was 
in its infancy throughout the West Coast region. A Civil 
Defence plan was outlined for the Reefton-Inangahua area and was 
presented to the Regional Commissioner at Christchurch in 1964. 
The plan though was based on Reefton and all the personnel 
resided in that township. The swearing in of personnel to 
form the R~efton Civil Defence occurred in 1965 in the 
Inangahua County Council Chambers. On 7 October 1965, the 
initial meeting of the Reefton Civil Defence Police was held. 
In September 1967 the Reefton Civil Defence organised an 
exercise to simulate a disaster - 'Operation Hotspot' - pre-
supposing that an earthquake confined to the central section 
of Broadway (the main street) had occurred during the early 
hours of the morning and a fire had swept through the shopping 
block. This was the first and last exercise that the Reefton 
Civil Defence organisation carried out before the earthquake 
of 24th May 1968. 
In Novemb'er 1967, one of the Inangahua County 
Councillors and a member of the Reefton Civil Defence 
organisation attended a Controller's Course at Lincoln College, 
Christchurch. In December 1967 another Councillor attended a 
Civil Defence Warden's Course at Lincoln College. 
In April 1968, the Reefton Police constable, who had 
been engaged in the instigation of the Reefton Civil Defence, 
discussed the existing Civil Defence plan at the Council 
meeting. He pointed out the plan had serious flaws in it as it 
stood, and, as such, it should be altered. A remit was passed 
to discuss this suggestion in full at the next Council meeting 
on April 30, 1968. 
On 30th April 1968, the Police constable gave his 
proposal for a different format of staff requirements for Civil 
Defence personnel. All Civil Defence positions were filled, 
people appointed to positions that had previously been vacated 
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because of movement away from the township. A meeting was 
arranged to be held on 2nd May 1968, bringing in the Council 
and the new appointees to the Civil Defence fold. On 2nd May 
the Reefton Police Constable detailed individual duties and 
answered questions by the new appointees. He stated that each 
offi~er should endeavour to provide a plan for their particular 
section within the overall context of the Reefton Civil 
Defence plan. A meeting was arranged for 30th May 1968 to 
discuss these plans, which would detail the functions of the 
various sections and their personnel in the event of a 
disaste~ in the area •••• 
C) The New Zealander and the West Coaster 
Attempts to assess the 'social climate' of New Zealand, 
or to portray the 'New Zealand character' rests on a very 
tenuous foundation. A more tenuous assessment exists when 
attempting to portray the 'West Coast character', although 
it is regarded as a 'fact' that one can tell a West Coaster 
a mile away: 
"Many New Zealanders in other cities can pick a 
West Coaster almost immediately, sometimes after 
hearing only a few words. That is because, 
although the Coasters like to consider themselves 
as a collection of individuals, many of them have 
characteristics of speech,mannerisms, and of an 
attitude toward life in general, and authority in 
particular, which speedily stamps them as coming 
from the western side of the Southern Alps"• 
(Hobbs 1959:145) 
There is agreement of specific features of the New 
Zealand character (Hobbs 1959; McCaskill 1966; Hall 1966; 
Mitchell 1972; Johnston 1976; Milne 1966; Willmott 1975; 
Parr 1974). One outstanding feature of New Zealand life is 
its tendency towards equality (Willmott 1975; Parr 1974; 
Mitchell 1972; Johnston 1976). Parr, in his paper states: 
"A high degree of commitment to an egalitarian 
ideology to all levels of life, including the 
national, is a cultural value that makes New 
Zealand society unique in comparison to most 
democratic societies. The development and 
operation of social welfare programmes, plus 
considerable equality of incomes are character-
istic of New Zealand life that are not manifested 
to such a high degree in many other societies". 
(1974:5)1 
New Zealand also owes much of its national character to 
the smallness of its population (Mitchell 1972:20; Willmott 
1975; Parr 1974:3). This smallness of population leads to 
other characteristics, for example, a high level of public 
morality. Willmott states that the high degree of trust, 
the willingness to go out of one's way, "even to take 
risks (1975:26) for the benefit of strangers;'and a strong 
commitment to the Commonweal· are attributes of New Zealand 
culture that comprises what he calls "a high level of public 
morality" (1975:26) that distinguishes New Zealand culture 
and life styles from other western societies. 
Another prominent New Zealand characteristic is 
pragmatism (Milne 1966:8), what Siegfried called the lack of 
"principle, convi6tions, reasoned beliefs" (1914:62). Milne 
also states that it "is not difficult to find evidence of 
social conservatism in New Zealand" (1966:8-9; see also 
Mitchell 1972; Johnston 1976:29). 
1This point of view is now under some criticism, particularly in 
more recent years, arguments have suggested that inequality is 
growing (refer George Bryant, The Widening Ga~: Poverty in New 
Zealand, (Cassell, New Zealand) 1979; Kilmart~n c. and Thorns 
D.C., Cities Unlimited (Allen and Unwin, Australia), 1978). 
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West Coast inhabitants are regarded as being an 
exaggeration of the New Zealand character, they are rougher, 
tougher and drink more, have less regard for the law, reflect 
the pioneer tradition and are hard-working outdoor types. 
Further~the West Coast itself is regarded as a 'frontier 
society' (Kay 1966; Hall 1966:29). Hall states that the 
West Coast conditions are still "more primitive than most other 
parts of the country" (1966:29). The West Coast region, 
because of this "cultural and physical barrier" (Ward 1976:22), 
and because the region is still regarded as an "economically 
depressed area" (Franklin 1976:279-80), has offered a· partial 
explanation why the inhabitants of the West Coast have a 
greater sense of isolation, and they have engendered a greater 
sense of community (Hobbs 1959: 148, 149). This has also 
resulted in a deep attachment to the region and to fellow West 
Coasters (Ward 1976: 22; Hobbs 1959:148). 
New Zealanders have long recognised the distinctive 
qualities of the narrow rain-drenched strip of lowland, known 
simply as "The West Coast" - there is little fear of confusing 
it with any other west coast in New Zealand (McCaskill 1966). 
Extractive industries, gold mining, coal mining and timber 
milling have formed the basis of settlement in contrast to 
the prevailing New Zealand economy which is primarily based 
on grassland farming and livestock rearing. Mines, timber 
mills, logging, gold mining, quartz mining and dredging 
are more hazardous occupations than many other types of 
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occupation. 1 As well as the high rate of industrial accidents, 
the West Coast has had a long tradition of both man-made and 
natural disaster/emergency situations, ranging from mine 
explosions, floods, bushfires, tunnel collapse, hurricanes 
and earthquakes (refer Grayland 1957: 1978; Soil Conservation 
and River Control Council 1957). The contribution of these 
disaster/emergency situations, and th'e high rate of accidents 
associated with hazardous occupations may contribute to the 
West Coast people adopting processes that have enabled them 
to internalize the consequences of crisis situations. They 
may have a higher level of preparedness due to greater 
experience of prior crisis situations. 
D) Earthquakes in the Inangahua Area 
Between the June 17, 1929 (Murchison) earthquake and the 
May 24 1968 (Inangahua) earthquake, there were 110 earthquakes 
of Richter magnitude 4.5 or above, that had their epicentres 
between latitude 41-43 degrees and longitude 170-173 degrees 
1 In the Greymouth De~artment of Labour area (which covers the 
West Coast district), 50.7% of all reported industrial 
accidents were recorded in mining and quarrying jobs. The 
remainder (49.3%) were received by injuries sustained in 
agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing,manufacturing, commerce, 
transportation and storage, and tertiary industries {refer 
Report on the Industrial Accidents Statistics of New Zealand 
Department of Statistics 1963, page 39.) By 1968 the 
percentages had remained similar - 49.7% of all accidents 
registered in the Department of Labour,Greymouth, resulted 
in mining and quarrying (1968:26). Taking the case of the 
mining and quarrying occupations and the resultant accidents 
in 1961 36% of all such accidents reported in New Zealand were 
recorded in the West Coast district. By 1968 this percentage 
had risen to 44% (1968:26). In 1961, 30% of the West Coast 
population was involved in mining and quarrying, forestry ax;d 
logging. By 1968 this percentage had fallen to 24.7%. Not1ce 
the decline of involvement within this occupation group but a 
rise in the accident rate (refer Report on Prices, Wages and 
Labour Statistics of N.Z. (Dept. of Statistics), 1962:61; 
1969:62). 
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(the Inangahua earthquake epicentre was 41.77 degrees, 
172.01 degrees). 1 It is taken for granted that the majority 
of these earth tremors were felt by the people of Inangahua 
Junction who inhabited the township during 1929-1968. Simpson-
House1y narrows the ,geographical area further and states that 
"(In) the Reefton area between 1925 and 1975, 28 earthquakes 
of Modified Mercalli 5 or more have been recorded" (1976:79) 
(refer Appendix for charts on the Richter Magnitude Scale and 
the Modified Mercalli Scale (Intensity) for earthquake 
assessment). It is almost certain that these 28 earthquakes 
would have been felt in the Inangahua Junction. These figures 
suggest that the inhabitantsof the township were relatively 
familiar with earthquakes occurring, though not necessarily 
familiar with the consequences of damaging earthquakes (the 
last 'sizeable' damaging earthquake in the region was in 1962 
when a 5.9 earthquake occurred with an epicentre off the 
Westport coastline). Such suggestions that have been made 
in the last sentence have more weight attributed to them by 
Simpson-Housely's study of Reefton residents: the frequency 
of past earthquakes aided the Reefton respondents in 
anticipating future seismic problems (1976:ii). The fact that 
the inhabitants of the area were unfamiliar with the consequences 
of earthquakes is supported by Simpson-Housely's finding that 
the residents response of denial of the earthquake threat is 
" ••• a positive function of topophilia (love of place) 
and that ataraxy (freedom from disturbance of the 
mind) is a property of most of the respondents in 
relation to the respondents cognitive knowledge of 
the earthquake hazard". 
(1976:133) 
1Earthquake numbers derived from New Zealand Earthquakes 
computer readout published by the Seismological Observatory 
Geophysics Division, D.S.I.R., updated to 13 February 1979. 
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5.3 The Emergency States 
these 
5.3.1 Warning 
5.3.2 Threat 
According to the model developed by Powell 
two periods come into existence after there 
and Rayner, 
has been 
acknowledgement on the part of people in positions of authority 
that danger may arise from a perceived natural hazard, and 
before that perceived hazard manifests itself into a disaster 
situation, that is, just prior to impact. Stallings says that 
the term "threat" conveys the connotation of potential 
disruption of existing social structure (1973:314). He goes 
on to state that "Theoretically, any event or conftition has 
such potential, but the probability of crisis g~neration 
differs widely". Threat, then, implies sometping more positive 
than potential disruption; the perception of an imminent hazard 
is also important. The warning and threat periods are 
dependent on the 'perception' of a threat or hazard. Miletti 
et al define perception of a hazard as 
" ••• an individual's understanding of the 
character and relevance of a hazard for self 
and/or community. The perception may 
include notions about speed of onset, scope, 
intensity, duration, frequency, temporal 
spacing, causal mechanisms and predictability". 
(1975:23)1 
1For a discussion on the perception of hazards, refer 
Miletti et al, Chapter II: "Anticipating Disasters". 
Miletti in Chapter III of the same book offers a discussion 
on the warning process and the response to impending 
environmental hazards. 
There did not appear to be any warning of the May 24, 
1968 earthquake~ Unlike the 1929 (Murchison) earthquake, 
where earth rumbles were 
" ••• reported to have been audible the day before 
the main shock and slight earthquakes were felt 
about 1.30 and 7.20 on the morning of the 
disaster" 
{Henderson 1937:96) 
(the main shock occurred at 10.24 a.m.), there has been no 
mention by any residents of the Inangahua area, nor any 
evidence from seismological data that there were any fore-
shocks before the 5.24 a.m. earthquake on May 24. (The 
D.S.I.R. computer files on New Zealand Earthquakes shows that 
the last earthquake preceding the (Inangahua) ~hoQk was 
located in the Taranaki area (400 Km north) on M~y 20 1968. 
It is unlikely that this earthquake acted as a precursor for 
the Inangahua population). That foreshocks occur prior to 
main earthquakes has often been reported (Rikitake 1976:289), 
but they are unreliable as indicators of future shocks. 1 
Several observers reported unusual animal behaviour 
at different times before the main earthquake in Inangahua. 
Two of them, one at Inangahua, the other at Oweka, claim to 
have been awakened at 5.15 a.m. by cattle and sheep noises 
which, at that time in the morning - two hours before sunrise 
was very unusual.· But the absence of any small foreshocks 
recorded by the Kaimata seismograph makes it unlikely that an 
earthquake was responsible for the upset of the animals, 
1Richter pointed out that "foreshocks seldom afford any 
opportunity for warning or prediction of major earthquakes 
since there is nothing to distinguish foreshocks from 
ordinary small shocks". (1958:67) 
(Adams et al 1969:14). The Oweka observer also reported 
a flash of light1 beyond the Buller River in a northerly 
direction, the direction that was to become the epicentre 
(Adams et al 1969:14). Unusual animal behaviour was ruso 
recorded during interviews by two respondents. One respondent 
recalled that a normally placid horse was very unsettled the 
day before the earthquake, running up and down its paddock, 
bucking and neighing. The second respondent reported that 
about ten minutes prior to the earthquake on the Friday 
morning, he had to get up and let his cat out of the house 
because it was running furiously up and down the hall in a 
highly uncharacteristic manner (the cat was not seen for 
several days after the earthquake). None of these abnormal 
animal activities were associated at the time with a forth-
coming earthquake. 
5.3.3 Impact Prologue 
In the early morning of Friday 24 May, 196g at 
5.24 a.m. local time, a shallow earthquake of Richter 
magnitude 7 occurred about fifteen kilometres north of the 
town of Inangahua. The earthquake was felt over most of the 
country, with Modified Mercalli intensities reaching MM X 
around Inangahua (Maps V and VI). It became the sixteenth 
New Zealand earthquake to reach Richter magnitude 7 or greater 
since 184g (Adams et al 196g:7). 
1For further information on 'earthquake lights', refer 
Weisbecker et al 1977:g3; Earthquake Information Bulletin 
Vol. 9, No.9, May-June 1977, 17-21; Derr, J.s., Earthquake 
Lights: A Review of Observations and Present Theories, Seismolo~ical Society of America Bulletin, Vol. 63, No. 6, 
2177-218 • 
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Felt observations and isoseismals for main lnangahua earthquake. 
May 24 
ORIGIN TIME 
EPIC ENTRE 
DEPTH 
MAGNITUDE 
INTENSITY 
ORIGIN 
1968 May 23 17 hours 24 minutes 
16.7 seconds (Universal time) 
1968 May 24, 5.24 a.m. 
(New Zealand Standard Time) 
41 72' South 
121 94' East 
12 Kilometres 
(Richter) 7.0 
(Modified Mercalli) MM X 
15 Kilometres north of Inangahua 
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The epicentre of the earthquake was confined to the 
Oikaka or the Mackley River Valley~ a few miles north of 
Inangahua township. 
The first movement of the shock was an upward 
displacement. No longer than two seconds later the high 
frequency vibrating and confusion of noises enveloped 
Inangahua as the surrounding hills crashed down, trees were 
uprooted,dwellings destroyed and dislodged off their pilings 
and roads ripped up. Then came the jolting as shock waves 
started to rebound through the region (Hogue 1969:37). 
The duration of strong shaking at Inangahua is difficult 
to estimate, but it was probably rather less than a minute1 • 
It would seem much longer to someone actually experiencing it: 
1Private communication W.D. Smith, Seismological Observatory. 
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one respondent stated that it lasted for one and a half 
minutes. 1 Another respondent stated that it was only a few 
seconds after the initial shock that the aftershocks began2 • 
Inhabitants of the sleeping town and the surrounding 
region were awakened immediately. One respondent's first 
conscious thoughts on the Friday morning were 
"Being violently wakened by an upthrust, the house 
seemingly took off, then settled into a violent 
shaking movement. There was a tremendous noise, 
which afterwards would be the ground noises from 
the earthquake, the crashing of furniture and 
crockery in the house, and the hills disintegrating. 
Having experienced other earthquakes, but not of 
this intensity, I felt that this was the end 11 • 
Another homestead was heaving so much that Shirley, a farmer's 
wife, could hardly stay in bed, Nor could she get to her 
two small children in another bedroom. Her husband Dave, 
was getting the cows in for milking when the shock struck. 
The cows stampeded and ran over the top of him. In The Camp, 
another couple tried to stand up, could not, and were thrown 
from side to side in their bed. One couples bed was moving 
violently in all directions. While the earthquake was occurring 
"you couldn't do much about it". Another couple in the 
Junction also considered that there was not much point in doing 
anything: once they had identified what was happening as an 
earthquake, they ~ecided to stay in bed. In New Creek, a 
farmers wife could not answer her husband's question about what 
••Estimates of the time of duration of an earthquake made with-
out a watch are often seriously in error, with a strong 
tendency toward overestimation. Shocks are known to have 
lasted from a few seconds to more than a minute, though in the 
case of long duration there are generally one or more lulls". 
(Heck 1965:7-8). 
2The seismological bulletin that documented the earthquake 
sequences lists an aftershock of magnitude 5 just nine minutes 
after the main event. There could have been smaller ones pre-
ceding this one, but they would have been masked on the 
seismological records by the coda of the main event which, 
detectable only by sensitive seismographs, continued for quite 
some time (private communication W.D.Smith). 
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was happening, she had lost her voice from fright. The house 
seemed to lift and tip over to one side and back again. This 
sensation of houses tipping was also recalled by another 
respondent. He thought his house was sliding down a huge hole. 
The Primary Impact of an earthquake is the physical 
damage and the injury wrought by the tremors as they proceed to 
convulse the surrounding environment. Certain other types 
of hazards that are concommitant with earthquakes, such as 
fires and electrocution from fallen live wires, are indirect 
effects and are considered secondary impacts. Landslides 
consequent upon earthquakes acting as a trigger are also termed 
secondary impacts according to White and Haas (1977:322)(refer 
Figure 12). In the Inangahua earthquake two deaths were 
directly attributed to landslides and an unknown amount of 
physical damage, particularly to communication networks, was 
caused by landslides. The difficulty of differentiating the 
effects of primary and secondary impacts are problematic and 
will not be developed here. 
Loss of life and injury was relatively light1 , with 
17 people injured and three deaths as a direct result of 
primary and secondary impacts (a taxi-driver whose vehicle 
crashed into a bridge as a result of the road subsiding before 
the bridge approach; one woman who was engulfed in a landslide; 
and another woman who died in hospital after being caught in a 
landslide). Three more people died indirectly as a result of a 
1The percentage of deaths by population numbers in the impact 
area was 0.6%, the percentage of injured was 5.6~. 
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helicopter accident while linesmen were repairing power 
cables in the 'recovery period'. 
Within the impact area, without exception, every 
property-owner suffered damage. The particular location of 
the earthquake (near ground level almost in the centre of 
Inangahua township) caused destructive damage to buildings, 
roads, railways, bridges, as well as initiating many slips, 
slumps and rock falls throughout the Buller region (refer 
photographs). Some indication of the damage caused by the 
earthquake may be gained from estimates of expenditure 
incurred by the following Government Departments. 
N.Z. Railways 
National Roads Board 
Restoration of rails, 
buildings and bridges 
Education Department Repairs to school 
Electricity Department Repairs to towers, 
switchgear and buildings 
Internal Affairs Civil Defence 
Department costs 
State Advances Corporation 
Miscellaneous 
$ NZ 
424,516 
515,000 
121,000 
77,332 
24,156 
53,300 
19,400 
TOTAL $ NZ 1, 2 84, 7 04 
In additio~, the New Zealand Earthquake and War Damage 
Commission paid out $2,500,000 on 10,500 claims from the 
1 2 
earthquake ' • 
1Report of the Earthquake and War Damage Commission for the Year 
Ending 31 March 1969 (Government·Printer,Wellington 1969:3). 
2 Although the Report of the Earthquake and War Damage Commission 
for the Year Ending 31 March 1969 does not specify where the 
earthquake claims come from, a suspicion is that the greater 
number of these claims were from the West Coast (South Island) 
region. 
Inangahua Junction. The main street split 
by a fissure. Note the collapsed chimney 
on the house in the left of the photograph, 
and the fallen telegraph pole 
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A larg e landslide poised above 
Inangahua Junction which threatened 
the building s as it continued to 
move towa rds the settlement 
153. 
Dama ge to the interior of 
a house in Inangahua Camp 
154. 
The dama g e sustained by the earthquake 
in a house at Inangahua Junction 
155 . 
House at Inangahua Junction 
illustrat ing the external 
structural damage as a result 
of the 1968 earthquake. 
156. 
A further view of the house at 
Inanga hua Junction (refer page 156). 
157. 
House at Inangahua Hydro Camp showing 
the damage to tiled roof and chimney. 
158. 
House at Inangahua Junction 
illustrating the movement of 
the house on the foundations. 
Note the gap between the verandah 
and the house. 
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Remains of a house which was swept 
150 yards by a landslide. One person 
was killed in this landslide and another 
occupant of the house died from injuries 
later in hospital 
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The main hi ghwa y through the 
Buller Gorg e obliterated by a 
l a ndslide 
162. 
163. 
Road blocked by landslide at Oweka 
Road subsidence. The driver of this 
car pulled out of his driveway in the 
pre-dawn light and backed into this 
hole created by the earthquake. 
164. 
The road between Reefton and Ina ngahua 
showing subsidence. 
165. 
Road surfaces buckled under the energy 
released by the earthquake. 
166 . 
(Photog raphs by courtesy of the Christchurch 
'Press', the Christchurch 'Star', the Greymouth 
Evening Star, and residents of Inangahua Junction). 
Severe damage to dwellings, on the basis of the initial 
field damage reconnaissance by Shephard et al (1970) appeared 
to be confined to an area from Stitts Bluff (Berlins) and 
Inangahua Landing, to Inangahua Junction to Lyell (an area 
of 216 square kilometres). As a result of the earthquake, 
eighteen buildings were recommended to be 'written off' in 
Inangahua because ·of their condition. 
In Inangahua and its immediate environment, all 
chimneys app~ared to have been damaged. An incomplete 
assessment two days after the earthquake revealed that 70 per 
cent of 80 house chimneys (56 houses) in the area had totally 
collapsed. Those that had not collapsed were badly cracked. 
By June 19, 1968, the official assessment was 3,842 chimneys 
in need of repair in the West Qoast region. After a more 
thorough investigation carried out by July 24, 1968 the 
number had risen to 5,000 requiring repair. 
For a distance of about 40 kilometres south of 
Inangahua and through the Upper and Lower Buller Gorges roads 
were seriously affected by slips, cracks and subsidences. All 
the State Highways and the County roads into Inangahua were 
blocked by extensive slips. Cracks in sealed roads were very 
prevalent. Over a wide area road fills subsided, particularly 
bridge approaches. Within 40 kilometres of Inangahua, 30 of 
the 50 bridges examined showed displacement or damage (Evans, 
1969). There was damage.to culverts, as evidenced later by 
gradual subsidence of the road surface caused by fill material 
dropping through gaps between displaced pipes. The major 
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damage to State Highways (S.H.) was centred at Inangahua 
Junction and extending on S.H.6 from about Eight Mile Creek 
in the Upper Buller Gorge to Windy Point in the Lower Buller 
Gorge, and on to S.H.69 from Inangahua Junction to Cronadun. 
On S.H.67 there was extensive cracking and deformation of the 
sealed surface between Westport and Mokihinui and several 
large landslides on the Karamea Bluff section. On S.H.7 there 
were some more slumps and dropouts; on S.H.6 there were a 
number of landslides. Opposite the foot of Dublin Terrace, on 
the south side of the Buller River, a large rock and rubble 
avalanche swept over 600 metres into the Buller River and about 
110 metres up the opposite bank to dam the Buller River to a 
height of between 18-25 metres above normal. The Buller 
River was backed up for about seven kilometres, but early on 
May 25 the water broke over the top offue avalanche and 
gradually cut down the dam without causing any serious flooding 
to the lower reaches. 
In the Whitecliffs area the high bluffs of limestone 
overlying papa were badly shattered and large landslides 
wrecked a bridge and substantially covered a highway. It was 
necessary to abandon the highway over this section and 
relocate a new road in the river bed clear of the unstable 
cliffs and wet slips. 
The total assessed quantity of slip material that had to 
be cleared from highways as a result of the earthquake 
exceeded 400,000 cubic yards. 
Damage to railway facilities was mainly confined to 
a 30 kilometre radius of Inangahua. Sides gave way and slip 
material covered the track. In some places the track had to 
be rebuilt after the slips had been cleared. Embankments 
subsided or slipped away leaving the lines suspended. The track 
was pushed out of line for practically the whole 90 kilometres 
length of the main affected area. 
In the New Zealand Electricity Department substation 
building, at Inangahua Junction, the station battery, the 
control relay and communication panels were overturned. Three 
66Kv insulator stacks in the airbreak switches were snapped 
off (Hitchcock 1969). The six Departmental houses and the 
depot buildings were severely shaken and damaged. Tpe 
telephone exchange at the Junction was twisted on its 
foundation and, owing to extensive damage to the lines, no 
telephones were working. Outside contact was lost because of 
toll line damage. Three kilometres of underground cabling 
was abandoned in the Junction area as the cable was badly 
damaged by 80 ground subsidences and cracks. The Post Ofiice 
and exchange building were threatened by a large slip, and the 
buildings were relocated to a new site (by June 9, 1968). 
The Reefton Post Office was badly damaged and had to be 
demolished on June 5, 1968. Minor damage occurred in the 
Greymouth exchange building. Major damage to Post Office plant 
and lines occurred in the Upper Buller Gorge due to slips 
immediately following the earthquake and further slips due to 
heavy rain in the area after May 24, 1968. 
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In Greymouth, the Fire Station was evacuated because 
of the condition of the building, as was one of the hospital 
wards. In Westport the water and power supplies were 
disengaged by the shock, and sewage lines broke. There was no 
water for a period, and low pressure was experienced for a 
time. A building had to be demolished as a result of the 
earthquake. Gas mains were severely affected. 
The time during the initial tremor was, for most people, 
a time of bewilderment. Immediately after the main earthquake 
there was a period of considerable activity by the residents. 
One of the residents, Terry, said that his first thoughts were 
to get to his son: "H6w I got there I don't know, looking 
back, but I arrived there in the bedroom". When he got there 
his son was sitting up in bed shouting: "Daddy, Daddy, the 
house is falling down!" Terry picked him up when he managed 
to catch up with the bed as it scurried across the room and got 
themselves back to the main bedroom, by which time the initial 
intensity of the shock was decreasing. Another couple tried to 
get up and out of bed, but the combination of a duchess mirror 
falling over their legs and the motion of the earthquake meant 
that they were thrown from one side of the bed to the other and 
could not get out of their bed until the earthquake had stopped. 
"People seemed td become 200 per cent alert at a time like 
that", said one respondent, recalling the time. 
'~hen it happened, I just could not imagine getting 
out alive". This sentiment was expressed by 58 percent of the 
respondents. Others were "frozen, just frozen to the spot". 
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The impact caught everyone unaware, and impressions were mixed 
as to what was happening: some guessed it was an earthquake 
immediately, others thought it was a cyclone, a bomb, a bull-
dozer ramming their house, war, or just "the end of the world". 
With the almost immediate swaying and rolling of the ground 
and the houses after the initial upthrust displacement, the 
residents soon realized that what they were experiencing was an 
earthquake. The noise was tremendous as if, according to 
one respondent, "a train was hurtling along right next to you". 
What happened during the initial impact is rather 
confused: some reported that while the main earthquake event 
was in progress they were in the act of rescuing and securing 
their children. Others claim that any activity during that 
particular earthquake would have been impossible; it was only 
possible to "hang on and try to stay where you were". One 
must also remember that the main earth tremor lasted for a 
period of less than a minute and the next recorded aftershock 
(Richter 5) was nine minutes later (at 5.33 a.m.). This does 
not mean that there was no earthquake activity within that nine 
minute interval; if there were any they would have been 
masked by the seismological recordings of the main event and 
thus were not recorded as separate tremors. The activities 
which some of the·respondents stated they undertook during the 
initial tremor would, in all likelihood, have been impossible 
to achieve. This activity could have been achieved within the 
interval between 5.24 a.m. and 5.33 a.m. 
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There are three possible explanations which could 
account for this discrepancy of the respondents'statements. 
The first is that at the time of the earthquake ·and for a 
short period after the main event, the respondents were 
confused and bewildered. They may not have had any 
cognizance of the period of relative quiescence between the 
main shock and the first aftershock. In all the jumble and 
mess of their disarranged homes, it could have seemed that 
they rescued their children during the main event, but in 
actuality they may have rescued their children after the main 
tremor, during the period of quiescence and during the first 
aftershock. Because of the confusion, this period was 
condensed in the participants mind as being undertaken in 
the main event. 
The second possibility relates to the passage of time 
between the earthquake in 1968 and the time of interviewing 
in 1978. The ten-year gap may be too long for the respondent 
to recall all chronological events with complete accuracy. 
Third, the respondents may be rationalizing the situation when 
they stated they rescued their children during the main earth-
quake. This makes their action more acceptable to themselves 
and to others (it is more appropriate for a parent to save 
his/her child(ren) in times of crisis than to do nothing). It 
may be the case that these respondents have internalized the 
ideal behaviour in favour of their real behaviour; ideally, 
this assumption suggests, they should have rescued their 
children as soon as a dangerous situation manifested itself. 
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In reality, they may not have been able to do anything (no 
one could have realistically done anything substantial during 
the passage of the main earthquake). Feelings of guilt, 
generated by their inaction, or feelings of inappropriate 
behaviour by not doing anything may have made the respondent 
subconsciously reject the real and accept the ideal as their 
actual behaviour. 
There is a fourth possibility, and that is a combination 
of all or any of the above. 
5.3.4 Inventory 
Wallace defines inventory as that period which enables 
the disaster victim to develop a perceptual and cognitive 
reorientation to the new environment so that a decision on 
action is possible (1956:10). Inventory is, to a large 
extent, an individual orientation, and the length of time taken 
in inventory is probably highly variable from person to person. 
Inventory is the period of stocktaking; it is the period before 
organized, concerted action from within the impacted community 
becomes apparent. Individual inventory moves into collective 
inventory of what has happened and the recognition of what to 
do next develops. The inventory phase can be considered to 
consist of two separate and distinct parts; the first is that 
period described above, that centres on the impacted community. 
The second part, which is very relevant to this particular 
earthquake situation, is the inventory conditions that occur 
external to the impacted area. Stocktaking and 'reorientation' 
need not be confined only to the zone in which the disaster 
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occurs. Authorities and communities outside the impacted area 
also need to prepare themselves for future rescue and relief 
work. A collective inventory of what has happened in the 
impact zone has to be achieved in those areas peripheral to 
the impact zone because it is these external areas that 
predominate in the rescue, relief and recovery of the disaster 
area. If the area of impact has sustained a disaster, then, 
by definition that area is incapable of recovering fully from 
the devastation through the institutionalized means that were 
available to that area before impact. The impact area is then 
dependent on regions external to it for full recovery and relief 
rescue work. At the same time, the dependency between 
the impact area and the external regions relies on the ability 
of the external regions to be aware that disaster has occurred. 
Thus the inventory period could be considered as an 
'Awareness Phase' on the part of authorities outside the 
devastated region. 
In the 1968 earthquake there was considerable 
confusion as to where the epicentre of the earthquake was. 
External authorities had to first establish the whereabouts 
of the impact area before coming to an understanding of what 
they should do to alleviate the damage and injuries that were 
consequences of the earthquake, or even if they were required. 
I 
Consequently, the period of Inventory that Powell and Rayner 
describe will be subdivided into the "Inventory Phase" which 
will examine the variables pertinent to the inhabitants of 
Inangahua, and the "Awareness Phase" which will centre on the 
situation and activities external to the impact area. 
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(1) The Inventory Phase 
Inventory begins the moment the primary impact ceases. 
This creates a problem when discussing earthquakes because 
major earthquakes seldom end with one tremor1 • Aftershocks 
can occur for many days, weeks or even months following the. 
main event and can cause further damage and injury (hence 
Powell's type III disaster-type, i.e. "prolonged repetitive 
impact-series with cumulative threat" (1954:II,l6). This 
'prolonged' impact has many implications regarding the 
behaviour of people in the disaster area, both as individuals 
and as members of a collectivity. This situation may be 
modified in the case of earthquakes by the somewhat mistaken 
belief2 that after the initial earthquake all subsequent earth 
shocks will 'not be anywhere near the size of the first one'. 
So, although the earthquake series may involve a repeated 
number of shocks, for the victims perception of the earthquake, 
a 'cut-off point' can be located between the main shock and 
subsequent aftershocks. 
This idea that all subsequent tremors after the initial 
shock will not be as large or as damaging provides the researcher 
with the convenient 'cut off point' as well. Although the 
1Private communication with Mr. George Eiby, Superintendent of 
the Seismological Observatory, D.S.I.R., 11.6.79. 
2As George Eiby points out: ''The main shock could be a fore-
shock of a larger event. Aftershocks may also be large in 
terms of magnitude, but according to the empirical Baths 
Law, the largest aftershock is 1.2 magnitudes smaller than 
the main shock, although the variations of these are wide. 
Also, there is no reason why the last aftershock in a series 
should/could not be the largest, as was the case in the 1931 
Hawkes Bay sequence. The largest aftershock in this 
sequence came ten days after the initial shock". (private 
communication) 
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'1 Inangahua region "was like a jelly all day", the main damage 
was sustained by the initial jolt and. the immediate subsequent 
shaking, plus the effects of the landslides that resulted from 
the ground movements. If the residents of Inangahua were not 
immediately aware that it was an earthquake, they were by the 
time the first tremor had subsided. The acknowledgement of this 
event was the beginning of the inventory period. After 
recognition of the cause of disruption, stocktaking could begin. 2 
Some people were in a state of disbelief over what 
had happened and what had caused the destruction. This was 
particularly evident from the older inhabitants of the region. 
After the 1929 (Murchison) earthquake, it was popularly 
believed that there would be no more earthquakes. When another 
earthquake struck with similar destructive force it was 
therefore not expected and the older inhabitants were really 
taken by surprise. 
One respondent thought that the earthquake had caused 
considerable destruction throughout the country: when his 
eight year old son asked him if there was go~ng to be any 
people dead, he answered: "Yes there would be a lot of people 
dead this morning". Many inhabitants of the Inangahua region 
1
over 809 earthquakes were recorded within 40 days of the 
initial shock (Adams et al 1971:5). 
2stocktaking and reorientation could not begin if the cause of 
the disruption or devastation was not known. If the cause was 
not recognisable the situation would revert to that of the 
threat phase because the people in the impact area would not 
know if the disaster agent had ended or not. With the belief 
that earthquakes create damage only in the initial shock, 
the people were then able to organise themselves and take 
stock of the situation. 
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thought that the earthquake must have caused immense damage 
in other parts of the country. Of the 24 respondents who 
were living in the Inangahua region at the time of the 1968 
earthquake, 17 (70.8~) spontaneously recalled that they 
thought other areas of the country were worse hit than their 
own township. In Westport, the Anglican vicar's house was 
situated on the road that led to the Westport hospital. The 
vicar thought the earthquake must have been very severe 
because there seemed to be a lot of traffic passing his house 
which he thought was taking the dead, dying and injured to 
the hospital. He told his wife he was going to the hospital 
to see if he could be of assistance. 
The period after the earthquake is relatively difficult 
to reconstruct because outside observers who would be in a 
better position than the victims to deliver an objective 
assessment of the victims activities had not arrived into the 
impact area. Those in the area were not always in the best 
positfon or frame of mind to observe objectively, or to 
remember without distortion later, what they did. A 
generalised reconstruction from the comments made by 
inhabitants of Inangahua and the surrounding farming area 
suggests a scene like this: 
Twenty of the 24 respondents (83~) had children in 
the house at the time of the earthquake. All those 20 
respondents, except one, either went to their children's 
rooms to rescue them, or called out to their children to see 
if they were alright and safe. What happened next is 
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universal amongst the sample population with families (50%). 
The children were collected and brought back to the main 
bedroom with the parents (25~ of the respondents), or 
evacuation of the house was undertaken immediately (25~ of the 
respondents with families). Those families who first 
gathered in the main bedroom later moved outside the house. 
All were outside their houses by daybreak. Uniting family 
members in some cases involved considerable physical feats 
(moving 22 cubic foot freezers out of doorways; pushing 
against jammed and blocked doors; uplifting furniture from 
beds; climbing out of windows). All these activities were 
undertaken in the dark in houses ~hat had been disrupted by 
the effect of the earthquake. The immediate actions under-
taken centred around getting to safety and security. 
To better understand the actions of the impact-victims 
after the earthquake, a knowledge of the composition of the 
disaster community is required. The concept of community 
has been the concern of sociologists for a long time, and the 
definition of community has proved to be problematic (refer 
Hillery 1955; Bell and Newby 1971, 1976; Kilmartin and Thorns 
1978; Thorns 1979). Thorns states that the study of any 
aspect of society has two major dimensions, those of structure 
and meaning (1979:26)~ There may be a difference in inter-
pretation of what community is, based on these two dimensions. 
Very generally, the idea of community on a structural 
dimension implies that community can be observed as a 
'geographical expression, that is, a finite and bounded physical 
location' (Bell and Newby 1976:195). The community in this 
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perspective can be viewed as a single unit, the concern being 
with the 'size, density, growth and economic organization and 
regularities' (Thorns 1979:26), that are found within a 
bounded locality. 
On the other hand, the "meaning" dimension has the 
idea of community focussed on the social construction of the 
members in that society and 'is part of their search for social 
identity' (Kilmartin and Thorns 1976:141-142). This 'meaning' 
dimension orientates the res.earcher to the belief that a 
community may be composed of not one identifiable community, 
but a number of 'sub-communities' with. separate identities. 
Each of these sub-communities are interlocked to provide a 
distinct geographical area, or a 'bounded physical locality'. 
Any populated area may be divided into subcommunities 
based not only on the meaning dimension, but on territorially or 
geographically-created units. These territorially distinct 
areas may still be considered a community of sentiment (after 
Toennies 1957). This was the case in Inangahua after the 
earthquake in 1968. 
Inangahua was composed of three geographically distinct 
areas, yet these areas were combined socially to form one united 
. . 
community in terms of the residents'social construction of the 
township. The three areas were Inangahua Junction, 
Inangahua Camp, and the immediate hinterland comprising 
approximately 30 farm houses. The earthquake produced a 
restructuring of the Inangahua community into three distinct 
territorial units, whereupon the community of sentiment which 
had characterised the three areas before impact was temporarily 
eliminated. 
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The actions of the residents after the earthquake are 
dependent to a large extent on the location of these victims 
·in relation to the township. Taking the areas of the Junction, 
the Camp, and the farming homesteads separately, and 
elaborating on the generalized activities that were undertaken 
within these three areas,·a better understanding of the 
reactions and the behaviour of the impact-population can be 
obtained. 
In the Junction, which had a 1968 population of about 
40 people, the residents started to gather outside the 
Junction Hotel immediately after the first series of earthquake 
impacts. Nobody was injured by the earthquake, but everyone 
seemed to be in a shocked and confused state. The majority 
of the Junction residents were in their night attire. 
Nobody, it seems, thought of checking the houses to see if 
anyone was trapped or hurt. Most assumed by the number of 
people congregating outside the Hotel that all were present. 
According to one respondent, the Junction population "stood 
around talking, discussing what had happened". Another 
respondent was more explicit: "They were all standing in the 
middle of the road passing round whisky and brandy, drinking 
it neat, passing it round and round". people comforted each 
other, warmed each other by offering them blankets that 
they had grabbed as they ran out of their houses. People were 
quiet and companionable. Everyone was in groups, and as 
people came to an understanding of what had happened, it became 
evident that they had all suffered a similar experience, a 
narrow escape from falling debris, confusion, fright and 
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bewilderment. They started to build up a picture of what 
had happened. "Everyone was recalling their individual 
experiences and what had happened to them. They (the 
experiences) were totally inconsequential things". People 
started to think about how others were in the Camp, friends 
and relatives on the farms, and further afield. Thoughts were 
turned to wondering how severe the earthquake had been else-
where; where was the centre and what was it like there? 
"That was something everybody was thinking about". It did 
not occur to anyone in the Junction that the epicentre was 
almost where their township was. It was not until daylight -
an hour and a half later, that people began to realize that 
they were the centre of the earthquake. The Greymouth radio 
station's seven o'clock news broadcast recorded the fact that 
Greymouth had been rocked by an earthquake in the early 
hours of the morning but the damaged sustained was, on the 
h 1 ~· . 1 1 w o e, super£1C1a • 
For that first hour and a half until daylight at seven 
o'clock, little occurred apart from piecemeal conversation 
between congregated inhabitants. "Its a funny feeling because 
you don't do anything. You just stand there and occasionally 
you talk to someone. Nobody was doing anything at all". 
1Greymouth was not declared a disaster area. The earthquake 
disrupted electricity, water, gas and sewage systems. 
Structural damage to buildings, although some had to be de-
molished afterwards (Greymouth had a lot of masonry-type 
buildings), was in the majority of cases confined to falling 
chimneys and wall cracks. There were no injuries recorded. 
Earthquake and War Damage assessors established an office in 
the city for the 2,000+ claims ultimately received. A 
Reconstruction Committee was also established in Greymouth. 
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With daybreak came the realization that they were in fact 
the centre of the earthquake. Associated with daybreak was the 
ability to look, for the first time, at the damage caused by 
the earthquake. People started to venture forth, to look 
at their homes. "Everyone seemed to want to go off and have 
a look at the damage to their homes". People were not keen 
to go inside their houses; some rushed inside to get extra 
clothing and blankets, or food, some started cooking some 
breakfast out in the open. Others, particularly the farmers, 
started their routine farm jobs that had to be carried out 
no matter what the circumstances, feeding and milking stock. 
There was no attempt to organise the activities of the 
residents, each family went off and did what it decided to do, 
with no collective decision made on what should be done to 
alleviate their situation. 
No-one attempted to clean up the debris. The earthquakes 
continued throughout the day, moving slips closer to houses, 
creating more uncertainty. About mid-morning word came 
through that there had been an accident up the Buller Gorge. 
A farmer's wife was missing after their house had been swept 
away by a landslide. 1 Some of the adult males made their way 
across the landslips and cracks in the road to assist in the 
search for the missing woman. The rest of the Junction 
residents meanwhile remained in an unorganized state until 
the return of the men, approximately at 3.00p.m., after the 
body was found under the rubble. 
1According to one source, this news reached the Junction by 
one of the Camp youths who had crossed the Inangahua Road 
Bridge. 
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Throughout this period of the disaster, there was 
no organised activity. There was no co-ordination between 
individuals and between other family members. 1 
The Camp had approximately 200 people living in it at 
the time of the earthquake. This section of the township can 
be divided into two, the State Hydro, or Electricity Camp, 
and the Ministry of Works (M.O.W.) Camp. Following from the 
earthquake, aft~r the individual families had been united, 
the general activity was one of movement towards one of the 
2 two Camps. 
There seems to be fourexplanationswhy people congregated 
at the Hydro Camp: 
1) Some went to the Hydro Camp because they had 
relatives living in the compound. 
2) Others went to the Hydro Camp because of their job 
affiliation to that site. 
3) Others went to the Hydro Camp because they were drawn 
by the blare of the alarm-hooter resounding above the 
crash of hills and falling trees. 
4) Others were invited by friends and neighbours who 
were going to the Hydro Camp. 
Similar ciTcumstances drew people to the M.O.W. Camp: 
1) The officer in charge of the MOW Camp had turned on 
the vehicle lights which flooded the Yard with light. 
This attracted many residents to the Yard. 
The Reefton Police Constable stated that when he and the 
Superintendent of the Reefton Hospital arrived at the Junction 
around mid-afternoon, they came across people congregated 
around fires and barbeques. 
2some people stayed in or around their houses until daybreak 
and then moved to either of the two Camps. 
2) Others went to this site because of job 
affiliation, relatives or friends. 
3) Others were directed to the MOW camp by the 
officer-in-charge and his men. 
The two Camps differed in the way that key personnel 
reacted to the situationfuat was now confronting them. In 
the MOW Camp, the Officer-in-Charge, dressed and called out to 
two employees living on either side of him. After making sure 
of the safety of the two employees families, one of the 
neighbours, together with a single man employed by the 
Ministry of Works "immediately set out to search the Inangahua 
Camp area. We had established within ten minutes to a quarter 
of an hour that there was nobody seriously hurt, that the 
destruction was quite severe in some houses and to a lesser 
extent in others". 
People congregated together in the Yard and comforted 
each other whilst coming to some realization of what had 
happened. As the residents started to arrive at the Yard, 
it became apparent to the Officer-in-Charge and his assistants 
that something would have to be done to augment the welfare 
of the victims. So "we got some of the younger boys and the 
older men .to build fires in the Yard". Thu$ by 6.30 a.m. a 
community fire had been started. Ministry of Works employees 
went round the houses and told the pepple who had not yet 
gathered at either Camp site that a relief centre had been 
established at the MOW Camp Yard and to go down there and take 
with them what they could in the way of food and cooking/ 
eating utensils. 
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At the Hydro Station, the Electricity Department 
employees were attracted to the Sation yard by the alarm 
hooter that had been activated by the earthquake. Realizing 
1 that this was upsetting the people , the Hydro Supervisor 
managed to pull the wires off the battery that fed power to 
the alarm and silenced it. The Station personnel started to 
look around the Camp and they soon realized that nothing could 
be done until daylight. They elected to go back to their 
houses with their families until they could restore the area 
in the light of day. For the next hour until dawn finally 
broke, the Hydro personnel comforted their families and their 
neighbours. 2 Some Inangahua Camp residents who had left 
their homes and had walked to the Hydro Camp sat in vehicles 
along the main road. Huddled in their vehicles, they sat 
until first light, wondering what had happened, what was still 
to happen, and wondering what was going on, experiencing as 
one respondent put it "the horrible feeling of everything 
crashing around us". At first light they saw the hills 
stripped of vegetation,houses holed and chimneys on the ground, 
water tanks upturned, gaping holes in the roads, trees and 
telegraph poles felled and leaning at odd angles. ·~e thought 
what was the rest of the place like if it was like this here". 
As daylight began, people started to move into the Hydro Camp 
site. The women and children started to prepare a fire and 
collected food that was strewn over the area from upturned 
freezers, and proceeded to "cook a bit of breakfast". While 
1
one respondent stated that "this alarm frightened people more 
than the actual earthquake." Another also commented on this 
effect. 
2some of the Hydro Camp population had joined other families in 
the compound and sought solace there. 
186. 
some of the men also helped to get some breakfast ready, 
using an open gate for a barbeque grill, others were trying 
to restore the disrupted power supply at the substation. 
The Farming Units are dispersed mainly along the river 
flats of the Inangahua, the Buller, the Mackley and New Creek 
Rivers. Scattered over these flats and valleys there were, 
in 1968, about 30 farmhouses. 1 They are usually located in 
pockets; the ones this research has focussed on were three 
farms up New Creek, three near Inangahua Landing-Browns Creek 
Road, and one up the Buller Gorge about three miles from the 
Junction heading towards Westport. A generalised 
reconstruction of the actions and behaviour of these people is 
as follows: 
Of the seven representatives of the farming units 
interviewed, six had children living at home. The seventh had 
adult children living and farming next door to them. There 
was fright and bewilderment in the houses during those first 
few minutes, parents could not open jammed doors to their 
children's bedrooms, children were screaming out in terror, 
utterly confused because of the tremendous noise and heaving 
of the house. Most of the respondents had no idea that it 
was an earthquake in the initial moments. The first reaction 
of the parents, both during2 and immediately after the first 
ear~hquake, was to rescue the children, and either gather them 
1There would have been approximately 50 people residing in these 
farmhouses. 
2one of the residents claimed that they immediately woke up 
and gathered the children from their rooms and were at the 
back-door of the house when the initial shock subsided. This 
family was the closest to the epicentre. 
together in the master-bedroom or immediately move outside. 
In the stillness after the first shaking the hills could be 
heard crashing down all around. Then the ground started 
heaving again. By this stage all had guessed that they were in 
the middle of an earthquake. 
The next one and a half hours until daylight, a time 
of intense activity for some, the men checked property and 
indicated to their neighbours that they and their families 
were all right. 1 Until daylight, it was a time of stocktaking, 
coming to terms with what-had happened, explaining to the 
children what earthquakes were and how they occurred, speculating 
on the extent of the earthquake and its destructiveness. By 
daylight the farming community had started to get themselves 
organized to aid themselves and their neighbours and to 
prepare for what they thought would be a very long period 
before outside help would arrive. 
Chapman suggests that individuals are 
" ••• overwhelmed for the moment that only he 
and his immediate companions have been the 
victims". 
(1962:15) 
Two statements can be made about this observation from Chapman 
with reference to the 1968 Inangahua earthquake situation. The 
first is that Chapman's observation is valid in the Inangahua 
situation if the person's 'immediate companions' are taken to 
be not only that person's immediate family, but all the people in 
1A dam had burst on one New Creek farm and the farmer and his 
farm-hand immediately went to assess the situation. The 
farmers on the Buller Gorge road drove their cars onto the 
road and turned on their headlights as a sign to each other 
that they were 'okay'. 
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the geographical area, or the sub-community, in which that 
person is a resident (i.e. the Camp, the Junction, or the 
farming areas). The second statement that can be made is that 
Chapman's observation does not seem to be relevant in the 1968 
Inangahua disaster if one considers how many of the respondents 
spontaneously wondered how people and places outside their 
own sub-community had suffered, and where the epicentre 
actually was (70.8% of the respondents wondered this). 
From all accounts, there does not seem to be any 
evidence, as obtained from the respondents of the Inangahua 
area, of any fragmentation of the disaster scene into isolated 
individuals, or any reactions of the kind that Wallace described 
as the 'disaster syndrome' (1956:110-141). The respondents 
seemed to react as a family unit initially, and then, in a 
very short period, if the situation allowed (it was more 
difficult in some of the more isolated farming areas) to act 
as a larger group, assessing and coping with the disaster as a 
collectivity. This is probably epitomized by the activities 
in the Inangahua Camp area. 
(2) The Kwareness Phase 
This phase, which is part of the Inventory Period, is 
oriented to the realization and awareness that a disaster has 
occurred by those outside the impact area. If we refer to 
Wallace's model of Disaster Space (Figure 11) the 
'awareness phase' refers to those actions of people living in 
any of the four areas with the exception of the Total Impact 
Area and the Fringe Impact Area. The spatial areas of 
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Wallace's model would have to be redefined for direct 
application to the Inangahua earthquake disaster. The Disaster 
Space model infers that the Impact, Fringe Impact, Filter 
Area and Organised Community Aid Areas are all within the same 
urban area. This unit of analysis cannot be applied to the 
Inangahua township and the surrounding farmland. In this 
example, the Fringe Impact Area extends to Reefton, Westport, 
Greymouth and the Filter Area extends to Christchurch, Nelson 
and Wellington. Organised Community and Regional Aid areas 
can then be referred to as 'National Aid Areas•. 
The suitability of Wallace's model to explain the 
spatial dimensions of a disaster is questionable when applying 
that model to the 1968 Inangahua earthquake disaster. This 
research though, will only comment on the discrepancies found 
between Wallace's explanation of the different disaster areas 
and those found to be the case in the Inangahua situation. 
It is hoped to develop a more elaborate analysis of the 
Disaster Space model elsewhere. 
Wallace defines the 'Fringe Impact Area' as that in 
which minor damage and few or no serious injuries occurred 
(1956:4). In the Inangahua earthquake this area can refer to 
Reefton, Greymouth and Westport. Beach (1967) makes the 
assumption that the people in the Fringe Impact Area are aware 
of where the Total Impact Area is, and it is only a matter 
of these people in the Fringe area caring for their own friends 
and families, then the people in the Fringe Area move into the 
Total Impact Area to render assistance (1967:18). The 
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assumption made by Beach is that the Total Impact Area is 
recognizable by those in the region immediately surrounding 
the Total Impact Area. Wallace makes this assumption also: 
that it is known where the impact area is, at least in the 
Fringe Impact, the Filter Area and the Organized Community 
Aid Area. 
In the disaster studied here, there was no knowledge 
of where the impact area was. People in Reefton thought it 
was in Reefton, Greymouth residents thought they had borne 
the brunt of the earthquake, and Westport people had similar 
thoughts. Even in Inangahua, people thought that the epi-
centre was elsewhere. Further afield the only knowledge 
available was that there had indeed been an earthquake. The 
6.30a.m. regular news bulletin on the New Zealand Broadcasting 
Corporation service reported that mild tremors had been felt 
in New Zealand in places as far away as Timaru (280 Km 
south east of Inangahua) and Muriwai (700 Km north-east of 
Inangahua). There was no indication at all that Inangahua 
was the epicentre; indeed, the earthquake had not been 
narrowed to any specific location until after 9.00 a.m.that 
morning. 
The New Zealand Electricity Department at Nelson 
realized that the earthquake must have been centred south of 
them because power had been disrupted from somewhere in that 
region. At 6.10 a.m. officials in the N.Z.E.D. in Nelson 
alerted Helicopters (N.Z.) Ltd. to stand by with one of 
their craft to fly service personnel and an emergency first 
aid team into where they thought was the area of power 
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disruption, Inangahua substation. Power had never before 
been disrupted in that area and they thought that the earth-
quake must have caused serious damage in this area when they 
failed to receive any reply from the substation to the radio 
signals that Nelson N.Z.E.D. was transmitting. By 7.20 a.m. 
the N.Z.E.D. in Nelson had been in contact with the Nelson 
Police Search and Rescue Squad who in turn had contacted the 
Greymouth Police Headquarters. Personnel in the Greymouth 
Police Headquarters relayed back to the Nelson Police Station 
that Greymouth was the centre of the earthquake, and that 
everything was under control. Nelson Police advised the 
Nelson N.Z.E.D. on the request of the Greymouth Police that 
the earthquake was not therefore in the Nelson jurisdiction, 
thus they were directed to withdraw the services of the doctor 
and nurse who were standing by. 
By 8.20 a.m. the authorities at the Nelson N.Z.E.D. 
were convinced that the centre of the earthquake was not in 
Greymouth and decided to send its own men via helicopter 
to the Inangahua substation to check it out. By 8.50 a.m. 
the Helicopter (N.Z.) Ltd. craft was on its way to Inangahua 
with the Electricity Department party and a quantity of 
emergency equipment and supplies in case their suspicions were 
confirmed. 
Meanwhile, the Inangahua County Ch~an, living at 
Inangahua Landing, thought the earthquake had left another 
area more devastated than his own. He thought the damage would 
be worse at Reefton. Consequently, after he had fixed the 
holes in his roof and made sure that all his family was safe, 
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he set off on foot for Reefton to see if he could help or be 
of any use in his official role. As he went up the road 
towards Reefton, he began to notice that the visual damage 
was less severe. ••It was not until I got to Reefton at 
about 8.30 a.m. that I realized the Junction was the worst 
hit place as far as damage was concerned". From the 
description of the area he presented to others at Reefton, it 
was obvious that the northern area had been harder hit than 
Reefton. It was also around this time that authorities in 
Reefton realized that they were cut-off from the rest of the 
outside world by slips, road blockages and from audio 
communication devices. 
In Christchurch, at the Civil Defence Southern Regional. 
Headquarters, the offices were opened, as they always were 
at 8.00a.m. Between 8.30 a.m. and 9.11 a.m. the Regional 
Offices had obtained information from Nelson/Marlborough, 
Hokitika, Greymouth and Westport,and had ascertained the 
extent of the damage in those places. No communication 
contact was able to be established with Reefton or Inangahua. 
It was not until 11.25 a.m. that the New Zealand Railways 
Office in Christchurch was able to contact the Reefton 
Stationmaster on their private line that communication was 
available from outside the Reefton area. From this time on 
the Southern Regional Headquarters of the Civil Defence and 
the Civil Defence Commissioner in Christchurch were in 
contact with Reefton. The Controller of Civil Defence 
operations in Reefton was able to explain the situation to the 
Regional Commissioner as it was in Reefton and he could 
speculate on the plight of Inangahua. 
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Meanwhile, just after 9.15 a.m. the occupants of the 
Helicopter (N.Z.) Ltd. craft flew out of the fog that had 
enveloped the helicopter since taking off from Nelson half an 
hour earlier, and observed immense damage in the Upper Buller 
Gorge and New Creek areas. Realizing the magnitude of the 
earthquake and of the possible injuries sustained by the 
inhabitants of the township, the pilot headed towards the 
town with increased urgency. The occupants also noticed that 
the Buller River was dammed at Newmans Lookout. At 9.50 a.m. 
the helicopter reached the N.Z.E.D. substation and the Nelson 
personnel made contact with the M.O.W. Supervisor who had 
assumed leadership of the Inangahua Camp. The M.O.W. 
Supervisor told the new arrivals of the situation and also gave 
them the news of the report of an assumed death due to a 
landslide in the Lower Buller Gorge area. The helicopter 
immediately took off to aid in the rescue and climbed to make 
radio contact with Westport Aeradio giving a full account of 
the known damage and casualties in the area. The pilot 
requested that the information be sent to the Nelson Police 
and the Hokitika Aeradio for advice to Police and Civil 
Defence personnel. Thus, three and a half hours had elapsed 
since the earthquake had struck the township and the first 
outside aid had arrived on the scene. 
In Reefton, at about the same time that the helicopter 
reached Inangahua, the police constable was able to make 
contact with the Greymouth Chief of Police. The constable 
was able to give the Chief Police Officer all the information 
he had obtained from the Inangahua County Chairman about the 
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conditions· around Inangahua as well as the situation in 
Reefton. As a result of this discussion, it was decided that 
a search party should leave immediately for Inangahua. The 
Reefton Constable, the Reefton Hospital Superintendent and a 
Forestry Worker equipped with a two-way radio, set out at 
10.45 a.m. for Inangahua by vehicle and by foot. 
Back in Nelson, the Electricity Department officials' 
concern for the Inangahua region resulted in representatives 
of the Earthquake and War Damage Commission and the New 
Zealand Geological Survey flying to Nelson at 9.00 a.m. As 
the centre of the earthquake was still unknown at this stage, 
with complete certainty, these representatives hired a plane 
and flew over the Murchison area, down the Buller Gorge to 
Westport. Reports of the damage were relayed back to the 
Geological Survey, the Seismological Observatory and the 
Earthquake and War Damage Commission headquarters. At 
9.15 a.m. the Director of Civil Defence in Wellington 
received the news of the earthquake from the N.Z.E.D. who 
were still concerned for the Inangahua area. 
At 10.25 a.m. a Police party left Greymouth for 
Reefton to assist in rescue activities. By this time it 
was apparent that Inangahua Junction was near the epicentre 
and had received the most damage and injuries. 
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5.3.5 Rescue 
The beginning of purposeful extraction, self-help 
and mutual aid among the victims initiates the rescue stage 
(Powell 1954:II 6). Rescue then is characterised by amateur, 
unorganised activity carried out by the disaster victims 
themselves. Dynes adds that this period also involves 
the extraction or survivors, protective activity and pre-
cautionary activity against secondary threats such as 
electrocution by fallen wires, fire and escaping gas (1970:57). 
Chapman states that 
" ••• the phase of rescue is divided from that 
of immediately preceding impact by naturally 
indistinct boundaries". 
(1962:17) 
This is certainly the case in the Inangahua disaster because 
some of the activity that is expected at this stage, and which 
differentiates the rescue period from the inventory period 
was not present, there were no secondary threats to endanger 
lives; fires, escaping gas, fallen live wires were absent; and 
there was no mass rescue activity to free trapped victims, nor 
were there many injured people to care for. The absence of 
these characteristics can be explained in part by two factors: 
(1) Circumstances (e.g. all electricity in the area 
was disrupted by the earthquake, thus no fallen live 
wires were strewn over the ground, although telegraph 
and power poles were toppled). Inangahua township, like 
many small South Island settlements did not have a gas 
reticulation system. The time of impact and the 
absence of any industrial plant diminished the chances 
of fires because almost the whole population, with the 
exception of some farmers, were asleep, and no fires 
had been started for cooking/heating purposes. 
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(2) The size of the township, the population density, 
and structure and type of material used in most of 
the dwellings (wood1 ) may help to explain why there 
was a minimum of injuries and no consequent mass 
rescue activity; the news, rescue bid and ultimate 
discovery of the landslide victim was the sole example 
of organised rescue activity, but as will be shown 
later, this incident did not mark the division from one 
disaster period to another in all of the three sub-
communities. 
In some sense this period can be defined not so much 
as being the beginning of the rescue period as the end of the 
inventory period. This is because there was an absence of 
entrapped victims and no secondary impact to counteract 
that compelled the population to achieve any collective 
positive activity that is characteristic of the rescue period 
suggested by Powell and Rayner (1952) and Powell (1954). The 
rescue phase was not so much a collective orientation 
immediately recognizable from other actions, but more an 
activity of a few 'spontaneous leaders' who initiated 
activity that gradually involved more people into performing 
actions that could be considered characteristic of the 
rescue period. There was no complete division of activity 
by all victims at one time that marked the arrival of the 
rescue period. If we take the activity of the Inangahua 
Junction area as an example: 
1Most of the buildings were of a single-storeyed type with a 
wooden frame and timber exteriors. Wood is less rigid than 
masonry, and is therefore more appropriate for buildings in 
earthquake-prone areas because of its ability to absorb more 
of the earthquake shock than brick/masonry type buildings. 
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The observation has been made in the previous section 
that the inventory period lasted until mid-afternoon, from 
the moment of impact until the men who had gone to aid in 
the search for the landslide victim had come back to the 
Junction. During the absence of these men, the rest of the 
Junction residents remained in an unorganized state. 
Prior to the earthquake, the Junction, unlike the 
Inangahua Camp1 , had no recognizable authority structure. 
None of the residents in the Junction had occupational roles 
which enabled them to assume the position of a leader in the 
post-emergency period as an extension of their occupational 
role. Because of this, there were no expectations on any 
resident to fulfil the role of leader to the sub-community. 
None of the residents had had prior leadership experience, 
nor had they had any experience in decision-making 
activities, other than those performed in the family setting. 
The leadership which emerged in the Junction, which 
was manifested after the men had returned from helping in 
the search for the landslide victim, was assumed by a corps 
of residents (how many it is not known) coming to collective 
decisions and organising the activities which they considered 
1The Camp had two well defined authority structures based on 
the official hierarchy within the Ministry of Works, and the 
Electricity Department personnel. After the earthquake, the 
Officers-in-Charge of these two Government departments took 
over the leadership of the Camp, the M.O.W. Supervisor 
assuming overall leadership of the entire Camp settlement. 
The post-emergency leadership roles required little or no 
modification from the pre-emergency roles. Both Officers-in-
Charge assumed responsibility for the safety and welfare of 
their employees and their families, and also of the safety 
and welfare of other residents in the Camp site. Had the two 
Officers-in-Charge been injured or killed, the authority 
structure would have had to be reformed, presumably changing 
quite markedly the activities that were consequently performed. 
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were necessary for what they thought would be a prolonged 
stay in the area under disruptive conditions. Some people 
began to dig toilets, acquire bedding, clothing and food,others 
were in an unorganised state, undertaking little or no 
mitigatory activities. The community action as a whole, 
though, began to be transformed from one of non-activity and 
no orga~isation, into one of appropriate activity (getting 
clothes, bedding, food, locating suitable shelter) and 
organised behaviour and division of duti.es (some of the 
residents dug toilets, others located shelter). A 
decision was made to move everyone in the Junction up the 
road to the Railway Station houses which were thought to have 
suffered less structural damage and were not endangered by 
landslides and advancing slips. All the residents were then 
advised of this decision and preparations were undertaken to 
expedite actions. 
It seems that the activities undertaken by some of 
the men from the Junction in searching for the missing woman 
in the landslide brought some realisation of the situation 
in which the sub-community was now facing to these men. Up 
until that time the Junction residents were still in a 
situation of assessing their position (stocktaking, i.e. 
inventory period), and coming to a realisation of what had 
happened. Little or no attempt was made to mitigate the 
j 
situation. After returning to the Junction, the searchers 
began to assess their own situation. With the help of some of 
the people who had not participated in the search for the 
missing body, members of the search group began to organise 
the community into concerted actions that could be objectively 
considered part of the rescue period. 
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Powell makes the point that a doctor in the impact 
zone giving emergency first aid does not initiate the 
remedial stage (1954:II 11). The arrival of the Superintendent 
of the Reefton Hospital, along with the Reefton police 
constable and the Forestry serviceman was still in the rescue 
period of the disaster in the Junction. 1 The rescue phase 
ends "as a distinct stage when officials, agencies and trained 
personnel begin to move in and take charge" (Powell 1954:II 10; 
Chapman 1962:19; Dynes 1970:57). This phase occurred in the 
Junction sometime in the late afternoon/evening when a Civil 
Defence officer ordered the residents to make their way to 
Reefton via the landslide that blocked the Junction-Reefton 
highway at Oweka2 , where buses would be provided to take them 
from the Landing Bridge to the Civil Defence Headquarters 
at the Forestry Services huts in Reefton. With the arrival 
of the Civil Defence officer, the decision-making process 
passed from internal resolutions based on the residents to 
one of external decision-making based on the incoming rescue 
agencies. 
At Inangahua Camp the rescue period was initiated much 
earlier and activities could be more positively related to 
Powell and Rayner's rescue period. This was no doubt due to 
the more clearly defined authority structure and the 
1
similarly, the arrival of the helicopter at the Camp site 
at 9.50 a.m. and the taking of the two injured people from 
the Lower Buller Gorge to Reefton Hospital does not 
constitute the beginning of the remedy period for those 
particular sub-communities. 
2
rt was feared that a dam which had been created by a slip 
upstream on the Buller River would break and flood the low-
lying river flats. Evacuees were advised to stick to the 
hills and avoid river flats in case the dam burst. 
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pre-emergency organisational structure within the Camp. It 
has already been stated that within five minutes of the main 
earthquake, the M.O.W. Supervisor and two of his work-mates 
had made a preliminary reconnaissance of the Camp to establish 
the situation as best they could, given the circumstances. 
By daylight, that is, within the first two hours, the M.O.W. 
personnel had gathered a large section of the Camp residents 
together in the M.o·.w. Yard, had arranged groups to build 
fires and commence breakfasts. Other M.O.W. personnel, with 
some of the residents, had searched the township once more; a 
search party went as far as the school and checked on all the 
houses on the way. Within this two hour period other 
residents had gone up the road towards Murchison, having got 
as far as Dee Hill where the road was blocked by slips. 
Vehicle access was denied them, so all search parties had to 
travel by foot. 
A similar situation existed in the Hydro Camp, and 
within two hours of the impact, all members of the Inangahua 
Camp had Pathered either at the Hydro or the M.O.W. yards. 
Those who wanted food were fed, the township had been searched 
by parties to ascertain the extent of the damage1 and search 
parties had been sent to various parts of the area to make 
contact with people and assist if necessary. By mid-morning 
some Hydro staff had contacted the farming community at New 
Creek, Inangahua Junction had been contacted and from 6.00 a.m. 
onwards M.O.W. personnel had tried to make radio contact with 
1The M.O.W. Officer-in-Charge stated that he estimated 70 per 
cent of the houses were uninhabitable in the township. 
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the outside world. At 8.30 a.m. two M.O.W. employees took a 
radio trans-receiver up to Dee Hill and around 9.00 a.m. they 
managed to make contact with Gisborne (700 Km north east). 
Gisborne was told of the situation and was asked to relay the 
message to the Westport Ministry of Works Depot. 
Also at around 8.30 a.m. that Friday morning, contact 
by a Lower Buller Gorge resident was established with the 
Junction. A farmer had walked out with the news that a land-
slide had occurred which had swept away his house and that 
two people were injured, one of whom was missing. Messengers 
were sent from the Junction for assistance in the search for 
the missing person, and M.O.W. staff organised their members 
to form search parties. The Hydro personnel divided themselves 
into two groups, half of them went on the search and rescue 
party, the other half stayed behind and attempted to restore 
the electricity flow, and later searched the surrounding area 
of New Creek. 
The Rescue Period took on a new turn with the arrival 
p 
of the helicopter from Nelson, sent by the N.Z.E.D. The 
helicopter landed at the electricity substation with the 
N.Z.E.D. personnel it had picked up at Nelson, and on the 
request of the Officer-in-Charge, proceeded to the site of the 
landslide to assist in the search for the missing person. 
The pilot also radioed a description of the situation at 
Inangahua to Westport and requested that this information be 
passed on. The helicopter landed at the landslide site at 
10.30 a.m. and with the assistance of a state registered nurse 
from the Camp (the wife of the school teacher), the farmer and 
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the injured person were taken on board and flown to Reefton 
Hospital for emergency care. 
Back at the Camp, the Hydro personnel were still trying 
to re-activate the power supply, and with the assistance of 
the arrivals from the Nelson N.Z.E.D., they managed to get the 
power restored. 1 
The inhabitants of the Camp were milling around the work 
yards, sight-seeing and trying to assess the damage to their 
properties. Some of the residents were now becoming aware 
that the situation they were facing was graver than they first 
thought, especially with the news of the landslide tragedyz 
'~e didn't realize how bad it was until we heard that someone 
was missing". 
After flying the two injured people to Reefton Hospital, 
the Helicopter (N.Z.) Ltd. craft left Reefton with a state 
registered nurse and three policemen aboard to return to 
Inangahua. Radio sets were taken to establish a link with the 
1This activity, strictly speaking, is more in keeping with the 
'recovery period', that is, it is oriented towards resuming 
normal activities (Powell 1954: II 12). The actions of the 
Hydro personnel - why they returned to work-related 
activities so soon after the disaster could be explained by: 
(1) their families were all safe and this fact was known 
to the men, hen~e alleviating any fear or concern on the 
part of the employees about their families. This situation 
was augmented by the fact that workmen and their families 
were in close proximity to the work-place, hence there would 
be an absence of any concern about leaving the family in such 
a time of duress; (2) a division of labour had been 
established in the Camp area that left the Hydro employees 
free to concentrate on the task of restoring power without 
feeling they were neglecting their fellow residents; 
(3) the occupation of a N.Z.E.D. employee is considered to 
be an 'essential occupation', hence in time of emergency 
the role these men play is vital: electricity must be 
connected as soon as possible to areas outside the disaster 
area, as well as in the impact area for certain activities 
to be undertaken. Because of these three factors, the 
problems of 'role conflict' (refer Biddle and Thomas 1966) 
would not arise, hence the Hydro personnel would be free to 
return :to_ their work-related activites. 
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outside world, particularly with the Civil Defence Headquarters 
at the Forestry Camp in Reefton and the Reefton Police 
Station. Just after 11.00 a.m. the helicopter landed at the 
Hydro Camp. Meanwhile, at 11.00 a.m. in Reefton, the 
Controller of Civil Defence declared a state of emergency for 
the whole Reefton region, including Inangahua. 
In the farming community the termination of the rescue 
period was achieved when evacuation began. This activity, 
which forms the cut-off point from one (disaster) time period 
to another also acts as a partition between the residents 
because evacuation was undertaken in some cases before 
others, the people in the Lower Buller Gorge and some 
families in New Creek and Brown Creek Road were evacuated that 
day. Others in the New Creek and Brown Creek Road were flown 
out the following day (Saturday 25 May), whilst still others 
in Inangahua Landing were not evacuated at all. 1 Actions 
common to all the outlying respondents in this rescue period 
will be described, then the activities of the two sets will be 
considered according to time of evacuation. 
Generally, the farming population recovered from the 
impact within the first two hours before daylight, and where 
possible2 contact had been made with their neighbours within 
that two hour period. Those that could, had signalled to each 
1The families that were not evacuated were contacted by 
helicopter on Friday but were not in any need of immediate 
assistance, nor were they in a predicament that justified 
their removal. Electricity was restored that night to the 
area and the farm residents were able to live adequately 
until the restoration of damage was achieved at a later date. 
2
some of the farms were isolated because of distance that 
was exacerbated by slips and unsafe bridges. 
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other via their car-lights or had walked over to their 
neighbour's farm. With the arrival of daylight, assessment of 
the damage sustained was carried out and farm chores were 
fulfilled, cows milked, pigs and dairy herds fed. 
The farmers in the Lower Buller Gorge assisted in the 
search for the landslide victim. An hour after the body had 
been found, the decision by the M.o.w. Officer-in-Charge and 
the Hospital Superintendent at the Camp was made to evacuate 
everyone from the area. Two sons of a local farmer started 
walking to Inangahua to inform the people in the township 
that the body had been found, and were met en route by someone 
from the town coming out to inform the farming community in 
the Gorge to prepare for evacuation. Activity in the Gorge 
was then oriented towards this end which began in the late 
evening. 
In the Inangahua Landing-Brown Creek Road area, people 
were beginning to clear up the damage and construct make-
shift facilities for cooking and heating. Contact was made 
with neighbours to offer assistance and seek their welfare. 
Generally, they organised themselves to cope with the changed 
environment. People attempted to clean up the mess inside 
their homes caused by fallen crockery and provisions, food 
was prepared for meals1 and bedding was established for the 
night. 
1' In New Creek, the rema1n1ng 13 members of two families that 
were not flown out that night had elected to stay in one 
of the homes. A sheep was killed to provide meat. 
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During the middle of the day, the helicopter called 
on the farms in the Buller Gorge and New Creek area to check 
on the residents and ascertain their condition. The 
occupants of the craft advised the New Creek people that if 
they were happy with the idea, they would probably be better 
to stay where they were, rather than be ferried to the township 
where conditions were no better. From the account given by 
the pilot, the New Creek farming residents considered it was 
much wiser to stay where they were. One of the farmhouses 
to which the families finally settled in had running water, 
sewage system intact and a diesel-generated electricity 
supply, facilities unavailable in the town. 
At about 2.00 p.m. the helicopter returned to the 
outlying districts and delivered quantities of bread, obtained 
from a bakery truck at Rotokohu. 
taken to the Camp. 
The remaining bread was 
At 2.00 p.m. in the afternoon the Reefton Civil Defence 
Controller advised the Civil Defence Southern Regional 
Commissioner of the decision to evacuate the people from 
Inangahua township because of the fear that the dammed river 
might break. The Commissioner arranged an Air Force plane 
to fly Ministry of Works engineers to inspect the blockage. 
Meanwhile, the private craft of Helicopters (N.Z.) ltd., 
since about 1.00 p.m. had been evacuating workmen and 
marooned truckers from their sites to Inangahua Camp. The 
pilot requested the assistance of more helicopters to aid in 
the procedure. At about 3.30 p.m. the M.O.W. Officer-in-
Charge, the Reefton Hospital Superintendent and the Police 
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Officers now at the Camp agreed that an evacuation of the 
entire area would have to take place because, apart from the 
danger of the dam bursting upstream, the township's amenities 
could not provide the essential services to maintain a 
community. The M.O.W. Officer-in-Charge sent out a radio 
message to the effect that they were going to initiate an 
evacuation of the women, children and elderly because of the 
conditions that now prevailed in the area, He also asked for 
more helicopters to assist. Almost immediately, the Camp 
leaders got a radio message back informing them that the 
National Civil Defence Headquarters in Wellington had arrived 
at a decision, based on the information that had been relayed 
to them, that total evacuation should begin immediately. 
This decision for some of the outlying farming areas, 
marks the end of the rescue period and the beginning of the 
remedy period (Powell and Rayner 1952; Powell 1954). 
Evacuation of the New Creek and Lower Buller Gorge regions 
began about 6.30 that evening. As will be shown in the next 
section, the remedy period had begun much sooner in the Camp, 
and the Junction sub-communities. For the two farming families 
not evacuated that Friday night from New Creek, the night 
passed with little sleep because of the constant and vigorous 
aftershocks. Th~ following morning the two families were 
just about to have breakfast when a helicopter landed, the pilot 
informing them that they had to leave the area. The ladies 
considered going out with their children, the men stating 
their preference to stay. The pilot relayed these intentions 
back to his base, but was instructed that everyone had to be 
evacuated. By 11.30 a.m. on Saturday 25 May, all the people 
residing in the disaster area had been accounted for and the 
evacuation task was complete. 
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5.3.6 Remedy 
With the arrival of the Police party aboard the 
helicopter on its return to Inangahua from Reefton (to take 
the injured people to hospital), the remedy period began at 
Inangahua Camp at 11.08 a.m. Friday morning. By 11.25 a.m. 
the helicopter had taken one of the Police party to the scene 
of the search for the missing landslide victim to supervise 
activities there. Another member of the Police party began 
to set up a communication link with the Reefton Police 
Station via a radio transreceiver that had been brought in 
on the helicopter. By 2.08 p.m. that afternoon, contact was 
finally made with Reefton, although the reception was very 
poor. The third member of the Police party, the sergeant 
in charge of the Inangahua operations at the Camp, stayed 
at the Ministry of Works Camp with the M.O.W. Officer-in-
Charge and other M.O.W. employees to augment the organisation 
of activities. Although the blockage and consequent damming 
of the Buller River was known, there was no decision made at 
this early 'stage to evacuate the township. 1 Indeed, the 
leaders in the Camp did not know whether they would be able to 
evacuate everybody, given the knowledge they had of the 
physical damage throughout the region, especially the routes 
out of Inangahua· to Reefton. One of the local residents 
was given the task of billeting the Camp people in the houses 
that were structurally sound in the Camp, in the event that 
1After making the trip to New Creek at 11.10 a.m. the 
helicopter pilot advised the M.O.W. Officer-in-Charge and 
the police sergeant that it would be necessary to evacuate 
the low-lying farms of Rahui-Berlins if the dam had not 
breached by dusk. 
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they all had to stay the night. Some of the women took over 
the catering role to provide everybody with a light lunch 
"feeling that it would be better if we had our main meal at 
night and at least we could go to a somewhat uneasy sleep 
with a relatively full stomach". 
Early in the afternoon of Friday 24 May, the helicopter 
began to evacuate isolated pockets of people that had been 
stranded or cut-off by the earthquake. At 12.40 p.m. the 
helicopter started airlifting- twelve men and their gear 
(on three flights) from Baigants Sawmillers Ltd. in New Creek 
to Murchison. At 1.40 p.m. the helicopter found drivers 
marooned in the Upper Buller Gorge and transported them out of 
the area. At around 3.00 p.m. the craft picked up drivers 
from the Lyell region and took them to Westport. The pilot 
had earlier that day located a derailed train between the 
Landing and Cronadun, but there was no sign of the crew. Just 
after 2.00 p.m. while searching for the doctor and the 
police constable who were walking in from Reefton to the 
Junction, the pilot located a baker's truck at Rotokohu. 
The pilot loaded all available space in the craft with bread 
and then proceeded to distribute the loaves as far as 
Berlins Hotel and _to settlers at New Creek and Browns Road. 
The Reefton hospital superintendent, the Reefton 
police constable and the Forestry serviceman reached the 
Junction about one o'clock that afternoon. After assessing 
the situation there, and making sure that there were no 
serious injuries, the party went on to the Camp. They 
arrived at the Camp at about 2.30 p.m. and the doctor 
immediately set about inspecting the Inangahua Camp to assess 
the situation. The doctor reported to the police and the 
M.O.W. Officer-in-Charge that the sewage and water 
reticulation system were now a health risk. With this 
knowledge, and the physical destruction that had already 
taken place in the Camp and Junction, along with the 
constancy of aftershocks and the knowledge of the dammed 
river, a decision was made by the doctor, the police and the 
M.O.W. Officer-in-Charge at 3.30 p.m. to evacuate the township. 
This decision was relayed to the Reefton Police Station by the 
M.O.W. Officer-in-Charge. A few minutes later, a radio 
message was sent from Reefton to Inangahua advising the 
Inangahua party that the National Civil Defence Headquarters 
in Wellington had just issued a general order to evacuate 
the whole area. The doctor then addressed the Camp 
residents telling them of the order to evacuate and the reasons 
why. He told them that they had time to pack an overnight 
bag of essential clothing gear if they wanted, and that men 
and children over the age of twelve should prepare themselves 
to walk out. The others were told that preparations were 
being made to fly them out by helicopter. 
At the same time that the message from the National 
Civil Defence Headquarters was relayed to Inangahua, the 
helicopter which had flown some stranded drivers to Westport, 
returned to the Camp. With the arrival of the helicopter 
activities were made to begin evacuation of the town. While 
preparations were being undertaken, another helicopter arrived 
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from the Murchison area. By 4.00 p.m. both helicopters 
had commenced evacuation, the newly arrived Hiller craft 
taking up to four adult equivalents per trip, and the 
Helicopter (N.Z.) Ltd. Bell Jet Ranger up to nine per trip. 
At 4.30 p.m. that evening a second Bell helicopter from 
Helicopter (N.Z.) Ltd. arrived from Nelson and joined in the 
evacuation procedures. A third Helicopter (N.Z.) Ltd. 
craft arrived at 5.15 p.m. In order to minimise the 
time of the helicopter flights and to maximise the evacuation, 
the helicopters were taking the evacuees to Rotokohu (15 Km 
south of Inangahua and 11 Km north of Reefton), and from 
there the residents were transported by buses to Reefton. 
A Reception Centre had been established at the Reefton 
Forestry Services Camp to handle the arrivals. 
By the time darkness began (at about 5.30 p.m.) 103 
people had been flown out of the Camp settlement to Rotokohu. 
At around this time (5.30 p.m.) the first of the two Army 
Iroquois helicopters arrived from Manapouri (where it had 
been involved in activities related to a visit by the Duke of 
Edinburgh), and began evacuation on a limited scale because of 
a shortage of fuel. At 6.00 p.m. the second Army Iroquois 
arrived with fuel for both of the Army craft. By now there 
were six helicopters assisting in the evacuation of the Camp 
residents. By 6.30 p.m. the evacuation of the Camp was 
complete. A decision was then made by the flight crews of 
the civil aviators and the Army military operators in the 
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helicopters to divide the outlying regions up and begin 
evacuation of the surrounding settlements. Civil aviators 
concentrated on Rahui and Berlins farms, while the military 
concentrated on the New Creek area. 
In Reefton, the Forestry Services Camp had been desig-
nated as the Civil Defence Headquarters and the Reefton Centre 
for Reception of the evacuees from the impact area. Civil 
Defence authorities in Reefton had organised personnel to cater 
for the registration of evacuees, arrangements of billets had 
been undertaken, meals, clothes and the overall welfare of the 
incoming evacuees was arranged by the Reefton Civil Defence 
organisation. At 6.00 p.m. the first evacuees arrived. All 
people were registered on arrival as they entered the building. 
As they entered the main buildings they were given cups of tea 
and other liquid refreshments for the children. A television 
set had been installed for the children1 , and adults could 
collect mail and telegrams. Facilities were available to send 
telegrams to relatives. From the entrance of the building, 
the evacuees went into a large reception room where meals 
were served. While evacuees were in the building, registered 
names were delivered to other Civil Defence volunteers, who 
arranged billets, and as each family left the Centre, transport 
was supplied to take the evacuees to their billeted homes. At 
6.00 p.m. there was an urgent message from a Ministry of 
Transport Officer at the Rotokohu helicopter landing site that 
blankets were needed for evacuees awaiting transport to 
Reeft6n. Supplies of blankets were sent from the Civil 
Defence Headquarters in Reefton to Rotokohu. 
Television had only just begun transmission over the West 
Coast and it was a novelty to the children, which kept their 
minds off the experiences they had encountered during the 
day extremely well. 
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At Inangahua Junction, the situation was a little 
different. Evacuation was undertaken late in the afternoon 
following the order by a Civil Defence official from Reefton 
that the area had to be cleared. The Junction residents were 
advised to keep to the hills and not to follow the river 
flats when they evacuated their houses. There was concern 
that the dammed river in the Upper Buller Gorge might breach 
and cause flooding. Progress was slow and difficult, 
especially for some of the .older residents, all of them 
having to traverse the landslides and slips that had covered 
the roads. There seemed to be some confusion over the 
evacuation of the residents from the Junction. These 
residents were told by the Civil Defence official that 
transportation would be waiting for them at the Reefton side 
of the Oweka slip which would take them to Reefton. After 
the party of residents had negotiated the slip in the dark 
for two hours "there was nobody to meet us once we had made 
the crossing over the hill". It seems as if the Junction 
people were forgotten by the rescue authorities who had fully 
concentrated their resources on evacuating the Camp area. 
According to one respondent, "we were just standing around 
waiting in the dark, just wandering around". A Power Board 
truck with an employee in it happened to come along the road 
a little after the party had crossed the slip, and was 
surprised to find the group of people milling around. The 
truck-driver took some of the party in his truck down the 
road to where the buses and other vehicles were waiting for 
the Camp evacuees to be discharged from the helicopters, and 
arrangements were made to ferry the Junction residents to 
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the Civil Defence Headquarters in Reefton. This episode 
again illustrates the lack of authority structure and decision-
making processes that were apparent among the Junction 
residents. If there had been a recognised or a designated 
leader among the Junction residents, the unorganised milling 
around and lack of initiative of the respondents to plan 
appropriate activities after they had negotiated the Oweka 
slip and found no-one there to assist them, may have been 
channelled into appropriate action (for instance, instead of 
"standing round in the dark" for the transportation which was 
assumed to be waiting for them, the residents could have 
organised a party to continue walking down the road towards 
Rotokohu and make contact with the rescue authorities that 
were known to be there). 
By 8.30 p.m. 173 people had been registered at the 
Civil Defence Reception Centre. By 9.15 p.m. the number had 
increased to 189. There were still 32 people known to be in 
the region that night who were not flown out. Nine people 
remained at the Camp site. 1 The Headquarters of the 
Inangahua Camp was moved to the Inangahua Primary School 
which was situated on high ground, and the playground was 
used as a helicopter landing pad. Thirteen of the known 
32 people still remaining in the area were in the New 
Creek area. They were flown out via helicopter early on 
Saturday morning to the Reception Centre (refer Table VI). 
1The nine people were the Police Sergeant, three constables, 
the Officer-in-Charge of the M.O.W. Camp, two N.Z.E.D. 
employees and two schoolteachers. 
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24 May 25 May 
Method (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Helicopters '1'19 - 50 
II dead 
- - -
11 ho·spi tals 2 -
11 to Murchison '12 
-
11 to Westport 3 -
Landrover 8 
-
Walked 62 - 7 
Drove out: 
from Landing '16 - -
II Cronadun 2'1 - -
Totals 226 '17 57 
Total Evacuated 
To Reefton Civil Defence Reception Centre 
To elsewhere 
-
'1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
'1 
Totals 
' 
! 
'169 
'1 
2 
'12 
I 
3 I I 
8 I 
69 
'16 
2'1 
30'1 
30'1 
(a) 
(b) 
Source: riinistry of Civil Defence, Department of Internal Affairs: 
Report on tne Inangahua Earthquake NZ l:~ay i.968, p.29 
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By the end of the first day the following agencies 
were working either directly in the impact area, or were 
organizing and establishing facilities and amenities for the 
evacuees of the impact area: 
1) The Police from Reefton and Greymouth. 
2) Civil Defence. The Reefton Civil Defence was the 
co-ordinating agency for all disaster-related 
activity in the region and the key organizer for 
evacuees. 
3) The Army provided helicopters for evacuation. 
4) The Royal New Zealand Air Force provided a 
communication landrover and a. tanker. Wing-Commander 
Dallison assisted in the organisation at the Civil 
Defence Headquarters at Reefton. 
5) The New Zealand Electricity Department provided the 
initial movement into the disaster area, flew in 
support teams and rescue equipment. 
6) The Ministry of Works flew in engineers and assessors 
to gain an understanding of the situation. 
7) The Earthquake and War Damage Commission flew in 
assessors to Greymouth and Westport and also flew 
over the impact area to assess the extent of the 
damage~ 
8) The Forestry Service provided personnel, equipment 
and accommodation to evacuees. 
9) The Reefton Hospital Superintendent walked to the 
impact area to render assistance. The hospital 
provided amenities for the injured and distressed. 
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10) The Ministry of Transport aided in communication 
services, reconnaissance of reading throughout the 
area, and transported officials, equipment and 
emergency personnel. 
11) Helicopter (N.Z.) Ltd. provided three helicopters 
and pilots in the subsequent evacuation of evacuees. 
This company also flew in the initial contact party 
from Nelson, flew to all known areas of settlement 
in the area to assess damage and assure residents that 
their predicament was known. Helicopter (N.Z.) Ltd. 
craft flew in food to outlying areas and aided in 
communication. 
12) The Salvation Army Greymouth Centre sent $NZ 1,000 
in cash for immediate relief to Reefton-Inangahua 
residents. Captain Brown of the Greymouth Salvation 
Army offered his assiptance. 
13) The Geological Survey and 
14) the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research 
sent in personnel and equipment to observe the 
results of the earthquake and record aftershocks 
and their effect. · 
By the time the remedy period had ended (May 27, Monday) 
the activities of the agencies had been increased and further 
agencies were drawn into the relief organisation: 
1) The Police contingent had been augmented by personnel 
and equipment from the Christchurch police district. 
2) The Army had transported a landrover and a scoutcar, 
communication equipment and other equipment {e.g. a 
mobile kitchen) to aid in the resettlement of evacuees. 
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3) The Royal New Zealand Air Force provided more 
radios to augment the communication channel between 
Inangahua and Reefton. 
4) The Salvation Army brought in two truckloads of 
clothing which had been donated by Greymouth residents 
following an appeal broadcast by the local radio 
station. 
5) The Greymouth station of the New Zealand Broadcasting 
Corporation offered its services and personnel to 
transmit messages and announcements. 
6) The Resident Engineer of the Ministry of Works 
arrived from Westport to Inangahua to assess the 
situation. 
7) A Department of Health official travelled to 
Inangahua to assess the health risk caused by the 
earthquake. 
The day following the earthquake (Saturday 25 May), the 
evacuation of all Inangahua residents was completed. All 
evacuees were sent to the Forestry Services huts at Reefton 
and from there they were distributed to homes, initially in the 
Reefton area. A total of 283 evacuees were received at the 
Headquarters Reception Centre. In Inangahua, a communication 
and reception centre was set up in the Inangahua Primary 
School Dental Clinic to process all the in- and out-going 
messages. The police at the impact area set up two-man 
parties to patrol and guard the now deserted and abandoned 
homes and premises in the township. In the latter portion 
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of Saturday morning the police numbers at Inangahua 
increased to enable the arrangement and supervision of the 
inventory, removal and storage of furniture and personal 
effects from the vacated homes, a precaution against theft 
and looting at the request of the Earthquake and War Damage 
Commission's representative in the region. 
At the Civil Defence Headquarters in Reefton, 
procedures were arranged to optimize the use of available 
personnel and decisions were undertaken to co-ordinate the 
various agencies involved in the mitigation of the earthquakes 
effects. An Information Officer was appointect to attend to 
media enquiries. The establishment of a Signals Officer 
and a Signals Centre to co-ordinate the Army, Air Force, 
Police and Forestry radios, as well as the local telephone 
system was undertaken to restore some order in the 
communications section of Civil Defence. The Welfare 
Section of Civil Defence was re-organised into two. One 
section was to oversee the general aspect of welfare, the 
other section focussed activity on catering, clothing, 
packing and distribution of foodstuffs to the evacuees. 
Roadblocks were established at Rotokohu, Inangahua Landing 
and at Reefton on Highway 69 to Inangahua. Passes had to be 
obtained from th~ Reefton Civil Defence Headquarters for all 
people who wished to gain access to Inangahua. 1 
1Passes were issued daily to farmers in order that they may 
feed their stock. Owners of business premises and 
operators of essential services (for example, the petrol-
tanker driver) were ferried into the region from Sunday 
May 26 onwards to try to establish some semblance of order 
in the area. 
5.4 The Post Emergency Period 
5.4.1 Recovery 
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Powell and Rayner's model of disaster time states that 
the next discernible stage after 'remedy' is that of the 
'recovery period': that is, the functions and the pre-
dominating activities which come after the period which is 
.highlighted by the arrival of trained, professional or 
organisational persons from outside the impact area who 
supervise search and rescue, take charge of preventive and 
security measures, organise and supervise the evacuation of 
victims and the first aid or other medical treatment of 
victims. The period after this is Recovery. The remedy 
period thus marks the end of the emergency period and leads 
into the beginning of the post-emergency period (Powell 
1954: II 11). 
Recovery in Powell's words, is 
" ••• the resumption of normal functions, of 
responsibility for self-help, and the slow 
trek back to the status quo ante (sic) or 
a reasonable faesimilie of it". 
(1954: II 12). 
There is a problem of 'fitting in' the recovery period, as 
Powell has defined it, in the Inangahua earthquake disaster 
so that it follows the chronology of events after the remedy 
period. Taking the three criteria that Powell uses to 
define the recovery period, it will be attempted to 
illustrate that two of the three criteria are inappropriate 
explanations of the activity that immediately followed the 
remedy period in the Inangahua earthquake. If the three 
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criteria are taken as part of a whole definition of the 
situation by which the recovery period can be explained, then 
the problem of contradiction arises, as will be shown. If, 
on the other hand, the three criteria are taken separately 
the problem becomes one of choosing the criterion most 
applicable to the situation at hand and rejecting the others. 
This problem of defining the recovery period based on Powell's 
statement arises because the three criteria developed by 
Powell do not furnish an adequate explanation of what 
happened in the Inangahua situation immediately following the 
remedy period. 
1) "The Resumption of Normal Functions" 
"Function" in this case, refers to Caplow's definition 
whereby it is taken to mean the part played by any element 
of a social system in maintaining that system (1971:670). 
Therefore, the "resumption of normal functions" implies that 
the established social structures, procedures, processes and 
interactional pursuits that are common to a given society 
or community are once more present. "Resumption" in this 
case implies a 'carrying on', it implies that a halt in the 
proceedings has occurred, but now 'normal functions' are once 
more established. Given this, the implication for Inangahua 
township is that the social and physical structures are 
present in their former pre-impact state. 1 In the 
1In its pure form, the resumption of normal functions also 
suggests that not·hing has altered - what and who were present 
before are present now. 'Normal' functions between individuals 
cannot be maintained if one has since died due to the earth-
quake,· or hospitalised (unless that was the situation before 
the earthquake). Similarly, business transactions cannot be 
'resumed' if the premises that the transactions were 
conducted in are no longer there, rendered inoperable by the 
earthquake. 
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chronological sequence of events in Inangahua after the 
end of the remedy period, the situation described above 
leaves a time gap of between Saturday May 25 to some time 
in August when the bulk of the families had re-entered the 
township permanently, the majority of the houses had been 
restored to habitable condition, the reading and water/sewage 
reticulation was functioning, and business transactions were 
being performed. 
2) "Responsibility for Self-Help" 
The problem of using this criterion as a basis for the 
beginning of the recovery period is that there was a 
considerable gap between when the residents were evacuated out 
of the impact area to the time they were allowed back into 
the region again on any permanent basis so that they could in 
fact achieve responsibility for self-help, that is, before 
they could restore their houses and livelihoods to pre-impact 
standards. Some of the men were allowed back the day after 
the impact, but not to restore their own homes1 • These men 
were airlifted into the township to begin restoration of 
power facilities, clearing up slips, covering holes in house 
roofs with tarpaulins. Farmers were airlifted in to feed 
their stock. All of these residents had to be airlifted 
out of the region every day by 5.00 p.m. It was not until 
3 June 1968 that women were allowed into the area, but only 
if escorted by their husbands, and only if they were both out 
of the area by 5.00 p.m. that same day. After June 16, 1968 
1one respondent stated that "it was about a fortnight later 
that I was able to get back and clean up my own property. 
Previously I was engaged in restoring N.Z.E.D. equipment". 
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farmers were, if they desired, permitted to live on their 
farms instead of being airlifted out each night, but this 
permission did not extend to the farmers' wives or children. 
It was not until all restrictions were lifted on June 19, 
196S1 that p~ople were allowed back into the region on any 
permanent basis, but even at this date the water and sewerage 
systems were not operating properly, and the majority of the 
houses had not been fully restored. The ability to perform 
self-help activities by the residents of Inangahua was 
severely restricted until they were allowed into the 
region permanently, and they were not permitted to do this 
until the area had been made habitable and reconstruction/ 
restoration had taken place. 
3) "The Slow Trek Back to the Status Quo Ante" (sic) 
This criterion infers that a period of time will 
elapse before the impact area is restored to the pre-disaster 
situation "or a reasonable facsimilie of it". The implication 
in this criterion is that there may be a long period of 
extensive welfare and reconstruction activity before the 
system is restored to the original state. It differs from 
the two former criteria in that this statement recognizes 
that the recovery period is one of a (slow) return to normal, 
there is no impiication, as in the first criterion that the 
return is an almost spontaneous, automatic resumption of 
activities/functions immediately after the remedy period. 
1The Civil Defence lifted the state of emergency off the 
entire region on 30 May 196S, but declared the Inangahua 
township area an 'Emergency Police Area', therefore 
still placing restrictions within the area until 19 June, 
196S. 
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This particular criterion recognises that in order to 
achieve 'the resumption of normal functions', there are 
antecedent operations and activities that have to be under-
taken.· It differs from the second criterion in that it does 
not apportion this activity on any one section of the 
population. There is no implication that the impact 
population itself performs these activities or operations, nor 
does it suggest that the recovery operations are the actions 
or responsibility of 'outside' or external agents/agencies. 
The third criterion merely states that efforts have to be 
made to return the impact area back to a state similar to 
that before impact. This criterion allows for greater 
flexibility, both in the realistic assessment of the 
restoration process, and for its use for cross-cultural 
analysis because it allows for different political, 
economic, and thus different 'welfare systems' that operate 
in different countries throughout the world where disasters 
occur, and where this model, or derivations from it can be 
applied. 
Recovery in this sense suggests a re-creation of the 
conditions that were. Recovery aims at restoring the 
population insofar as possible to the pre-impact physical and 
emotional status, and at repairing the damaged material 
·culture to its pre-impact status, again, as far as possible. 
With the recovery period defined in this manner, the 
'recovery' of Inangahua can be seen to oegin on Monday 
27 May 1968, three days after the earthquake struck the 
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township. It is this last criterion that will be used as a 
definition of recovery and, as such, allows the events that 
occurred in the Inangahua area to follow with more precision 
the 'disaster time' periods suggested by Powell and Rayner 
(1952) and expanded by Powell (1954). 
From Saturday 25 May to Monday 27 May 1968, activities 
in the impact area consisted of three main operations: 
1) Some of the residents who were under the employment 
qf Government Departments with establishments in the 
impact area were allowed back to attempt 
restoration of essential services, particularly the 
N.Z.E.D., the Post Office, and the Ministry of Works 
personnel; 
2) Farmers were allowed back to their farms to feed 
stock; and 
3) Police were asked by the Earthquake and War Damage 
Commission representative to arrange and supervise 
the inventory, removal and storage of furniture and 
personal effects in order to facilitate in the 
repairing of houses. 
The Government employees (with the exception of the 
Police) and far~ers were obliged to withdraw from the area 
each.night at 5.00 p.m. The Police maintained a 24-hour 
surveillance in the area, being replaced by colleagues at 
specified intervals authorised by the medical authorities 
and the police hierarchy. Members of the police contingent 
staying in the Inangahua Camp were becoming mentally strained 
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as a result of being exposed to the constant earthquake 
aftershocks. The aftershocks prevented the policemen from 
sleeping without interruption. During the day, inspection 
of unsound properties, and the inventory, and removal of 
furniture and personal effects of the residents in the 
houses became hazardous with the constancy of aftershocks, 
some of which registered over 5 on the Richter magnitude 
scale. Ministry of Works personnel operating in the area 
during the daylight hours, as well as the police contingent 
in the Inangahua township reported digestive upsets; this 
complaint may also be attributed to the mental uneasiness 
experienced by these men as a result of the aftershocks. 
The activities prior to Monday 27 May 1968 are more 
suggestive of the emergence of the recovery period. This 
period, described above, can be considered as a 'phasing in' 
of the recovery period that was fully recognizable a~ a 
recovery period, as defined by Powell and Rayner (1952), 
on Monday 27 May 1968, when the Ministry of Works sent in a 
team of 10-15 carpenters, two plumbers, one drainlayer, two 
bricklayers, four labourers and electricians into the area 
to begin reconstruction work. At this time also, the Army 
agreed to provide a field kitchen for the contractors in the 
Inangahua area. 
On Tuesday 28 May, 1968 the Prime Minister issued 
instructions to an ad hoc inter-Departmental committee of 
Permanent Heads of Departments involved in the reconstruction 
1 
of Inangahua with the following decree: 
"The object of this committee is to ensure 
that the fastest and most efficient use' is 
made of all available resources to get the 
West Coast back to normal". 
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Two sub-committees were set up, the welfare sub-committee, 
and the sub-committee for physical reconstruction of earth-
quake damage. These committees were to oversee the work of 
the various agencies and contractors involved in the 
reconstruction and to determine the nature and extent of 
additional assistance from outside the affected area. Owing 
to the severity of the damage suffered at Inangahua township, 
this area was treated as a special case for reconstruction 
d th · · 't 2 A t d b an was us g1ven pr1or1 y. rrangemen s were rna e y 
the District Commissioner of Works to bring into the area 
a construction force of about 50 men made available by the 
Canterbury Master Builders Association. It was envisaged 
that after this construction team began operating, a further 
team would be brought in to speed up the restoration work. 
By the end of Tuesday 28 May, 1968, 35 of the houses in the 
area had been inspected, and 25 percent of these were 
classified as completely written-off, all of the others were 
damaged. By this time also, the Army kitchen was working 
in the area, providing meals for the reconstruction teams. 
1 Department of Social Welfare, Treasury Department, State 
Advances Office, Ministry of Civil Defence, Earthquake and 
War Damage Commission, Department of Health, Forestry 
Service, Railway Department, Post Office, Police Department, 
Electricity Department, Department of Education, and the 
Ministry of Works. 
2
rt should be remembered that this study is involved only with 
the earthquake as it affected the township of Inangahua and 
its residents. The effect of the earthquake on Reefton, 
Hokitika, Greymouth, Westport, Nelson and their hinterlands 
has not been considered. 
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Before reconstruction could begin on private homes, 
the Earthquake and War Damage Commission assessors had to 
review the premises and come to a decision about the monetary 
value of the house and the estimated cost of restoration. 
The damaged contents of the house had to be valued as well. 
This involved problems because the women were not allowed 
into the area until June 3, 1968, so consequently no private 
houses were restored for some time. Added to this problem 
was the burden of having to clear the houses of all furniture 
that was salvageable, and store it. Then the house had to 
be cleaned of debris, which had to be accounted for in order 
to be reimbursed by insurance. The contractor (initially 
the Ministry of Works) then inspected the damaged house and 
priced the cost of reconstruction. Because most of the 
private homes were let out to subcontractors to restore, 
the subcontractor also had to price the house. In many 
cases, following the subcontractors pricing, the tenders 
were too high, thus negotiations had to be carried out before 
a compromise price was accepted by the Ministry of Works 
and the subcontractor. As a result, it was not until 
18 June 1968, 26 days after impact, that the first building 
firm began work on the first contract for the restoration 
of private homes in Inangahua. 
Insurance assessment of damaged houses and other 
buildings proved difficult because there was trouble in 
separating earthquake damage from deferred maintenance. Most 
buildings in the area were substandard, thus the indemnity 
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values were less than the sums insured, and much less than 
reinstatement costs. Added to this was the isolation of 
the impact area which caused the cost of repairs to be high 
because of transport :costs and the accommodation of 
contractors. In essence, it meant that if the owner of a 
private dwelling wanted his house restored, he would have 
to find additional money apart from that obtained from the 
Earthquake and War Damage Commission. On 26 June 1968, 
the Minister of Housing announced that State Advances loans 
would be made to owners who needed assistance to meet the 
difference between insurance money and the cost of reconstr-
uction. These loans were to be on normal terms and advances 
of up to $400 were available, subject to means test. 
It soon became obvious though, that the Prime Minister's 
statement that nothing would be spared to bring the West 
Coast back to normal was misunderstood by the people of the 
region, the local authorities and the Government Departments 
involved. The impression was that finance would be made 
available quite liberally for all welfare and reconstruction 
needs, and much activity was started on this assumption. 
However, it became clear that no general fund of money was 
available, thus the scale of activities had to be reduced 
and any hopes of. sweeping activity to counteract the 
earthquakes effects were abandoned. This caused much local 
disillusionment amongst the people and also undermined 
what confidence the local authorities had to handle the 
situation because they had assumed that central government 
was taking overall responsibility. It was not made entirely 
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clear where the responsibility lay for the financing of 
restoration and reconstruction of the earthquake-devastated 
region. 1 In the Municipal Corporations Act 1954, the 
responsibility of land and properties damaged by floods, 
landslides, earthquakes, erosion and other similar hazards, 
is on the owner of that land, whether the owner is a private 
individual, a local authority,or the Crown (Section 369A). 
The private owner may apply for a loan, or a grant if it 
can be proved that the owner is not in a financial position 
to repay the money lent., to restore the land. According to 
the Municipal Corporations Act 1954, local authorities are 
assumed to have money reserves available in case of 
emergencies such as natural disasters. If the disaster is of 
such a magnitude (or if the local authority has no reserves 
of money to immediately pay for the damage) that the local 
authority cannot bear the full amount of the cost of 
restoration, then, under the Civil Defence Act 1969 (Section 
46), the local authority may, with the consent of the Minister 
of Finance, borrow money from its bankers by way of an over-
draft. Thus, it seems as if the restoration of an area 
is the responsibility of the local authorities. In reality 
though, the local authorities can apply to the central 
1A similar situation has manifested itself in 1979, at Dunedin 
in the suburb of Abbotsford, where problems have developed 
over whose responsibility it is to finance the restoration 
of the landslide area that destroyed or endangered 69 private 
homes. The national Government has so far not made any 
statement that finance will be given from the Treasury to 
assist in restoration, apart from the dollar-for-dollar 
subsidy it has granted in relation to the public donations 
received. At present, the Green Island Borough, where 
Abbotsford is situated, is faced with a million dollar re-
storation bill which it is incapable of honouring from its 
revenue. As a result of the Abbotsford landlside, and as a 
result of the overall confusion inherent in the Government 
Statutes and Acts relating to disaster relief, the Ministry 
of Civil Defence and the Treasury Department are at present 
(October 1979) attempting to restructure the legislation 
concerning payment of restoration after disaster. 
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government for financial assistance in the form of a grant 
or financial relief aid. How this financial assistance is 
determined is more a matter of circumstance than policy. It 
was this aspect, the government aid, that was the root of the 
problem in financing the Inangahua earthquake restoration. 
The Prime Minister's announcement suggested that the central 
government was going to grant financial aid to the region, 
but this was not the case. 
In addition to these regulations, if a Government 
Department becomes involved in disaster-related activities, 
the costs incurred during this involvement are paid from the 
revenue made available by the Treasury in the Treasury's 
annual vote of revenue to that Department. This sometimes 
has the effect of the Head of a government d~partment being 
reluctant to assist in disaster relief because his 
administrators have to re-allocate finite resources that have 
usually been ear-marked for other activities. 
Because the Ministry of Works was placed in charge of 
overseeing the restoration, and because the Prime Minister 
had stated that nothing would be spared to bring the West 
Coast back to normal, the implication made by the local 
authorities was that central government was going to free 
funds from the Treasury to aid in the disaster recovery. 
In the end, however, restoration was financed by the local 
authorities and the various government departments involved 
who re-allocated their annual vote of money from the 
Treasury to the Inangahua-West Coast region. 
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Despite such drawbacks, progress on the restoration of 
Inangahua township was "satisfactory".1 On 12 June 1968, 
a tentative scheme was suggested by the Town and Country 
Planning Officer who had recently visited the township. In 
general it was accepted that the Junction was under a serious 
threat from slips and it seemed obvious at that time to think 
of re-zoning the whole Inangahua township. The idea was 
accepted to consolidate the township at the Camp site. 
Negotiations were undertaken to consider financial settlement 
for those not wishing to settle in the Camp area who had 
previously resided at the Junction. A decision was made to 
relocate the Post Office at the Junction to the Camp because 
of the threat of inundation by slips. On the assumption 
that the Camp will become the new township, an impression was 
gained that there would be a shortage of occupiable houses. 
Suggestions were offered for the purchase, restoration and 
transfer of vacant houses from the Railway and private home-
owners at the Junction to the Camp. On 4 July, 1968 the 
Earthquake and War Damage Commission investigation branch 
confirmed a report by their insurance assessor in the area 
that five properties, including the Junction Hotel and the 
Tearooms, would not be worth repairing on their present site. 
They were consequ~ntly pulled down. 
Restoration at Inangahua was hampered in the first few 
months, although progress was still considered satisfactory, 
becausecr the weather: the intense cold and rainy conditions 
slowed progress and this was exacerbated by the slow delivery 
1Ministry of Works files. 
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of contractors supplies. A total of 105 buildings were 
involved and inspected in the Inangahua area. Thirty-two of 
these were farm buildings, 20 were Departmental houses, two 
churches, a school, a hotel, two shops, a Post Office, a 
garage, Railway station, N.Z.E.D. and M.O.W. outbuildings, and 
the rest being private houses. By 18 July, 1968 contracts 
had been let and were in progress on ten government houses, 
one shop and one motel. Sixteen private buildings were 
repaired by private arrangements; 14 of the buildings belonging 
to the Government were being repaired by the Departments 
concerned. Eighteen buildings in the area were considered 
unworthy of restoration. 
Negotiations were proceeding on the remaining 45 buildings 
which had all been inspected and scheduled for restoration. 
Contractors' prices had been obtained for most of them and 
the remainder would be priced within the week of -8 July 1968. 
It was recommended that no re-building should be carried out 
at the Junction site. 
On 17 July, 1968, the Welfare Section of the Civil 
Defence closed down. From 24 May, 1968 to this period the 
Welfare Division of Civil Defence had arranged accommodation 
for 283 people from the impact area, had provided a clearing 
. 
house for the huge amounts of clothing and food parcels that 
were sent from all over the country to the earthquake victims, 
had aided as a clearing house for the distribution of all 
sorts of items required by the evacuees during their stay 
away from their own homes, and had issued cash to those in 
need of it. 
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By the end of July 1968 the completion of some houses 
meant that the occupants would be able to return at the 
beginning of August. By the second week in August 1968, the 
situation in Inangahua was such that there was complete 
restoration of four N.Z.E.D. houses, three of the six Railway 
houses were repaired (the other three were not required any 
more by the Railway Department nor by private claimants and 
would be put up for tender), three M.O.W. houses were 
occupied, two~ their departmental houses were abandoned. 
Of the 48 private houses, eight new houses had been built, 
two houses had been moved to new sites, 24 tenders had been 
arranged and work was proceeding. No action was taken on 
nine houses because of difficulty o£ road access. In the 
non-residential category, 10 tenders had been arranged and work 
had commenced on restorat~on. There were four building 
contractors in the area. Progress was slow, mainly 
attributable to poor weather conditions and the availability 
of materials and supplies. 
By September, what restoration was still rema~ning to 
be done was not considered urgent. Urgent repair on domestic 
chimneys in particular had been completed (which was essential 
because most of the houses in this area relied on coal fires 
for cooking and heating of water and rooms), although there 
was still more work to be done. Restoration was progressing 
at a "reasonable" pace1 and it was considered that all 
restoration would be virtually completed by the New Year. 
1Ministry of Works files 
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Thus, by September the Inangahua Camp area was steadily 
getting back to 'normal' with the garage, store, motel, 
churches, Post Office and Hall all restored and able to 
provide the appropriate services to the township. The N.Z.E.D., 
M.O.W. and Education Department houses were all re-occupied 
and other residents had returned, although only a few of the 
buildings were fully completed. 1 The Primary School re-
opened on 2 September, 1968. From the beginning of June to 
September, when the Primary School re-opened, the children 
were educated at the other schools. Those whose families 
had been evacuated to Reefton and were housed in Reefton until 
such time as their own homes in Inangahua were repaired, 
attended either the Reefton Primary School or th~ Reefton 
Convent School. Those whose families remained on their 
properties in the district (some of the farming families in 
the Inangahua Landing-Brown Creeks Road area) or who were 
living near Cronadun, attended the Cronadun Primary School. 
There were also some families who moved away temporarily 
from the district. The children in these families attended 
whatever school was in the district where they were located. 
Other children were sent to stay with relatives in other 
parts of the country while their parents stayed in the district 
to repair their houses. 
Some families did not return to Inangahua after the 
earthquake. How many moved away permanently is not kno~~ for 
sure, but the Inangahua Primary School roll was reduced by 
57 per cent from February 1968 to December 1968. 
1There was still a refugee family occupying a house rented 
from the Civil Defence at Reefton in November, 1968. 
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By the end of 1968, seven months after the earthquake 
struck the town, Inangahua had recovered sufficiently from the 
impact for a veneer of 'normalcy' to cover the area. All the 
roads had been cleared, levelled and sealed, the railway lines 
had been reinstated, so had the Railway Station, bridge 
approaches were built up and bridges were restored to pre-
earthquake safety levels, telephone and commercial radio 
communication was re-established, and the economic activities 
of the township were back to active levels. 1 The school 
had re-opened, farms were re-occupied and their owners were 
pursuing farming routines whilst reinstating fences, stock 
numbers, machinery and outbuildings. The majority of houses 
were once more occupied and families were able to conduct 
their social lives within the boundaries established prior to 
the earthquake. 
Most of the people returned to their former homes and 
rebuilt their lives from the ruins of Inangahua township. 
For the 283 people from the Inangahua area who had been 
billeted in Reefton, some of them for periods of up to six 
months, the last few months had been a time of trying to re-
build their lives. Unable to get back to their own 
accustomed ways of life, being billeted with strangers who 
they had met for the first time on the Friday of the earthquake 
or the day after, trying to gather what possessions they had 
left, they were faced with a situation of having to plan for 
1That is, those economic activities that were re-activated and 
survived the earthquake. The Hotel, the Tearooms and two 
sawmills closed down as a result of the earthquake's occurrence. 
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the future, whether they should return to Inangahua, or whether 
they should move further afield and establish their lives and 
livelihood somewhere else. 
For some Inangahua residents a decision was made not to 
return to the township. Some of them based this decision on 
economic factors; their jobs had gone, or their homes were 
damaged to such an extent that it would have cost more to re-
build the dwelling than it would to build anew. Others moved 
because members of the family refused to go back to Inangahua 
where they might be the victims of future earthquakes. But 
the majority did return. Summing up the effects of the earth-
quake and philosophising on mans' stoicism, one respondent 
concluded: 
"I think it is part of the tragedy and part 
of man's triumph over nature that people are 
going to go back and pick up their broken 
pieces and say, 'Well, its happened to us, 
now lets get going again', and roll up their 
sleeves and get stuck in once again to the 
business of living". 
"No matter how we are compensated for our losses 
during this period, it is not going to replace the 
sentimental value of wedding presents or gifts that 
we had been given over the years, or little treasures 
we had gathered about us. Things that have a 
personal significance in our lives. These can never 
be replaced because they are usually bought at a 
certain time or periods in one's life which is now 
passed and'perhaps served as mementos of this time 
in your life. It is though you have to start off 
building once again half-way through your life". 
(May 24, 1968 Inangahua) 
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TABLE VII 
COST ACCRUED FROM THE 1968 INANGAHUA EARTHQUAKE 
Salvation Army cheque for immediate relief+ 
Westport cost to repair 25 septic tanks 
Westport North Beach area damage to sewers 
Westport Damage to another,61 properties 
Westport 200 properties not covered by insurance 
Inangahua substation restoration of ~ur houses 
Helicopters (N.Z.) Ltd. 
County Roads cost estimate 
Hokitika Council staff expenditure 
Government grant to earthquake Disaster Appeal 
Fund+ 
Evaluation and rescue work in Inangahua 
Emergency clothing etc. 
Securing houses used by evacuees 
Food for families and Civil Defence squads 
Emergency demolition 
Emergency plumbing 
Communications 
Inangahua County Council staff overtime 
Freight of Indian tea (Gift from Indian Government) 
Local authority grant 
Inangahua restoration (as from 17 August 1968) 
Westport Catchment Board Loan 
Greymouth Town Clerk's Office estimation 
Ministry of Works work for Earthquake and War 
Damage Commission 
Inangahua earthquake appeal fund addition+ 
National Roads Board expenditure 
Reefton Town Clerk's office 
Plarit used in Reefton 
Westport damage Ministry of Works estimate 
New Zealand Railways 
Education Department 
Electricity Department 
State Advances Corporation 
Internal Affairs Department 
Earthquake and War Damage Commission Claims Cost 
TOTAL* 
$NZ 
1,000 
3,000 
7, 320 
7,320 
21,000 
6,000 
400 
12,650 
992 
10,000 
6, 090 
' 2, 090 
3, 010 
1,440 
9, 700 
1,170 
630 
350 
50 
8,340 
60,619 
4,200 
1, 032 
5,290 
7,998 
838,803 
1,007 
919 
25,000 
474,516 
121,000 
77,332 
53,3 00 
24,156 
2,500,000 
4,298,986 
+Donations were considered as costs because this money had 
to be diverted for use in this crisis from other possible 
areas of expenditure. 
* Bligh estimates that cost of the Inangahua earthquake is 
$4,198,708 (Britton 1979). 
CHAPTER VI 
REFLECTIONS ON THE POWELL AND RAYNER 
MODEL OF DISASTER TIME 
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The concluding Chapter will focus attention on Powell and 
Rayner's model by assessing the applicability of the model as 
an analytic tool for the study of time periods and collective 
behavioural responses in disaster situations. This Chapter 
will also comment on the suitability of the model in the 
analysis of earthquake-induced disasters, in particular, the 
1968 Inangahua earthquake. In the presentation of this 
material, the chapter will be divided into four sections: 
6.1 Problems of applying the model to the 
Inangahua earthquake. 
6.2 The limitations of the Powell and Rayner model. 
6.3 The strengths of the Powell and Rayner model. 
6.4 Application of the model to earthquakes. 
6.1 Problems of Applying the Model 
(1) No Warning/Threat Stages 
There are two types of disaster situations which can be 
identified on the basis of: 
a) hazard perception (whether or not the disaster 
agent is identified before impact) and, 
b) the presence or absence of consequent activities 
based upon the perception of the hazard. 
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The first type of situation, based on the identification 
of the hazard before impact, can be termed 'anticipated 
disaster'. In this, the identification of a potentially 
hazardous situation has been recognized either by the 
authorities (for example, the Meteorological Service monitoring 
a cyclone advancing towards a population area, as illustrated 
by Wallace (1956), or by the people living in the area of the 
hazard (for example, in the Dunedin hill suburb of 
Abbotsford in 1979): two residents of Mitchell Street noticed 
cracking and slumping of their properties ten weeks before a 
landslide tore the hill apart. Twenty houses were wrecked 
when they fell into a chasm created by the land movement and 
over forty houses were considered unsafe for habitation because 
of their proximity to the chasm. The cracking and subsidence 
was monitored by the residents who informed the Green Island 
Borough Council (an area of Dunedin) and engineering consultants. 
Two days before the landslide the Civil Defence declared the 
area an 'emergency disaster area' and set in motion plans to 
evacuate the residents). 
In an anticipated disaster, Powell and Rayner's 
'disaster time' model and its seven stages can be identified, 
beginning with the 'Warning' stage. The hazard has been 
acknowledged by authorities or the people living in the region, 
and action can be initiated to mitigate the impact of the 
disaster. 
The second type of disaster situation can be termed an 
'unanticipated' or a 'precipitate' disaster, whereby the 
disaster agent and the consequent impact of the hazard on the 
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community is unexpected. In this type of disaster there 
I 
is no awareness by the authorities or the people living in 
the area that a disaster is imminent. In this type of 
disaster situation the first two 'disaster time pe~iods' of 
the Powell and Rayner mode.l (that is, the 'Warning' and 'Threat') 
are absent. The perception of a disaster situation begins with 
the impact of the disaster agent on the populated area. The 
Inangahua earthquake of 24 May 1968 is an example of the 
second type of disaster situation. Earthquakes are examples 
of 'unanticipated' or 'precipitate' disasters. 
The problem of placing the Inangahua earthquake within 
the context of the model established by Powell and Rayner is 
that there is no warning or threat stages. Powell and 
Rayner's model is therefore inappropriate to a 'precipitate' 
disaster if the total time dimension of the model is viewed 
as a 'normal' genesis of a disaster situation. The suggestion 
put forward in Chapter III of this study is that for 
situations like earthquakes, flash-floods, for many man-made 
disasters (for example, the Halifax explosion described by 
Prince (1920)), and other 'precipitate' disa~ters, a 'bolt-
from-the-blue' model of disaster time needs to be developed. 
Although this bolt-from-the-blue situation has been criticised 
as being an atypical disaster situation (particularly by 
Turner (1976) and Kastenbaum (1974) who coined the bolt-from-
the-blue usage in disaster models), it is appropriate for 
certain circumstances and for certain disaster types, and it 
should be acknowledged that disasters do not always have 
warnings or threat phases. It is recognised by students of 
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disaster research that there are many situations in which 
knowledge of an impending disaster is absent, but as the 
table from Stoddard shows (Figure 13),most Time models 
used in disaster research assume awarene.ss preceding disaster. 
(2) Problems of Obtaining Precise Information from 
Disaster Victims During Impact and Inventory 
Powell and Rayner state that each stage of development 
in disasters have 'characteristic patterns of behaviour, 
feelings and stress (1952:1), and each stage is 'characterised 
by significantly different phases of behaviour as well as 
subjective experience' (1952:2). The model developed by 
these two researchers, and the replication of that model in 
situations of.disaster is dependent on an accurate record of 
the disaster victims behaviour and activities within the 
period of the emergency. 
One of the problems faced in the research undertaken on 
the 24th May 1968 Inangahua earthquake is precisely that of 
obtaining an accurate reconstruction of the respondents 
behaviour and actions to the events caused by the earthquake. 
Three factors underlie the problem of obtaining an accurate 
record of the Inangahua earthquake. The first is that an 
event that is totally unanticipated and unfamiliar to the 
participant, and in an event which the participant views as a 
threat to his survival (as was the case in the Inangahua 
earthquake), a situation can exist in which the participant 
may not register fully the events happening around him/her 
and the activities which he/she undertakes during the impact 
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Carr Drayer Smith Form Williams Powell et. al. Wallace Ellemers Stoddard 
preparation Pre-Disaster Adjustive Pre-Disaster Steady State !Pre-Emer-
land Training Phase Phase. Conditions gency Phase 
Preliminary Emergency 
or Pro-dro- Phase 
mal Period Warning Warning -Warning 
Protective Warning and 
Phase Threat 
Pre-Impact Pre-Emer- Threat Threat -Threat and 
gency Phase Evacuation 
Stage 
Threat or E.mergency Impact -Dislocation 
------------
-- Impact -- Impact --- Phase ----- Phase------ Impact --- -Impact ---- -Impact---- Stage ----
..,.. (Mass Care) 
Dislocation -Period I Survival Inventory Isolation 
and Disorga- Phase 
nization -Period II Rea cue Rescue Rescue 
Phase 
tJ:Jom ::o;s::l:9 
t-:3 ! 00 t:r.JOH CD ~ij Cf.lt::JQ :>< ~ ~§3 Ill <: t.:<JO 
en H '"dCD ::0 (J)t;tj 
Po at-Impact Post-Impact -Period III Remedial Remedy Evacuation -Relocation 
(Emergency Phase Stage 
Relief) (Recovery 
Period) 
Readjustment Post Emer- Recovery Restoration Post Emer-
and Reorgani gency Phase and gency Phase 
zation Temporary Reha bilitatior -Short Term 
0 t-:3 •• 0 
::8 ~ fi2m ::r: C::->-CD Cf.l\.N 
OJ t-'c+ t.:xJ .. 
c+ H 0 t::l 
CD ~ iS:P, Cf.l 
~ OP, t?:J 
::l t:;l tJs:n ,_,t-i 
H t:r.J~ t?:J 
1-cJ Cf.l t-'P. t::l 0 
~ :» (/.) H 8 
Rehabilita- Rehabilita-
tion tion 
Permrnent Integrative Irreversible -Long Term 
CD Cf.l t:r.J (/.) ~ Ol t-:3 0• :X:· 
OJ t:r.J 1:9~ Cf.l 
::0 • t-:3 8 ::r: •• t.:<J H 
Rehabilita- Phase Change Rehabilita-
tion tion 
_, ,...... ~ ;s:: 
\.() ~ t.:<J 
0'1 :» 
I 
- --·-
co ~ 
.. 
_,. 
_, 
243. 
of the disaster agent. This can also be the case in the 
period immediately following impact. It may be very 
difficult to objectively recall the chronological sequence 
of events during the impact and inventory pe;iods. The 
problem, then, is one of being able to reconstruct 
accurately a unique and frightening experience. 
Fritz states that an instantaneous disaster tends to 
produce the maximum social and psychological disruption 
(1957:7). It may be too much to expect an individual to 
accurately recall what he/she experienced in a disaster 
situation to the extent that will satisfy the demands and 
rigor of the Powell and Rayner model. The researcher may 
have to be satisfied with a general recollection of some 
events or characteristics of the disaster. This may mean 
that adequate data cannot be obtained to satisfactorily 
place the behaviour into different stages of disaster. 
This problem is exacerbated by the second factor: the 
length of time between the disaster event and the time when 
6 
the researcher interviews the respondents about the 
disaster. In the study undertaken on the 1968 Inangahua 
earthquake, research was started in 1977 - nine years after 
the event had occurred (it was ten years after the earthquake 
that interviews were begun with residents of the Inangahua 
township). This posed problems because the researcher was 
entirely dependent on the ability of the respondents to recall 
events that occurred a decade ago with the degree of precision 
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that Powell and Rayner's model requires. This problem has 
already been noted earlier in this study (refer Chapter IV), 
and further elaboration would therefore be a duplication. 
The third factor underlying the problems in obtaining 
an accurate record of events in a disaster situation is an 
outcome of the two problems mentioned above. If the respondent 
cannot recall clearly the sequence of events as he experienced 
them because of psychological disruption (Fritz 1957:7), and if 
there is considerable time intervals between the event in 
question and the time the interviewer collects data from the 
respondents about the disaster, there is a probability that 
the knowledge internalized by the respondent about the 
disaster and the consequent information he/she gives to the 
researcher is not one based entirely on the respondent's own 
experiences but on the information that· has been augmented 
by the shared experiences of others who were also in the same 
event. In other words, there is a diffusion of knowledge 
between the participants of the disaster about what happened. 
What others did or experienced may become incorporated into 
what the individual thought he/she saw or experienced. The 
researcher then has the additional prob~em of trying to extract 
the individuals own private experience that may be supplemented 
by the general knowledge of the group which is based on 
consensus. 
(3) Inventory Period Applies only to the Impact Area 
Powell and Rayner characterise the Inventory Period as 
one of stock-taking and re-orientation towards action (1952:4)· 
Powell develops this period, describing inventory as a 
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'peculiarly intra-personal stage' (1954: II 8), that is, one 
of personal re-adjustment to the new environment, of 
regaining awareness, of taking stock. Inventory also 
consists of a collective public recognition of what has 
happened after impact (Powell 1954: II 9). The inventory period 
developed by Powell and Rayner refers only to the area impacted 
by the disaster agent, that is, the area which Wallace calls 
the Total Impact Area (1956:3). 
It was suggested in the preceding chapter that it is 
useful to regard the inventory period not only as a phase 
affecting the Total Impact Area, but as a phase extending 
to the other disaster space areas proposed by Wallace. In 
order to facilitate this extension, the meaning of Inventory 
will have to be broadened. It is important to realise that 
the area outside the impact zone has to become aware of what 
has happened - in Powell and Rayner's terms, 'to take stock 
of the situation and the circumstances that have occurred' 
(1952:3). If there is no a~~reness by the outside area that 
a disaster agent has struck a populated area then there can be 
no help or aid coming from the unaffected population, hence 
there can be no Remedy Period as defined by Powell and Rayner, 
and the Recovery Period would be considerably delayed in 
developing the characteristics given to that period by Powell 
and Rayner. Presumably too, the recovery period would also 
be prolonged over a greater time period. Indeed, the recovery 
period may not eventuate; if the impact area had no aid from 
outside, the sequence of disaster time co.uld conceivably move 
from Impact to Inventory to Rescue to Irreversible Change. 
246. 
Implicit in Powell and Rayner's model is the assumption 
that areas outside and adjacent to the impacted area (as 
defined by Wallace 1956:3) are aware that a disaster has 
occurred and that the area of occurrence is known. This 
assumption should not be taken as a known fact in all 
situations where a disaster has occurred. As illustrated 
in the 1968 Inangahua earthquake, neither the recognition by 
populated are~s external to the impact area that a disaster 
had occurred, nor the recognition that the disaster area 
was known can be taken for granted. It is suggested then, 
that the model be extended to include within the Inventory 
period an 'Awareness Phase' that takes account of the 
possibility that people in areas outside the impact zone 
have to 'learn' that a disaster has taken place and where 
it has occurred. This 'Awareness Phase' may necessitate 
an elaboration of the definition of Inventory to include the 
idea that inventory also implies the 
perception that a disaster has occurred by a 
population outside the impact area who are in 
a position, once they are aware where the 
disaster has occurred, to provide aid and relief 
to the population of the impact area. 
The 'Awareness Phase' would only apply to those disasters 
which are unanticipated. In anticipated disasters, that is, 
those with a warning and a threat phase, the disaster agent 
would be monitored by agencies and the population that is 
likely to be affected by the disaster agent. There is thus 
a greater likelihood of information about the perceived 
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impending disaster situation being disseminated. This 
dissemination of information about a perceived threat could be 
received by people outside the assumed affected area, and 
would therefore create an awareness of the possible danger 
and the location of the assumed impact area. In terms of 
Merton's concepts of 'manifest' and 'latent' functions, the 
manifest function of disseminating information about an 
expected or anticipated disaster situation is to inform the 
people in the perceived affected area of the threat, thus 
enabling those people to prepare for the disaster. The latent 
function of the dissemination of the information of an 
expected disaster is the creation of awareness by those in 
the great~r non-affected area that there may be a disaster 
in the near future; the disaster agent and the anticipated 
location of that disaster is made available so that when the 
disaster has occurred, the source and location is known, thus 
the time between impact and the arrival of outside aid/relief 
is reduced. 
Powell and Rayner's assumption that the impact area is 
known to those outside the affected area can be correct only 
if information from some source is available. The dissemination 
of ~uch information is present in an anticipated disaster and is 
absent in an unanticipated disaster. 
(4) 
Powell and Rayner, in their model of Disaster Time, 
imply that the impact area is a discrete and united social unit. 
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Their definition of community can be regarded as belonging 
to the structured dimension of community, that is, the 
community as a physically bounded locality (refer Chapter V 
Inventory Section). They do not consider that a community 
can consist of sub-communities in which the people within them 
may act differently (from each other) in time of threat or 
impact from a disaster. 
In the pre-impact period, Inangahua was composed of 
three geographically distinct areas, yet these areas were 
combined socially to form one united community in terms of the 
residents social construction of the town. These three 
areas were Inangahua Junction, Inangahua Camp and the immediate 
hinterland comprising approximately 30 farmhouses. The earth-
quake produced a restructuring of the Inangahua community into 
three distinct territorial units, whereupon the community 
of sentiment, characterised in the three areas before the 
impact, was temporarily ruptured. 
Thus the problem in studying Inangahua was one of 
researching the effect of the impact and inventory phases on 
three sub-communities that were a creation of the earthquake. 
(5) Problem of Regarding the Rescue Period as a 
Universal Period with Respect to the Time of 
Commencement and the Activities Undertaken within 
the Total Impact Area. 
If, as a result of the disaster agent, the impact area 
is divided into territorially distinct sub-communities, then 
it is appropriate to consider that the period of rescue will 
differ from one sub-community to another in terms of: 
1) the kind of activities undertaken, and, 
2) when these activities were begun by the 
disaster victims. 
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Each sub-community can be looked at as a distinct 
impact area and within each of the impact areas, Powell and 
Rayner's model of disaster time can be applied. For instance, 
in the 1968 Inangahua earthquake,the people in the Camp area 
recovered more quickly than the Junction residents, thus the 
inventory period was lessened and the rescue phase began 
earlier in the Camp. The activities performed by the members 
of the Camp area were different from those in the Junction 
(for details refer previous Chapter). 
The Powell and Rayner model makes no provision for 
there being any more than one impact area in a disaster 
situation and, therefore, there is no provision for the 
impacted population to commence rescue activities at different 
times. This assumption differs from the empirical evidence 
obtained in the study of the 1968 Inang~hua earthquake, where 
it was established that the township of Inangahua was divided 
into three sub-communities as a result of the earthquake, and 
that the activities and behaviour of the inhabitants of these 
sub-communities could not be placed effectively into one 
single period of rescue. In order to apply the model to this 
particular disaster, each subcommunity had to be studied 
independently and the different periods of disaster time had 
to be employed in each of the subcommunities. 
250. 
The assumption that underlies Powell and Rayners 
model that disaster victims in an impact area will exhibit 
feelings and activities that are consistent on a temporal 
dimension throughout the impact area may therefore be wrong. 
(6) Problem of Assuming there are Universal 
Characteristics in a Disaster Situation and 
Basing a Disaster Time Period on those 
Characteristics. 
Powell expands the original definition of the rescue 
period (Powell and Rayner 1952:4) and describes the rescue 
period as being 
" •• marked by a period of utter confusion; the 
wanderers and the screamers among the impact 
victims; the inrush of curious and appalled 
from the fringe; the hasty searches by individuals, 
most of these being parents who were not in the 
impact area but who rush in there to find their 
families; the crowds of inactive spectators". 
(1954: II 10) 
The rescue stage 
" •• also includes precautionary activity against 
secondary threats such as electrocution from 
fallen wires, fire from escaping gas, etc. 
(1954: II 10) 
These are the characteristics which, when present, establish 
the beginning of the rescue period. 
of this period are 
Other characteristics 
"The self extrication of the survivors and rescue 
of protective activity by the impact zone 
population itself". 
(Powell and Rayner 1952:4; 
Powell 1954: II 9) 
In the elaboration of the rescue period, Powell 
introduces characteristics which he assumes are typical of 
all disaster situations but which are clearly not apparent in 
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May 24 1968 earthquake at Inangahua. The problem develops 
when the researcher tries to base analysis of the rescue 
period on the features that Powell describes as being 
universal in disasters. If, for example: (a) there were no 
trapped victims immediately known by the survivors in the 
impact area, and if there were no secondary threats such as 
houses burning, escaping gas, fallen live wires that were 
endangering the lives of survivors, necessitating immediate 
action by those survivors, and (b) if the impact area was 
physically isolated from other populated centres so that the 
'inrush of curious and appalled from the fringe' could not 
occur for some considerable time (assuming that the impact 
zone was known by those outside the impact area)1 , then the 
beginning of the rescue period may become problematic for the 
researcher who bases his time periods on the characteristics 
described by Powell. 
The characteristics of the disaster time that are under-
lined (page 250) provide a better definition of the rescue 
period because the level of generality is such in this 
definition that it allows each disaster situation to portray 
specific peculiarities (for example, whether or not there are 
secondary threats, or an inrush of people from the fringe) 
and does not circumscribe the disaster time period by 
characteristics that may not be present. Yet, this underlined 
definition still explains the actions of the disaster victims 
in a manner that differentiates the actions within this period 
from that of other periods of disaster time. 
All of these characteristics were present in the Inangahua 
earthquake situation. 
252. 
(7) Problem of Interpretation of the Recovery Period 
Powell's development of the recovery period as 
" ••• the resumption of normal functions, of 
responsibility for self-help, and the slow 
trek back to the status quo ante or a 
reasonable facsimilie of it" 
(1954:11 12) 
is problematic when this definition is applied to a disaster 
situation. The argument on this problem has been developed 
in the previous Chapter (see The Post Emergency Period: 
Recovery);. but it will be summarised below. The three 
criteria that Powell uses to define the recovery period are 
not compatible to explain the activities and processes that 
occur after the remedy period. The problem can be viewed 
from two perspectives, one with reference to the general 
application of the recovery period as defined by Powell, 
to all disaster situations, and secondly, with reference 
to the 1nangahua earthquake of 1968. 
With respect to the first perspective, the application 
of the recovery period based on the criterion of the 
'resumption of normal functions' within the overall context 
of disaster research, requires a careful understanding of 
the implication of this phrase. The 'resumption of normal 
functions' implies that the established social structures, 
institutions, procedures, processes .and interacting 
pursuits that are common to a given society or community 
are once more present. 'Resumption' implies a 'carrying on'; 
it suggests that a halt in the proceedings has occurred, but 
now the conditions that were typical of that community are 
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once again established. This interpretation may not follow 
with chronological regularity from the previous disaster· 
time (remedy), as shown by the Inangahua earthquake, thus a 
refining of the model in terms of incorporating another time-
period that bridges the interval between remedy and recovery 
as it has been interpreted above needs to be attempted, or in 
terms of redefining the period of recovery so that the actions 
and processes that follow the remedy period can be incorporated 
into the recovery period. 
With reference to the Inangahua earthquake, Powell's 
'responsibility for self-help' introduces problems of using 
this as a criteria for the recovery period. Again, this 
criteria creates an interval between the remedy period and the 
time when the responsibility of self-help was achieved. This 
interval was caused by the total evacuation of the inhabitants 
of Inangahua after the earthquake of 24 May 1968 until 
19 June 1968, when all restrict.ions were lifted, thereby 
allowing women and children to return to their homes in 
the impact area on a permanent basis. This ability to 
perform self-help by the residents was restricted until they 
were allowed into the region permanently, and they were not 
permitted to do this until the area had been made habitable 
and reconstructi·on/restoration had taken place; activities 
that were carried out in the main by building firms under 
contract to various Government departments involved in the 
restoration of Inangahua. 
I 
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The development of the recovery period as Powell has 
defined it leads to the confusion of when this period in 
the stage of disaster reconstruction takes place. The 
clarification of recovery warrants attention by researchers 
using this model. 
6.2 Limitations of the Powell and Rayner Model 
Man proposes a system of hypotheses; Nature 
disposes of its truth or falsity. Man invents 
a scientific system and then discovers whether 
or not it accords with observed fact. 
R.B. Braithwaite, Scientific ExplanaTibn 
(1) Situational Reference 
A nine-fold typology for evaluating existing disaster 
models was devised by Chapman (in Baker and Chapman 1962:306). 
Utilizing Chapman's typology, a model for disaster research can 
be characterised by its position along the situational-
individual continuum, that is, whether the model is intended 
to be a workable construct of the situation in which people 
find themselves in at the time of disaster, which is almost 
a completely physical description of the situation (Chapman 
1962:309)1 , or whether the model is essentially an inter-
pretation of the behaviour of an individual within these 
given situations,. 2 
1 For example, stating the nature of an earthquake and the 
important physical effects of destruction and injury to be 
expected under the circumstances. Haas' scenarios for earth-
quake prediction are examples of this (refer Haas and 
Miletti 1977). 
2This type of model may, for example, focus only on how people 
react to direct personal injury, or how individuals react to 
the social changes that occur during a disaster. 
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Models of disaster that have been developed so far 
in the field of disaster research can be placed somewhere 
along the situational-individual continuum. Because these 
models are able to be placed along the continuum, it means 
that no one model has been devised which can account for all 
disaster behaviour that can be observed, or the conditions 
in which the behaviour has developed. This means that models 
used in disaster research at present are useful only for the 
analysis of some behaviour within the disaster; they do not 
cover the complete spectrum of activities and behaviour of 
individuals, groups of individuals, or the total affected 
population; or else are useful for a physical description 
of the disaster. Models available to the researcher at 
present are capable then, of providing frameworks for the 
partial explanation of the total consequences of the disaster 
under study. For a researcher to study the full effects of a 
disaster-agent upon a community, he needs to refer to several 
models that are placed along the situational-individual 
continuum. 
The Powell and Rayner model of disaster time is an 
example of a model that offers partial explanations of the 
behaviour to be found within a disaster-impacted community. 
This model's emphasis is an attempt to explain collective 
behaviour in disasters. Collective behaviour here is studied 
by breaking down the disaster into time periods, each period 
of disaster time is stated to have characteristic activities 
that are undertaken by the victims of the disaster-agent. 
Because the emphasis is on collective behaviour and the 
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collective response of the impact population, this model 
falls between the middle of the continuum and the individual 
'end' of the continuum. Powell and Rayner's model cannot be 
used successfully for explanations of individual reactions to 
specific incidents that may occur within the overall context 
of a disaster, nor can it be used to describe the physical 
effects that a disaster agent brings upon the material structure 
of the impacted community. It is useful, however, as an 
explanation of the stages by which a disaster population 
reacts to the changed social environment and organises the 
members of the impact area to repair the devastation. It also 
offers an explanation {although limited to certain conditions -
refer Chapter VI Section A, Part 3), of how outsiders assist 
in a disaster situation. As well as providing an explanation 
for the collective behaviour of the population at risk in an 
impending disaster, and the collective actions of people in 
a period of impact, some of the disaster time periods of 
Powell and Rayner's model can be used to illustrate 
individual responses to a disaster situation (for example, 
the threat, impact, inventory and rescue periods). 
Powell and Rayner's model then, is a useful tool for 
providing the researcher with a framework in which to place 
collective, and 'in some cases, individual responses to a 
disaster situation. This model, however, is only a partial 
explanation of the overall behaviour in a disaster and is not 
intended to offer a description of the physical effect of a 
disaster, or to be used as a device for studying individual 
reactions to specific aspects that occur in a disaster. 
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(2) Level of Abstraction 
Following again on Chapman's analysis of the dimensions 
of models (1962:312), the lack of specificity of Powell and 
Rayner's model is a limitation for the application of that 
model to the real-life disaster situation. Although the model 
may be relevant to the analysis of disaster situations, it 
may not be discriminate with respect to the specific disaster 
situation under study: in other words, although the terms of 
the model correspond to periods in which the disaster may be 
viewed, the disaster under study may exhibit features for 
which the model makes no provision. For example, Powell and 
Rayner's model suggests that the inhabitants of the impact area 
will react to the disaster and it's effects in a united way, 
and therefore their actions can be generalised and placed into 
distinct disaster periods. These disaster periods will 
encompass the whole impact area and the behaviour of the 
victims. In the 1968 Inangahua earthquake study, prior to the 
earthquake, Inangahua functioned as a single community in 
terms of Toennies 'community of sentiment', incorporating the 
territorally distinct areas of Inangahua Camp, Inangahua 
Junction, and the farmhouses surrounding the former two areas. 
After the earthquake, this 'community of sentiment' was 
restructured into three separate sub-communities, each 
responding to the after-effects of the earthquake in different 
ways (refer Chapter V). The time periods of inventory,rescue 
and remedy could be applied to each of the sub-communities, 
but could not be applied to the overall impact area without 
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difficulty because the people in the different sub-communities 
reacted to the consequences of the impact on temporal 
dimensions that were at variance with the other sub-
communities. The model does not make provision for an impact 
area that is divided into isolated sectors: it envisages the 
population in the impact area to pass through discernible 
time periods in an impact area that can be viewed as a single 
unit. The model developed by Powell and Rayner is an 
idealized representation of the real-world situation 
pertaining to disasters. Ideal types are tools for analysis, 
they are logical models built up by accentuating the salient 
features of situations that have a common basis (Shipman 
1972:135), in this case the common basis is behaviour in 
disasters. Ideal types are not a description, but a logical 
deduction, an impression, not a product of actual 
investigation (Shipma:n 1972:135). Models that are ideal types 
are abstractions of reality, they do not purport to provide 
a good explanation of the particular. In fact, the weakest 
point of an ideal type is its ability to provide an 
explanation for. particular situations. 
Even so, an idealized model should be based on the 
empirical evidence of a number of diverse, yet related 
situations. Powell and Rayner's model is based on disaster 
situations (plane crash series, tornadoes) that are geograph-
ically restricted. Disaster-agents are not always confined 
to such restricted areas (for example, earthquakes or droughts). 
Because of the concentration of particular types of disaster 
which affect geographically confined areas, the assumption 
that the social behaviour portrayed within these types of 
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disasters will be the same for more geographically dispersed 
disasters may be wrong. The inability of the Powell and 
Rayner model to acknowledge that the people in an impact area 
may react, not as a united social group in which case the 
activities and behaviour of the people involved can be seen 
as occurring en masse, but as a situation in which the people 
affected by the disaster-agent act as sub-groups, and therefore 
may move from one disaster period to another at different times, 
may be seen as portraying an unrealistic assessment of human 
social behaviour in disaster. 
The Powell and Rayner model is a general representation 
of collective behaviour in disaster situations. Because it is 
a general representation, and because it is meant to be 
applicable for all major disaster-types (Powell and Rayner 
1952:1), the application of the model to a specific disaster, 
and a specific disaster-type (e.g. earthquake), may mean that 
some parts of the model will not 'fit' with the real disaster 
situation. An example of this problem is the model's 
discussion of the 'Emergency Period' that precedes impact. 
Here, the model describes the period of warning and threat 
that are assumed to be present before the disaster-agent has 
actually struck a community or a segment of a community. 
These periods though, are present only in 'anticipated' 
disaster. Not all disaster situations are anticipated, thus 
not all disasters are preceded by an emergency period. 
The higher the l~vel of abstraction a model achieves, the 
less specific it becomes with respect to empirical behaviour 
that is observed in the field. The problem then becomes one 
of trying to place the empirical data into the framework 
of a model that is being used to structure the disaster 
situation for analytical purposes, and finding the model 
does not 'fit' the real world situation in the disaster 
studied. 
(3) The Recovery Period 
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Powell and Rayner (1952) in the initial development of 
the model, and Powell (1954) in his paper which further 
elaborated the time periods, referred to the Recovery Period 
as being one in which the individual and the community recon-
struct and restore the damage delivered by the disaster-agent 
and attempt to return to the conditions that were present 
before impact. This post-emergency period devised by Powell 
and Rayner implies that the community struck by a disaster 
agent will be re-built in terms of the social networks and in 
terms of the physical infra-structure that were established 
prior to the disaster, thus the community will be restored to 
its original condition. 1 
There have been few studies undertaken that have concen-
trated solely on the post-impact period of disaster (for 
an example, see Haas et al 1977; Germen 1978). Most research-
ers treat this period as an appendage to the disaster model 
they have devised or are employing in their analysis of a 
disaster situation, acknowledging that the disaster-stricken 
community will recover from the damage dealt by the disaster-
1Powell and Rayner do not take into account that social and 
structural change is ongoing. Because of this, a social 
system may never return to its previous state because the 
'previous state' is but a process, a stage that is developed 
and these developments often have irreversible effects. 
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agent, with the social environment being restored to much the 
same as it was before the impact. 1 It is acknowledged that 
restoration may take a long time (Beach 1967:22) and that 
as the process of recovery goes forward, something much like 
the original social system is typically re-established. The 
recovery period also typically assumes that the individuals 
who experienced the disaster will recover from their ordeal 
and will re-establish their former life-styles and social 
networks as they were in the past, although some (e.g. 
Tyhurst 1951) state that this recovery may be a life-long 
endeavour and may be different from the original. 
There is some evidence to support the contention that 
the original social system will be re-established. Haas et al 
(1977: Chapter 6) states, for example, that 
and 
"all cities rebuild ••• on the same site" 
(1977:262) 
"the final outcome of reconstruction following a 
disaster does not necessarily result in a rebuilt 
city that is more efficient, or is more pleasant 
to live in, or provides its people with access to 
a fuller range of services. Nor does it result 
in a reduction of future vulnerability". 
(1977:267-8) 
Nevertheless, neither Haas et al in their conclusions, nor Powell 
and Rayner in their model of disaster time make implicit the 
evidence established in some research (e.g.Wallace 1956) which 
shows that post-impact communities do not always recover fully 
1This may not be possible. The effect of the disaster may be a 
permanent force upon the community e.g. Aberfan in Wales, 
and Abbotsford in New Zealand. 
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and do not necessarily return to the former conditions that 
prevailed before disaster struck. 
Another example of the changed equilibrium that 
results from disaster impact can be illustrated with reference 
to the 1968 Inangahua township. Prior to 24 May 1968, the 
population of Inangahua Camp and Inangahua Junction was 
estimated to be 240 persons, 40 of these living in the 
Junction. After the earthquake it was decided by officials 
from the Town and Country Planning division of the Ministry of 
Works that the Inangahua Junction was under serious threat 
from slips and was unsafe for people to live. As a 
consequence, the Junction area was not rebuilt. Work was 
undertaken in July 1968 to re-zone the Junction houses and 
families to the Camp site. These 40 people, representing 
16.6 per cent of the Inangahua population, were advised they 
could not return to their former homes as they were then 
situated. Because of this governmental action, the buildings, 
which represented 22 per cent of the total buildings in the 
township, were either re-sited or demolished. 
Thus, after the earthquake: 
·a) the township was reduced in size by the removal of 
houses and other buildings from the Junction site and 
consolidated at the Camp site. In 1968 the Junction 
comprised a Post Office, Hotel, Store, Tearooms, 
Transport Depot and twelve houses. In 1979 the former 
Junction site has the Transport Depot and four houses, 
representing 29 per cent of the original number of 
buildings in the Junction before the earthquake, and 
housing 32 per cent of the population that was living 
in this area in 1968. 
b) The population of the Inangahua township was 
reduced from a 1968 figure of 240 residents to a 
1978 figure of 135, a 43 per cent decline in the 
ten years. 1 
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c) The economy of the area was depressed prior to the 
earthquake of 1968, mainly because of the decline in the 
coal industry in the West Coast region. Some of the men 
previously engaged in this industry were employed in 
timber milling. Employment opportunities in the region 
were further reduced by the closure of the two sawmills 
shortly after the earthquake. The hotel was abandoned, 
so were the tearooms. There is no doubt that the earth-
quake had a severe effect on the economy of the region 
and on the population in the area. But not all the 
depopulation can be attributed to the earthquake. 
Numbers were further reduced by such actions as the 
Ministry of Works reducing their activities in the 
region after the completion of the Lower Buller Gorge 
road in early 1968. After the earthquake, considerable 
damage was done to this section of the highway, but 
after repairs had been carried out, the number of M.O.W. 
personnel in .the Inangahua township was considerably 
reduced. 
These three examples cited from the study of the 
Inangahua township following a devastating earthquake in 1968 
1Between the years of the 1966 Census and the 1976 Census the 
Inangahua County statistics revealed a 30 per cent decline 
in population. The Inangahua County consists of Reefton, 
Inangahua Junction (the name given to the consolidated Camp 
area), and the surrounding farming homesteads. These 
figures illustrate that Inangahua township had declined more 
rapidly than Inangahua County. 
help to illustrate the point that a community does not 
necessarily re-establish itself to the original pre-disaster 
situation as most disaster models assume. Wallace, in his 
analysis, acknowledged this weakness while applying the Powell 
and Rayner model to the tornado-stricken community of 
Worcester, United States of America. He accordingly re-named 
the final period of his revised disaster model as 
'Irreversible Change' in recognition of the fact that after 
the disaster-agent had struck, the "social system has 
changed irreversibly" (1956:12). 
Powell and Rayner's final period of disaster time needs 
to be re-defined to allow the model to incorporate the 
empirical observations that have been made which suggest that 
a community does not always re-establish itself along the 
original physical and social networks apparent before the 
disaster. A community can, and, as has been observed, does 
change from the original social system as a result of a 
disaster. 
(4) Static. Nature of the Model 
The previous limitation which suggested that the Powell 
and Rayner model, by virtue of the fact that the recovery 
period implies the disaster-stricken community and its social 
members re-establish along the lines of the pre-impact 
community, introduces a further limitation: the model has a 
static perspective because it suggests that the disaster-agent 
affects a community that was in a state of equilibrium and that 
consequent activities (inventory, rescue, remedy, recovery) 
are regarded as processes directed towards bringing the 
social system back to the original state of equilibrium. 
It is important to note that the equilibrium to which 
the community or individuals within that community finally 
adapts itself is not always the equilibrium that was present 
prior to the disaster. From this perspective, there emerges 
the concept of evolutionism {Chapman 1962:321). The 
pertinence of this concept is found by the evidence already 
stated in the 1968 Inangahua earthquake example; as a result 
of the earthquake, Inangahua underwent a transition from one 
equilibrium to a new equilibrium, the characteristics of whicl 
were different from the former. Many disaster studies note 
the fact that the impact of a disaster upon a community is 
not simply to disrupt the community's original state of 
equilibrium and to initiate processes which return it to its 
former equilibrium, but is also sometimes to induce lasting 
social changes in the community (for example, refer Wallace 
1956; Haas et al 1977; Moore 1958; Miletti et al 1975). The 
consequence of a disaster may, therefore, be that from one 
system a new system is produced with its own quite different 
normal state. 
6.3 Strengths of the Powell and Rayner Model 
{1) The Model as a Framework for Analysis 
Despite the limitations apparent within the model, 
Powell and Rayner's schemata of the periods which victims 
pass through as a result of a disaster situation is a very 
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useful tool for the analysis of a disaster event. Perhaps the 
most useful contribution this model makes to disaster research 
is the application of the model as a framework for the 
analysis of the events and behaviour within those events. 
The utilization of time models (i.e. an ordered sequence of 
events) allows the researcher to give a more accurate account 
of experiences and attitudes as they sequentially occurred. 
The importance of using time models in disaster research cannot 
be overemphasised. Stoddard suggests 
'~ithout distinct temporal categories to limit 
the general application of basic behavioural 
principles to all time periods during a 
crisis situation, numerous erroneous inferences 
can be made". (1968:9) 
Stoddard also states that a chronological classification helps 
to isolate those factors directly responsible for bringing 
about present attitudes and situations (1968:9). 
Powell and Rayner's periods of disaster time have been 
found to describe typical behaviour in the context of a 
crisis situation and their usefulness as a basis for suggesting 
the types of collective behaviour and activities during a 
time of disaster has been great enough to have brought about 
this time-schema, or minor variations of it, into general 
acceptahce. Their model has sought to establish a framework 
permitting a comparison between disasters in terms of the 
stages or time-periods through which the disaster passes. 
The seven stages - warning, threat, impact, inventory, 
rescue, remedy, recovery - are used to construct a profile of 
disasters which can be related to individual and group 
responses to disaster. 
(2) Comprehensiveness 
Like all social science research, disaster research 
models may attempt to explain a great deal of what happens, 
or it may restrict its explanations to some particular 
facet of the situation which is nevertheless in itself 
important. Powell and Rayner have constructed a model of 
disaster behaviour which purports to explain the many phases 
of a disaster and the behaviours that occur in those phases. 
This model then, is an attempt to provide a comprehensive 
coverage of the disaster event by dividing the total disaster 
period into seven distinct stages, each stage of the disaster 
illustrating behaviour that corresponds to one time period 
which is not appropriate or apparent with any regularity 
for any other time phase. 
The utility of the Powell and Rayner model lies in its 
ability to provide an overall framework of a disaster 
situation within which the observed individual and collective 
behaviour of the victims can be located. The comprehensive 
nature of the model thus allows behaviour from any one period 
within the disaster to be placed within an outline for 
subsequent analysis. 
(3) Social' Action Perspective 
Powell and Rayner's analysis allows the conclusion that 
many of the phenomena associated with disaster can only be 
understood in terms of their meanings for the affected 
collectivities. That is, the model defines human behaviour 
and social action caused by a disaster in terms of the 
subjective meanings the actors attach to the disaster 
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situation. Such action also takes into account the behaviour 
of other actors and the model is thus oriented along this 
dimension as well. 
The actions of human beings can be understood only if 
cultural definitions and the meanings implicit in personal 
emotions and feelings are taken into account, together with 
consideration of the situations in which the behaviour occurs 
(Morris 1977:5). Powell and Rayner's model tries to grasp 
the meaning of the disaster as it is lived by the people 
involved. This is highlighted by the definitions given to 
the stages of warning, threat, inventory and rescue. The 
emphases in these stages are the meanings of the differing 
situations as perceived by the participants themselves. The 
effort is to study disaster-related phenomena not as 
entities or essences in themselves, but as they are perceived 
by the human actors involved in the situation. The emphasis 
in the model is not on facts but on the meaning of the 
experiences the participants have undergone or are undergoing 
in a disaster or crisis situation. The model provides an 
alternative perspective to the psychological models of 
disaster behavibur (e.g. Lang and Lang 1964; Wolfenstein 1957; 
Tyhurst 1951), or the physical analyses of a disaster 
situation (e.g. Gutenberg and Richter 1949; Hewitt and 
Burton 1971; Burton and Kates 1964), models which Stoddard 
suggests are the least useful classification system in 
disaster research (1968:12). Powell and Rayner's model 
allows the researcher to understand the disaster situation 
in terms of the participants perspective of that disaster 
(Brown and Goldin 1973:60). 
6.4 Application of the Model to Earthquakes 
Although the frequency of earthquake occurrence in New 
Zealand is relatively great compared to other natural hazards 
· (there are approximately 350 felt earthquakes per year in New 
Zealand; on average there are 3.5 floods per year (Soil 
Conservation and River Control Council 1957)), damaging 
earthquakes are much less frequent. New Zealand can expect, 
on average, one Richter magnitude 6 shock per year; one 
Richter 7 every ten years, and one Richter 8 every 100 years. 
Damaging earthquakes are relatively rare natural hazards. 
The importance of this characteristic is that the less 
frequent a phenomenon, the less frequent are the occasions 
which the pub~ic have of being exposed to it, and thus of 
experiencing the effects. This leads to a lessened 
opportunity of being able to internalise actions that are 
appropriate in specific situations to mitigate or counter-act 
the consequence of ,that phenomena. It may also have 
important implications in relation to the application of the 
Powell and Rayner model, which will be discussed further in 
this section. 
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An earthquake is, at present a £recipitate natural 
hazard. That is, it occurs without forewarning and is thus 
unexpected with reference to the actual arrival of the earth-
quake.1 It is also a hazard that strikes raridly (Dynes 1970: 
Chapter 3; Burton et al 197g:24). An earthquake may also be 
repetitive (Dynes 1970), that is, the disaster agent does not 
necessarily strike with a single impact but may occur 
frequently in the form of aftershocks over a prolonged period 
of time (the Inangahua earthquake series resulted in g09 
shocks within 40 days of the main event). Because of these 
aftershocks, earthquakes may have a prolonged duration that 
extends over a period of days, weeks or months. 2 Early 
aftershocks are sometimes as big as the main shock itself 
(Eiby 1957:97), although aftershocks sequences are only 
present in shallow-focus earthquakes (Eiby 1957:105)3. In 
shallow-focus earthquakes, therefore, the duration of the 
period of danger may be unknown until the earthquake series has 
finished. The duration of the period of danger can only be 
determined in retrospect. For example, in the 2 February 1931 
Hawkes Bay earthquakes (which registered 7.7 on the Richter 
scale) the largest aftershock (7.1 Richter) came ten days 
after the main seismic event. 4 
A population living in an earthquake-prone area may anticipate 
or expect future earthquakes, but they do not know in advance 
when an actual earthquake will occur. 
2The figure by Burton et al (Figure 14) suggests that either 
only the initial main shock has been considered in the 
construction of this diagram, or that the main shock plus 
the aftershocks do not usually result in affecting a given 
habited area as long as other hazards (e.g. droughts). Thus 
duration is relative, depending upon other hazards. 
3Also private communication with Dr. W.D.Smith, Seismological 
Observatory, Wellington. 
4Because of the inadeqaute records covering the Hawkes Bay 
earthquake, the damage that was caused by this particular 
aftershock is not known. 
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It is possible to draw a profile for natural events with hazard potential and to 
make comparisons between events by characteristics independent of their 
human impact. 
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As Burton et al point out in Figure 14, earthquakes 
are usually spatially concentrated. The idea of spatial 
concentration is relative though. Other researchers, (e.g. 
Carr 1932) have suggested that earthquakes are spatially 
diffuse on the basis that they affect communities in totem, 
compared with a focalised disaster such as a mine explosion. 
The comparison of drought and blizzard by Burton et al implies 
that earthquakes are more spatially concentrated compared 
to the other two types of hazards. But if the unit of 
analysis was taken to be the community, as Carr suggests, 
and not a larger geographical area, as implied by Burton 
et al1 then the earthquake would also be diffuse. 
These four characteristics - the rarity of damaging 
earthquakes, no forewarning, rapidity of onset and the 
prolonged duration of shallow-focus earthquakes - may be 
features of a disaster-agent for which consequences of 
social behaviour and action cannot be fully integrated into 
the Powell and Rayner model of disaster time. With the 
exception of one of the above characteristics (the rarity 
of damaging earthquakes), the model is not entirely suitable 
for the study of earthquake disasters. 
a) Because of the rarity of a devastating earthquake 
in any specific 'region, the impact of such an earthquake may 
mean that the behaviour described in Powell and Rayner's model 
(particularly in the inventory period of coming to an under-
1Assuming also that a hazard is only a hazard when it affects 
the human use system as well. Burton et al do not define 
the parameters which they have employed to determine 
geographical area. 
273. 
standing of what has happened and taking stock of the 
situation) may be manifested in an earthquake-induced disaster. 
That is, if a damaging earthquake struck a region every 
40 years, as Smith estimates is the case of a MM VII earth-
quake in the West Coast City of Greymouth (1976), the 
interval between earthquakes would be such that a new 
generation of inhabitants living in this area would not have 
experienced a sizeable earthquake. This would make the 
earthquake a unique experience for those people. The 
application of the model to a situation which involves a 
unique disastrous experience is appropriate for describing 
the social behaviour of the participants. If the disaster-
agent was recurring in a given population area it is 
conceivable that the Powell and Rayner model would be 
inappropriate (for example, the pre-warning-warning-threat 
stages would become part of the 'normal' cultural conditions 
of that community. Inventory would have to be redefined 
with the emphasis away from coming to an understanding of 
what had happened). 
b) and c) Earthquakes are precipitate disasters. 
Because of this, and because the occurrence of earthquakes 
is rapid, the perception of an impending earthquake is 
absent. This situation results in the absence of Powell and 
Rayner's time periods relating to warning and threat. The 
significance of the unanticipated occurrence of an earthquake 
means that Powell and Rayner's model cannot be used in its 
entirety. The absence of the warning and threat stages may 
have an effect on the subsequent behaviour of the impact 
population. If the post-impact behaviour as envisaged 
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by the model is dependent on the forewarning periods, then 
the applicability of this model to an earthquake situation 
is obviously suspect (in this regard, the model may be used 
with more effectiveness in the analysis of behaviour in a 
predicted earthquake). 
d) The fourth characteristic of earthquakes: that 
earthquake activity in the form of aftershocks, may continue 
for an indeterminate length of time, may cause problems for 
the implementation of the model to a disaster caused by an 
earthquake. Recapitulating on what was stated previously, 
because large shallow focus earthquakes (i.e. those of 
Richter 5 or more) are likely to come in a series of shocks, 
there is a high degree of probability that more than one 
earth tremor is to be expected. This expectation can be re-
defined to suggest that in an earthquake disaster there may 
be repetitive impacts with cumulative threat caused by the 
anticipation of more impacts. Earthquake aftershocks may 
cause physical damage to property, and injuries, death and 
disorientation to individuals over and above that caused 
by the main event. The fact that an earthquake may cause 
physical damage ·and social upheavel through a number of 
impacts may cause problems in 'fitting' the Powell and Rayner 
model of disaster.time to an earthquake-induced disaster 
situation. The Powell and Rayner model assumes that a 
disaster has a single impact, and that all social behaviour 
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and time periods will follow from a single impact. Because 
earthquakes may have repetitive impacts, means that the 
duration of the impact phase could be extended and repeated. 
Hence the time period of the model may not be sequentially 
developed (from Impact through to Recovery) as Powell and 
Rayner have inferred. Repeated impact with concommitant 
threat may be a more appropriate typology for the study of 
earthquake disasters. Several impacts over an extended 
period will affect the behaviour of disaster victims in a way 
that Powell and Rayner's model does not elucidate (if, for 
example, the Inangahua population had not been evacuated 
from the impact area, and if, as was the case in the 1931 
Hawkes Bay area, a larger aftershock several days after the main 
event occurred, Powell and Rayner's model of disaster time 
may not have been an appropriate model both for the periods 
of disaster time and as a framework for the analysis of the 
social behaviour of the impact-area victims). Although 
Powell and Rayner (1952) and Powell (1954) make provisions 
for earchquakes in their discussion of 'disaster types' 
(i.e. earthquakes are examples of a 'prolonged repetitive 
impact series with cumulative threat' (Powell 1954:II 16)), 
this type of disaster does not fit into the periods of 
disaster time portrayed by the model. 
Problems in applying the Powell and Rayner model to a 
particular earthquake disaster have already been discussed. 
Some limitations of the model for its application to 
disasters in general have been stated, and, in this section, 
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comments have been made about the appropriateness of the 
model to earthquake disasters. Despite these restnctions, 
the model nevertheless provides a working framework which 
can be used to analyse social behaviour in a disaster, 
in stages that are readily identifiable in most disaster 
situations. The Powell and Rayner model of Disaster Time 
was (the past tense is deliberate) a useful tool in the 
construction of more suitable and adequate models for the 
analysis of disaster behaviour. The refinements that have 
been achieved by researchers in the variations of the 
original Powell and Rayner model testifies its utility as a 
framework for disaster research. 
Adams, R.D., in Re ort to the Government of the 
Group on Nuclear Power, Government 
March, 1977. 
277. 
Adams, R.D., Eiby, G.A., Lowry, M.A., Lensen, G.J., 
Suggate, R.P., Stephenson, W.R., Preliminary 
Re orts on the Inan ahua Earth uake New Zealand, 
May, 19 , Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research), Research Bulletin 193, 1968. 
Adams, R.D., Eiby, G.A., Lowry, M.A., A Preliminary 
Seismological Report in Bulletin of the New Zealand 
Society for Earthquake Engineering, January, 1969. 
Adams, R.D., et al, New Zealand Seismological Report: 
Inangahua Earthquake 1968, (Seismological 
Observatory Bulletin E-l47),Government Printer,l971. 
Anderson, W.A., Social Structure and the Role of the Military 
in Natural Disaster, Sociology and Social 
Research; Vol. 53, No. 2, 19 9. 
Baird, A., O'Keefe, P., and Wisner, B., Towards an Explanation 
and Reduction of Disaster Proneness, Disaster 
Research Unit Occasional Paper No. 11, (University 
of Bradford, Bradford). 
Baker, G.W., Comments in the Present Status and the Future 
Direction of Disaster Research in Grosser et al, 
The Threat of Im endin Disaster, (Massachussetts 
Inst1tute o Technology Press , 1964. 
Baker, G.W., and Chapman, D.W. (eds.), Man and Society in 
· Disaster, (Basic Books), 1962. 
Barkun, M., Disasters in History, Mass Emergencies 2, 1977. 
Barton, A.H., Communities in Disaster,(Doubleday), 1969. 
Beach, H •• D., Mana ement of Human Behaviour in Disaster, 
(Emergency Healt Serv1ces D1v1sion , Cana a,l967. 
Bell, C., and Newby, H., Community Studies, (Allen and Unwin), 
1971. 
, Community, Communion, Class and 
-------------C~o_m_m __ u_n~i~t-y-Action in Herbert, D. and Johnston, R., 
Social Areas in Cities,(Wiley, London), 1976. 
Biddle, D.J. and Thomas, E.J., Role Theory: Concepts and 
Research, (Wiley), 1966. 
278. 
Bird, D.I.D., The Inangahua Earthquake: A Bird's Eye View 
Journal of the Insurance Insitute of N.Z., 
1969-70. 
Bishop, J. and Walker, M., Westland: A Centennial Album, 
(Pegasus Press, Christchurch), 1976. 
Bligh, P.M., Human Ad 'ustment to the Earth uake Hazard in New 
Zealand, M.A. Thesis Geography , University of 
Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand,· 1972. 
Bolt, B.A., Earthquakes: A Primer, (W.H.Freeman an~ Co.), 1978 
Bolt., B.A., Horn, W.L., MacDonald, G.A. and Scott, R.E., 
Geological Hazards, (Springer-Verlag), 1975. 
Boore, D., The Motion in the Ground of Earthquakes, Scientific 
American, December 1977. 
Bott, M.H.P., The Interior of the Earth,(Edward Arnold), 1971. 
Britton,N.R., The Social Im lications of Earth uake Prediction 
and Warnin on and for Or anisations, Department 
of Sociology , University of Canterbury, 1977. 
Britton,N.R., The Perception of Earthquake Prediction: A New 
Zealand Case Study, in Proceedings of the 
International Symposium on Earthquake Prediction, 
UNESCO, Paris 2-6 April, 1979. 
Brown, M. and Goldin A., Collective Behaviour- Review and 
Reinterpretation, (Goodyear), 1973. 
Brunton, D.J., Civil Defence Survey, Christchurch Combined 
Civil Defence District, February, 1979. 
Buller Combined Civil Defence District, Report of the 
Inan ahua Earth uake 24th Ma 196S, (Civil 
Defence Committee , Mimeo. 
Burton, I. and Kates, R., The Perception of Natural Hazards 
in Resource Management, Natural Resources Journal 
Vol. 13, 1964. 
Burton, I. and Kates, R.· and White, G.F., The Environment as 
Hazard, (.Oxford University Press), 1978. 
Caplow, T., Elementary Sociology,(Prentice Hall), 1971. 
Carr,L.J., Disaster and the Sequence-Pattern Concept of 
Social Change, American Journal of Sociology, 
Vol. 38, September 1932. 
Chapman, D.W., A Brief Introduction to Contemporary Disaster 
Research in Baker, G.W. and Chapman, D.W., Man and 
Society in Disaster, (Basic Books), 1962. 
279. 
Chapman, D.W., Dimensions of Models in Disaster Behaviour in 
Baker, G.W. and Chapman, D.W., Man and Society in 
Disaster, (Basic Books), 1962. 
Cisin, I.H. and Clark, W.B., The Methodological Challenge of 
Disaster Research in Baker, G.W. and Chapman, D.W. 
Man and Society in Disaster, (Basic Books), 1962. 
Clark, S.P. Jr., Structure of the Earth,(Prentice Hall), 1971. 
Clifford, 
Coleman, 
R.A., The Rio Grande Flood: A Comparative Study of 
Broader Communities in Disaster, Disaster Study 
Number 7, National Academy of Sciences, National 
Research Council, 1956. 
J.A., Relational Analysis: The Study of Social 
Organisations with Survey Methods in Etzionni, A., 
A Sociolo ical Reader in Com lex Or anisations, 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston , 1970, 2nd edition. 
Crozier, M., The Relationships between Micro and Macro 
Sociology, Human Relations, Vol. 25, No. 3. 
Dacy, D.C. and Kpnruether, H., The Economics of Natural 
Disasters,(The Free Press), 1969. 
Davis, I., Disasters and Settlements- Towards an Understanding 
of the Key Issues, Disasters, Vol. 2, No. 2/3,1978. 
-----
, Charity Begins with Homes, New Scientist, July,l978. 
Davis, M., International Disaster Assistance, Disasters, 
Vol. 2, No. 1, 1978. 
Doby, J.T. (editor), An Introduction to Social Research, 
(Appleton-Century Crofts), 2nd edition. 
Douglas, J.D. (editor), Understanding Everyday Life, (Routledge 
and Kegan Paul), 1974. 
Drabek, T.E., Methodology of Studying Disaster, American 
Behavioural Scientist, Vol. 13, No. 3, Jan/Feb.,l970 
Drabek, T.E. and Key w., The Impact of Disaster on Primary 
Group Linkages, Mass Emergencies 1, 1976. 
Dworkin, J., Global Trends in Natural Disasters 1947-1973, 
Natural Hazards Research Working Paper 26 
(University of Colorado), 1974. 
Dynes, R., Theoretical Problems in Disaster Research, Bulletin 
of Business Research, Vol. XLI, No. 19, 
September 1966. 
-----
, Organised Behaviour in Disaster, (Lexington), 1970. 
230. 
Eiby, G.A., Earthquakes, (Frederick Muller Ltd.), London,l957. 
, A Histor 
---------- Zealand 
Measures in New 
Eiby, G.A. and Reilly, W.I., Gravity, Magnetism and 
Seismicity, in Ward, I. (Editor), New Zealand 
Atlas, (Government Printer), Wellington 1976. 
Endleman, the Study of Disaster, (N.O.R.C.), 
roup ProJect, Octo er 10, 1952. 
Evans, G.L., Damage to Civil Engineering Works and Resulting 
Civil Defence Problems, Bulletin of the New 
Zealand Society for Eartnguake Engineer1ng, 
Vol. 2, No. 1, 1969. 
Evison, F.F., Earthquake Prediction in Seminar on the Social 
and Economic effects of Earthquake Prediction, 
Wellington, October 12, 1977. 
, Precursory Seismic Sequences in New Zealand, 
-------New Zealand Journal of Geology and Geophysics, 
Vol. 20, No. 1, 1977. 
, Fluctuations of Seismicity before Major 
-------------Earthquakes, Nature, Vol. 266, No. 5604, April, 
1977-
Eyles, R.J., Crozier, M.B. and Wheeler, R.H., Landslides in 
Wellington City, New Zealand Geographer, 
Vol. 34, No. 2, 1978. 
Form, w. and Loomis C. et. al, The Persistence and Emergence 
of Social and Cultural Systems in Disasters, 
American Sociological Review, Vol. 2l,No.2, 1956. 
Form, W. and Nosow, S., Community in Disaster, (Harper), 
195~r. 
Franklin, S.H., Trade, Growth and Anxiety, (Methuen), 1978. 
Fritz, C., Disasters Compared in Six American Communities, 
Human Organisation, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1957. 
, Disaiter,in Merton, R.K. and Nisbet, R., 
-------- Contemporary Social Problems, (Harper), 1961. 
Fritz, c. and Marks, E.S., The N.O.R.C. Studies of Human 
Behaviour in Disaster, Journal of Social Issues, 
Vol. 10, No. 3, 1954. 
281. 
Germen, A., The Gediz Earthquake: Reconstruction Between 
1970 and 1977, Disasters, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1978. 
Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L., The Discovery of Grounded 
Theor : Strate ies for Qualitative Research 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson , London, 19 7. 
Goffman, E., The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 
(Penguin), 1975. 
Grant-Taylor, T.L. (Editor), Microzoning for Earthquake 
Effects in Wellington, New Zealand, (Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research Bulletin 213), 
1974. 
Grayland, E., New Zealand Disasters, (A.H. & A.W.Reed), 1957. 
, More New Zealand Disasters, (A.H. & A.W. Reed), 
------197 • 
Gutenberg, B., Internal Constitution of the Earth, (Dover 
Publications, New York), 2nd Edition, 1957. 
Gutenberg, B. and Richter, C.F., Seismicity of the Earth and 
Associated Phenomena, (Princeton University 
Press), 1949. 
Haas, J.E. and Drabek, R., Communit Disaster and S stem 
Stress: A Sociological Perspective, 
Haas, J.E., Kates, R.W. and Bowden, M.J. (eds.), Reconstruction 
Following Disaster, (Massachussetts Institute of 
Technology Press), 1977. 
Haas, J.E. and Miletti, D.S., Socioeconomic Impact of Earth-
uake Prediction on Government Business and 
Community, Institute of Behavioural Science, 
University of Colorado), 1977. 
Hall, D., Portrait of New Zealand, (A.H. & A.W. Reed), 1966. 
Hamblett, S. and Yeatman, H.W., Restoration in the Inangahua 
Area, Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for 
Earthquake Engineering, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1969. 
Heck, N.H., Earthquakes, (Hafner Publishing, New York), 1965. 
Hewitt, K. and Burton, I., The Hazardousness of a Place: A 
Re ional Ecole y of Damagin Events, (University 
of Toronto Press , 1971. 
Henderson, J., The West Nelson Earthquakes of 1929, Department 
of Scientific and Industrial Research Bulletin 55, 
(Government Printer, Wellington), 1937. 
282. 
Hillery, C.A., Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement, 
Rural Sociology, 20, 1955. 
Hobbs, L., The Wild West Coast,. (Whitcombe and Tombs), 1959. 
Hogue, T., May 24, 1968 at Inangahua Junction, Bulletin of 
New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineer1ng, 
Vol. 2, No. 1, 1969. 
Janis, I., Problems of Theory in the Analysis of Stress 
Behaviour, Journal of Social Issues, Vol •. 10, 
No. 3, 1954. 
Japan-United States Disaster Research Seminar, Or§anisational 
and Community Responses to Disaster, eptember 
11-15, 1972. 
Jesser, C.J., Social Theory Revisited, (Dryden Press,Illinois), 
1975 
Johnston, R.J., -The New Zealander: How The Live and Work, 
(David and Charles , London, 197 • 
Jordan, P., The Expanding Earth, (Pergamon Press), 1971. 
Kahle, C.F. (editor), Plate Tectonics: Assessment and Re-
assessments, Memoir 23, (American Association of 
Petroleum Geologists, Oklahoma), 1974. 
Kastenbuam, R., Disasters, Death and Human Ecology, Omega 
Vol. 5, No. 1, 1974. 
Kates, R.W., Natural Hazards in Human Ecological Perspective: 
Hypotheses and Models, Economic Geography,47, 1971. 
Kates, R.W., Haas, J.E., Amural, D.J., Olson, R.A., Ramos, R. 
and Olson, R., Human Impact of the Managua 
Earthquake Disaster, (Natural Hazards Research 
Paper 23, University of Colorado), 1973. 
Kay, R.A~, The West Coast, (South Island Publicity Association), 
1966. 
Killian, L., An Introduction to Methodolo .ical Problems of 
Field Studies in Disaster, N.A.S.-N.R.C. , 1956. 
Kilmartin, L. and Thorns, D.C., Cities Unlimited, (Allen 
and Unwin, Australia), 197S. 
Lang, K. and Lang, G., Collective Responses to the Threat of 
Disaster in Grosser, G.H., Wechsler, H. and 
Greenblat, The Threat of Imtendin~ Disaster: 
Contributions to the Ps cho o o Stress, 
Massachussetts Institute of Technology Press), 
1964. 
Lazarsfeld, P.F., Main Trends in Sociology,(Allen and Unwin), 
1973. 
Lazarus, R.S., A Laboratory Approach to the Dynamics of 
Psychological Stress in Gross, G.H., Wechsler, H, 
and Greenblatt, M. (editors), The Threat of 
Im endin . Disaster: Contributions to the 
Psychology of Stress, Massachussetts Institute of 
Technology Press), 1964. 
Lenski, G. and Lenski, J., Human Societies: An Introduction to 
Macrosociology, (McGraw-Hill), 3rd edition, 1978. 
Lewis, J., Some Aspects of Disaster Research, Disasters, 
Vol. 1, No. 3, 1974. 
Lomnitz, c., Global Tectonics and Earthquake Risk, 
(Elsivier), 1974. 
Macalistair-Smith, P., International Disaster Relief: Recent 
Developments in the United States, Disasters, 
Vol. 2, No. 4, 1979. 
Marx, G.T., and Wood, J.L., Strands of Theory and Research in 
Collective Behaviour, American Review of 
Sociology, Vol. 1, 1975. 
Maskell, S.M., Radical Politics and Ideology in the Coming of 
the Post-Industrial Societ , M.A. Thesis, 
Political Science Department, University of 
Canterbury), 1977. New Zealand. 
McGee, R. et al, Sociology: An Introduction, (Dryden Press), 
1977. 
McCaskill, M., Man and Landscape in North Westland, New 
Zealand, in Geography as Human Ecology, (Edward 
Arnold), 1966. 
Mennell, S.J., Ethnomethodology and the New Methodenstreit, 
in Thorns, D.C. (editor), New Directions in 
Sociology, (David and Charles), 1976. 
Merton, R.K., Preface in Barton, A.H., Communities in Disaster, 
(Doubleday), 1969. 
Michaelis, A.R., Disasters Past and Future, Emergency Measures 
Organization National Digest Vol. 13, 1972. 
Miletti, D.S., Drabek, T.E. and Haas, J.E., Human Systems in 
Extreme Environments: A Sociolo ica1 Pers ective, 
Institute of Behavioural Scienc·es, University of 
Colorado), Monograph *21, 1975. 
284. 
Millar, J.H., Westlands Golden Sixties, (A.H. & A.W. Reed), 
1959. 
Miller, J., Aberfan: A Disaster and its Aftermath, (Constable, 
London), 1974. 
Milne, D.S., New Zealand Earthquakes, (Wilson and Horton Ltd.), 
1974. 
Milne, R.S., Political Parties in New Zealand, (Oxford), 1966. 
Mitchell, A., The Half-Gallon Quarter Acre Pavlova Paradise, 
(Whitcombe and Tombs), 1972. 
Mitchell, W.A., Partial Recovery and Reconstruction After 
Disaster: The Lice Case, Disasters, Vol. 2, 1977. 
Moore, H.E., Toward a Theory of Disaster, American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 12, No. 6, 1956. 
, Tornadoes over Texas, (Austin University Press), 
----- 1;958. 
Morris, M.B., An Excursion into Creative Sociology, (Columbia 
University Press), 1972. 
Mukerjee, 
Mullins, 
National Resources Survey, Part I: The West Coast Region, 
(Government Printer, Wellington), 1959. 
New Zealand Government, Civil Defence Act, 1969. 
-----------------------
, Earthquake and War Damage Act 1954. 
-----------------------
, Municipal Corporations Act 1954. 
New Zealand Department of Statistics, Report on Prices, Wages 
and 'Labour Statistics, (Department of Statistics), 
1962 and 1969. 
New Zealand Department of Statistics, Report on Industrial 
Accidents, Statistics in New Zealand,(Department of 
Statistics), 1963 and 1968. 
New Zealand Government, New Zealand Official Yearbook, 
(Government Printer, Wellington), 1969. 
New Zealand House of Representatives: Parliamentary Debates 
Vol. 337, 20 June-30 July, 1968. 
New Zealand House of Representatives, Report of the Earthquake 
and War Damages Commission for the Year ended 
31 March, 1969, (Government Printer,Wellington), 
1969. 
New Zealand Local Government Commission, Basic Statistics 
of Local Authorities: Descri tive Dia rams and 
Related Data, Government Printer, Wellington , 
1976. 
New Zealand Local Government Commission, Regional Districts of 
New Zealand: Areas Adopted to date for Various 
Administrative and Research Purposes, (Government 
Printer, Wellington), 1973. 
New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence, Report on· the Inangahua 
Earthquake, New Zealand, May 196~, (Ministry of 
Civil Defence, Department of Internal Affairs), 
1970. 
New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, A Preliminary 
Report on the Inangahua Earthquake, New Zealand, 
24 May 1968, Bulletin of the New Zealand Society 
for Earthquake Engineering, January 1969. 
Noll, R., Defending Against Disaster, Engineering and Science, 
(California Institute of Technology), Vol. XXXIX, 
No. 4, 1976. 
Oppenheim, A.N.,.~uestiqnnaire Design and Attitude Measurement, 
(Heineman, London), 1972. 
O'Riordan, T., The New Zealand Earthquake and War Damage 
Commission: A Stud of a National Natural Hazard 
Insurance Scheme Natural Hazards Research, 
University of Colorado), 1971. 
, The New Zealand Natural Hazards Insurance 
------------~cheme: Application to North America in White, G. 
(editor), Natural Hazards: Local National, Global, 
(Oxford University Press), 1974. 
Parr, A.R., Group Emergence under Stress: A Study of 
Collective Behaviour during the Emergency Period 
of Community Crisis, Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio 
State University, 1969. 
of the 
Parsons, T., in Rapaport and Sills, International Encyclopedia 
of the Social Sciences, (Macmillan), Vol. 15, 1968. 
Powell, J.W., An Introduction to the Natural Histor of 
Disasters: Flna ontract e ort, Disaster Research 
Project, Psychiatric Institute of the University 
of Maryland), June, 1954. 
Powell, J.W. and Rayner, J., Progress Notes: Disaster 
Investigation, (Chemical Corps, Medical Laboratory 
Army Chemical Center, University of Maryland), 195~. 
Power,C.A.,Earthquake Insurance in New Zealand and the 
Problems of Reconstruction, New Zealand Engineer, 
Vol. 23, 1968. 
Prince, S.H., Catastrophe and Social Change, (AMS Press),l920. 
Quarantelli, E.L., in Shibutani, T., Human Nature and 
Collective Behaviour, (Prentice Hall), 1970. 
(Editor), Disasters: Theory and Research, 
{Sage Studies in International Sociology 13), 1978 
Quarantelli, E.L. and Dynes, R., Social Crisis and Disaster 
American Review of Sociology, Vol. 3, 1972. 
, When Disaster Strikes: It 
------------~I~s~n-r't~Mn-u~c~h~L~i~k-e __ y_o--u've Heard and Read About, 
Psychology Today~ 5 February 1972. 
------------~~------~~~-----' Community Conflict: Its Absence and Presence in Natural Disasters, Mass 
Emergencies 1, 1976. ----
Rapaport and Sills, International Encyclo~edia of the Social 
Sciences, (Macmillan), Vol. I , 1968. 
Reading, H.F., A Dictionar) of the Social Sciences, (Routledge 
and Kegan Paul , 1977. . 
Richter, C.F., Elementary Seismology, (Freeman and Co.), 
San Francisco, 1958. 
Rikitake, T., Earthquake Prediction, (Elsevier), 1976. 
Rubington, E. and Weinberg, M.S., The Study of Social Problems, 
(Ox~ord University Press), 2nd edition, 1977. 
Russell, c.s., Losses from Natural Hazards, (Natural Hazards 
Research working Paper, University of Colorado), 
1969. 
Schatzman, L. and Strauss, A.L., Field Research: Strategies 
for a Natural Sociology, (Prentice Hall), 1973. 
Selye, H., The Stress of Life, (McGraw-Hill), New York, 1956. 
Shader, R.I. and Schwartz, A.J., Management of Reactions to 
Disasters, Social Work, April, 1966. 
Sheehan, L. and Hewitt, K., A Pilot Study of Global 
Disasters of the Past Twenty Years, (Natural 
Hazards Research Paper *11, University of 
Colorado). 1969 
Shephard, R. et al, Inangahua Earthquake - A Report of the 
Unlversity of Canterbury Survey Team, Bulletin of 
the Seismological Society of America, Vol. 6, 
No. 6, 1970. 
Shibutani, T., Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumours, 
(Bobbs-Merrill), 1961. 
Shipman, M.D., The Limitations of Social Research,(Longman), 
1972. 
Siegfried, A.,Democracy in New Zealand, (London), 1914. 
Silvester, D., Optimal Level for New Zealand Earthquake Code, 
(Department of Engineering~ University of 
Canterbury Research Report), 1977. 
Simpson-Housely, P., Influence of Locus of Control and 
Smart, B., 
Re ression-Sensitization on Perce tion of Natural 
Hazards, P .D. Dissertation, Department o 
Geography, University of Otago,New Zealand), 1976. 
Smelser, N.J., Theory of Collective Behaviour,(Free Press),l963. 
Smith, D., Emergency Mass Care, The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 309, 
1957. 
Smith, W.D., Some Aspects of Seismic Damage, New Zealand 
Engineer, Vol. 16, No. 9, 1961. 
, Statistical Estimates of the Likelihood of 
----------- Earthquake Shaking Throughout New Zealand, Bulletin 
of the New Zealand Society for Earthquake 
Engineering, Vol. 9, No. 4, December 1976. 
Soil Conservation and River Control Council, Floods in New 
Zealand 1920-1953, (s.c.R.c.c.), 1957. 
Sorokin, P., Man and Society in Calamity, (Dutton & Co.), 1942. 
Stallings, R.A., The Community Context of Crisis Management, 
American Behavioural Scientist, Vol. 16,No. 3,1973. 
, The Structural Patterns of Four Types of 
------------~O~r-g-anisations in Disaster in Quarantelli, E.L.(ed), 
Disasters: Theory and Research,(Sage Publications) 
1978. 
288. 
Stoddard, E.R., Conceptual Models of Human Behaviour in 
Disaster, (Texas Western Press), 1968. 
Takeuchi, H., Uyeda, S. and Kunamor, H., Debate about the 
Earth, (Freeman, Cooper and Co., San Francisco), 
Revised edition, 1970. 
Tatsch, H.J., Earthquakes, (Tatsch Associates,Massachusetts), 
1977. 
Taylor, J.B., Zurcher, L.A. and Key, W.H., Tornado: A 
Community Responds to Disaster, (University of 
Washington Press), 1970. 
Taylor, M., Disaster Housing Aid, Disasters, Vol. 2,No.l,l978. 
Thorns, D.C., The Quest for Community, (Allen and Unwin), 1976 
, (Editor), New Directions in Sociology, (David 
------------and Charles), 1976. 
, The Nature and Bases of Community in Dodge, J.S. 
------------and Dodge, J.M., The Community and Care of the 
Disabled, (Department of University Extension, 
University of Otago, New Zealand), 1979. 
Toennies, F., Community and Society, (Harper and Row, New 
York), 1957. 
Turner, B.A., The Development of Disaster- A Sequence Model 
for the Analysis of the Origins of Disaster, 
Sociological Review 24, No. 4, 1976. 
, Man-Made Disasters, (Wykeham Publications, 
------London), 1978. 
Turner, R.H., Nigg, J.M., Paz, D.H., and Shaw, B.S., Earthquake 
Threat: The Human Response in Southern 
California, (Institute for Social Sciences 
Research, University of California), 1979. 
Tyhurst, J.S., Individual Reactions to Community Disaster, 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 107:10, April, 
1951. 
United States Office of Emergency Preparedness Study Group, 
Disaster Preparedness, 1972. 
United States Department of the Interior, Earthquake 
Information Bulletin(s), (Department of the 
Interior, Geological Survey). 
Wallace, A.F.C., Human Behaviour in Extreme Situations: A 
Surve of the Literature and Su estions for 
Future Research, Disaster Study *1, 195 • 
Committee on Disaster Studies, N.A.S.-N.O.R.C. 
------------~~' Tornado in Worcester: An Exploratory Study of 
Individual and Community Behaviour in an Extreme 
Situation, Disaster Study 3, Publication 392, 
(N.A.S.-N.O.R.C.), 1956. 
Wallace, W.L., Sociological Theory, (Heinemann, London), 1971. 
Wallers, K.J., The Reconstruction of Darwin after Cyclone 
Tracy, Disasters, Vol. 2, No. 1, 197EL 
Wards, I. (Editor), New Zealand Atlas, (Government Printer, 
Wellington), 1976. . . 
Warheit, G.J., A Note on Natural Disaster and Civil 
Disturbances: Similarities and Differences, 
Mass Emergencies, Vol.l, 1976. 
Weisbecker, L. et al, Earthquake Prediction, Uncertainty and 
Pol1c1es for the Future: A Technolo Assessment 
o Earthquake Prediction, Stanford Research 
Institute, Menlo Park), 1977. 
Weller, J.M. and Quarantelli, E.L., Neglected Characteristics 
of Collective Behaviour, American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 79, No. 3, 1973. 
Wenger, D.E., Community Response to Disaster: Functions 
and Structural Alterations, in Quarantelli, E.L. 
(editor), Disasters: Theory and Research, · 
(Sage Publications), 13, 1978. 
Westgate, K., The Human Response to Disaster, M.Sc.Thesis 
(University of Bradford, Bradford, England),l975. 
Westgate, K. and O'Keefe, Some Definitions of Disaster, 
(Disaster Research Unit, University of Bradford 
Paper No. 4), 1976. 
Westport Borough Council, Report on Damare and Related Matters -
Earthquake of May 24, 1968, Mimeo). 
White, G.F. (Editor), Natural Hazards: Local, National, Global, 
(Oxford University Press), 1974. 
White, G.F. and Haas, J.E., Assessment of Research on Natural 
Hazards, (Massachussetts Institute of Technology 
Press), 1975. 
Williams, R., Symbolic Interactionism: The Fusion of Theory 
and Research in Thorns, D.C. (editor), New 
Directions in Sociology, (David and Charles), 
1976. 
290. 
Willmott, W.E., The Causes of Public Morality in New Zealand 
in Serl, V.C. and Taylor, H.C.,Papers in Honour 
of Harry Hawthorn, (Western Washington State 
College), 1975. 
Willmott, W.E., Introduction to the Sociology of Community, 
(Mimeo), 1976. 
Wolf, c., Group Perspective Formation and Strategies of 
Identity in a Post-Threat Situation, 
Sociological Quarterly, 16, 1975. 
Wolfenstein, M., Disaster: A Psychological Essay, (Routledge 
and Kegan Paul), 1957. 
Wolfle, D., Lost Opportunities, Science, Vol. 14, No. 3610, 
1964. 
Vaughan, C.K., Notes on Insurance A ainst Loss From Natural 
Hazards, Natural Hazards Research, University 
of Colorado, Working Paper 21), 1971. 
York, D., Planet Earth, (McGraw-Hill), 1975. 
Zimmerman, E.W., World Resources and Industries: A Functional 
A raisal of the Availabilit of A ricultural 
and Industrial Materials, Harper and Row, New 
York), 1951. 
1. TERRY 
2. FAY 
3. JOHN 
4. RAY 
5. MAC 
6. ARNOLD 
7. NOEL 
8. MAUDE 
9. WILLIAM 
10. COLLEEN 
11. WARREN 
12. RUTH 
291. 
SKETCH OF KEY RESPONDENTS 
Ministry of Works Overseert Inangahua Camp. 
Married, one child (2t yrs;, mid-30's. 
Been in Inangahua for five years. 
Housewife, married to John ••••• Inangahua 
Camp, one child (4 yrs), 30 yrs of age. Born 
in Inangahua 
Petrol tanker driver, Inangahua Camp. Married 
to Fay •••• 33 yrs of age, been in Inangahua 
for 18 years. Born in Westport. . 
New Zealand Electricity Department linesman, 
Inangahua Hydro station, Inangahua Camp. 
Married, one child (9 months), mid-30's. 
Been in Inangahua 3 years, born in Westport. 
New Zealand Electricity Department Supervisor, 
Inangahua Hydro Station, Inangahua Camp. 
Married, 2 children, mid-30's. Been in 
Inangahua 18 years. 
Ministry of Works employee, Inangahua Camp. 
Married, no children, 40 years. Been in 
Inangahua 10+ years. Before that Cronadun 
and Reefton. 
Ministry of Works employee, Inangahua Camp. 
Married, one child (8 years), 56 years of age. 
Long-time resident - been in Inangahua since 
2 years old. 
Housewife, Inangahua Camp. Married to Noel •••• 
53 years old. Resident in Inangahua 30 years. 
Secondary School teacher (Inangahua College, 
Reefton), Inangahua Camp. Married,three 
children, mid-30's. Been in the area for 
four years. 
farmers wife, Inangahua Junction, married, four 
children, mid-30's. Been in area 12 months 
Farm-hand on father's farm, Inangahua Junction. 
Married, no children. Born in Inangahua, been 
away to University for five years, returned 
three years before earthquake. Late 20's. 
Housewife, Inangahua Junction, married to 
Warren •••• , late 20's, resident in area for 
three years 
13. KEVIN 
14. PATRICK 
15. MRS. 0' 
16. JIM 0' 
17. SHIRLEY 
18. LES 
19. NOLA 
20. PETER 
21. LISA 
22. ROSALIE 
23. VERNON 
24. KATHLEEN 
25. JIM 
26. DON 
27. MURRAY 
292. 
Bushman, Inangahua Junction, married, two 
children, 40 years. 25 years in Inangahua. 
Before that resident in Westport 
Farmer and Bushman, Chairman of Inangahua 
County, Inangahua Landing. Married, no children 
at home, but children living in same Valley. 
70+ years of age. Resident in area 60+ years. 
Farmer's wife and former school teacher, 
Inangahua Landing, married to Patrick ••••• 
70+ years, long-time resident. 
Farmer, son of Patrick ••.• , Inangahua Landing 
Married, six children, 40 years of age. Born 
in area. 
Farmer's wife,Brown Creek Road, married two 
children, 30 years of age, born in Inangahua 
Farmer, Buller Gorge, three miles from Inangahua 
Junction, married, five children, 50 years of 
age, twenty years in the region. -
Farmer's wife, Buller Gorge, married to Les ••• , 
48 years, twenty years in the area. 
Farmer, New Creek, married, four children, 
40 years of age, Dutch emigrant, Been in New 
Creek 10+ years. 
Farmer's wife, New Creek, married to Peter ••• , 
40 years, Dutch emigrant, Been in New Creek 
10+ years. 
Farmer's wife, New Creek, married, three 
children, 22 years of age, resident in New 
Creek and Reefton area 8 years. 
Farmer, New Creek, married to Rosalie ••• , 32 
years of age, born in area. 
Farmerfs wife, New creek, married three 
children, mid-30's, been inthe area for 20 years. 
Town Clerk~, Reefton, in hospital at time of 
earthquake, discharged himself and assisted 
Civil Defence Controller. 
Deputy Controller Reefton Civil Defence and 
Registration Officer, Reefton 
Police Constable, Reefton, Civil Defence 
Communications Officer. 
28. GAVIN 
29. TOM 
30. DENZILL 
31. OSWALD 
32. MAXWELL 
33. SELWYN 
34. GORDON 
35 • COLONEL 
McCALLUM 
293. 
Minister of Religion, Westport, President of 
Red Cross, Westport Branch. 
Country Engineer, Deputy Civil Defence 
Controller, Buller Combined District, County 
Representative, Westport. 
Civil Defence Controller, Westport, Buller 
Combined Civil Defence District. 
Deputy Mayor, Greymouth, Second-in-Command 
Civil Defence, Greymouth. 
Police Sergeant, Greymouth, Police Liaison 
Officer, 1968 operation at Inangahua disaster. 
Ministry of Works Hydrology Engineer 
Christchurch, Consultant to Civil Defence 
and Ministry of Works, member of Reconstruction 
Committee. 
Senior Traffic Officer Greymouth. NOW 
Assistant Commissioner of Civil Defence, 
Southern District, Christchurch~ 
Present (1979) Commissioner of Civil Defence 
Southern District, Christchurch. 
294. 
University of Canterbury Christchurch 1 New Zealand 
Dear 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY 
6 June, 1978. 
I am conducting research, as part of my thesis for a 
Master of Arts, into the 1968 Inangahua earthquake. 
The primary intention is to analyse the earthquake 
situation in its social context. In order to achieve this, I 
require rna terial on different aspects of the Inangahua earthquake 
These include material on:-
1) the physical and economic effect of the earthquake: That is a 
blow-by-blow account of the earthquake and its 
effect on the physical structure and the economy 
of the area. 
2) the social effects of the earthquake on the community: For 
example, 
- how the community members reacted to and coped 
with the earthquake and it's consequences. 
- the deaths and injuries sustained. 
- the psychological disturbances incurred. 
- the effect of the disorganisation and disruption. 
- the impact and effect of such losses, and 
- the duration of the damage and losses. 
3) how community members organised themselves· in the face of 
disaster from the moment of impact to the end of 
the recovery and reconstruction period. 
- what external agencies aided in this organisation/ 
reorganisation. 
4) what modifications were adopted as a result of the earthquake: 
- what lessons were learnt, 
- what organisations adopted new procedures or 
regulations etc. 
- what new or revised statutes resulted from 
the 1968 earthquake. · 
If your Department has any data that will aid this 
study, I would be very grateful for a copy of it or access to it. 
It may be that some of this information is in unpublished form and 
is kept in your Department's files. If so, would you inform me 
whether it is possible to obtain access to those files for the 
purpose of my research. 
295. 
University of Canterbury Christchurch 1 New Zealand 
If your Department is aware of any other personnel 
or organisation that could supply any of the information I am 
seeking, I would be pleased if you could put me into contact 
with them. 
Thank you in anticipation of your reply. 
Yours sincerely, 
Neil R. Britton, 
Teaching Fellow, 
Department of Sociology. 
296. 
University of Canterbury Christchurch 1 New Zealand 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY 
28 September, 1978 
Dear 
I am conducting research concerning the 1968 
Inangahua earthquake for my Master of Arts thesis. 
Primarily, I am looking at the social effects of the earth-
quake on individuals and on the community-at-large. With 
this in mind, I require some material that can only be 
obtained from persons that have been subjected to the 
actual earthquake. 
If you were in the Inangahua area at the time of 
the earthquake would it be possible for me to call on you 
and talk about the event? If this is a possibility, could 
you please indicate by writing back to me in the stamped 
envelope to let me know of your decision. I expect to 
be in the Inangahua region within four to five weeks, that 
is, in October-November of this year. The interview will 
not take long, and all information will be confidential. 
I hope you will assist me in this study and 
realize the importance of being able to talk with you on 
this matter. I look forward to your reply. Thank you 
for your assistance. 
Yours sincerely, 
Neil R. Britton 
Teaching Fellow, 
Department of Sociology 
297. 
University of Canterbury Christchurch 1 New Zealand 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY 
26 October, 1978. 
Dear 
Thank you for your reply to my request for 
an interview with you concerning my research on the 
1968 Inangahua earthquake. This is just a note to 
tell you that I will be in Inangahua next week -
Thursday 2nd November to the Sunday, 5th November 
inclusive. I will be staying at a hotel in Reefton 
as I understand there is no such accommodation 
available at Inangahua. 
I am looking forward to meeting you. 
Yours sincerely, 
Neil R. Britton, 
Teaching Fellow, 
Department of Sociology 
Earthquake magnitudes, energies, effects, and statistics. 
Characteristic effects of shallow 
shocks in populated areas 
Damage nearly total 
Great damage 
Serious damage, rails bent 
Considera~le damage to buildings 
Slight damage to buildings 
Felt by. all 
Felt by many 
Felt by some 
Not felt but recorded 
Source: Data from B. Gutenberg. 
Approximate 
magnitude 
>8.0 
>7.4 
7.0-7.3 
6.2-6.9 
5.5-6.1 
~9-5.4 
4.3-4.8 
3.5-4.2 
2.0-3.4 
Number of Energy earthquakes (ergs) per year 
0.1-0.2 
4 
15 
100 
500 
1,400 
4,800 
30,000 
800,000 
>1025 
>.4 X 1024 
0.04-0.2 X 1024 
0.5-23 X 1021 
1-27X1019 
3.6-57 X 1017 
1.3-27 X 1016 
1.6-76 X 1015 
4 X 1 010_9 X .1 Q13 
APPENDIX: page 298 
THE RICHTER MAGNITUDE SCALE 
based on the amplitude of 
sedlsmic waves. 
Source: Press F.& Siever R. 
EARTH (W.H.FREEMAN & COMPANY: 
1974:639 
APPENDIX: page 299 
THE MODIFIED MERCALLI 
INTENSITY SCALE 
Source: Weisbecker L.w. et aJ 
1977:11 
To eliminate many verbal repetitions in the 
original scale, the following convention has been 
adopted. Each effect is named at that level of inten-
sity at which it first appears frequently and charac-
teristically. Each effect may be found less strongly, 
or in fewer instances, at the next lower grade of in-
tensity; more strongly or more often at the next 
higher grade. A few effects are named at two suc-
cessive levels to indicate a more gradual increase. 
Masonry A, B, C, D. To avoid ambiguity of 
language, the quality of masonry, brick or otherwise, 
is specified by the following lettering !which has no 
connection with the conventional Class A, B, C con-
struction). 
Masonry A. Good workmanship, mortar, and 
design; reinforced, especially laterally, and bound 
together by using steel, concrete, etc.; designed to 
resist lateral forces. 
Masonry B. Good workmanship and mortar; rein-
forced, but not designed in detail to resist lateral 
forces. 
Masonry C. Ordinary workmanship and mortar; 
no extreme weaknesses like failing to tie in at cor-
ners, but neither reinforced nor designed against 
horizontal forces. 
Masonry D. Weak materials, such as adobe; poor 
mortar; low standards of workmanship; weak 
horizontally. 
I. Not felt. Marginal and long-period effects of 
large earthquakes. 
II. Felt by persons at rest, on upper floors, or 
favorably placed. 
Ill. Felt indoors. Hanging objects swing. Vibra-
tion like passing of light trucks. Duration 
may be estimated. May not be recognized as 
an earthquake. 
IV. Hanging objects swing. Vibration like pass-
ing of heavy trucks; or sensation of a jolt 
like a heavy ball striking the walls. Stand-
ing motor cars rock. Windows, dishes, doors 
rattle. Glasses clink. Crockery clashes. In 
the upper range of IV wooden walls and 
frame creak. 
V. Felt outdoors; direction estimated. Sleepers 
wakened. Liquids disturbed, some spilled. 
Small unstable objects displaced or upset. 
Doors swing, close, open. Shutters, pictures 
move. Pendulum clocks stop, start. change 
rate. 
VI. Felt bv all. Many frightPned and run out-
doors .. PPrsons walk unstl'adily. Windows. 
dishPs. glasswarP hrokl·n. Knickknacks. 
hooks. etc .. off shelvl's. Pictun•s ofT walls. 
Furniture moved or overturned. Weak 
plaster and masonry D cracked. Small bells 
ring (church, school I. Trees, bushes shaken 
(visibly, or heard to rustle- CFRI. 
VII. Difficult to stand. Noticed by drivers of 
motor cars. Hanging objects quiver. Fur-
niture broken. Damage to masonry D. in-
cluding cracks. Weak chimneys broken at 
roof line. Fall of plaster, loose bricks, 
stones, tiles. cornices !also unbraced 
parapets and architectural ornaments -
CFRl. Some cracks in masonry C. Waves on 
ponds; water turbid with mud. Small slides 
and caving in along sand or gravel banks. 
Large bells ring. Concrete irrigation ditches 
damaged. 
VIII. Steering of motor cars affected. Damage to 
masonry C; partial collapse. Some damage 
to masonry B; none to masonry A. Fall of 
stucco and some masonry walls. Twisting, 
fall of chimneys, factory stacks, monu-
ments, towers, elevated tanks. Frame 
houses moved on foundations if not bolted 
down; loose panel walls thrown out. 
Decayed piling broken off. Branches broken 
from trees. Changes in flow or temperature 
of springs and wells. Cracks in wet ground 
and on steep slopes. 
IX. General panic. Masonry D destroyed; 
masonry C heavily damaged, sometimes 
with complete collapse; masonry B 
seriously damaged. !General damage to 
foundations - CFRI. Frame structures, if 
not bolted, shifted off foundations. Frames 
racked. Serious damage to reservoirs. Un-
derground pipes broken. Conspicuous 
cracks in ground. In alluviated areas sand 
and mud ejected, earthquake fountains, 
sand craters. 
X. Most masonry and frame structures 
destroyed with their foundations. Some 
well-built wooden structures and bridges 
destroyed. Serious damage to dams, dikes. 
embankments. Large landslides. Water 
thrown on banks of canals, rivers. lakes, 
etc. Sand and mud shifted horizontally on 
beaches and flat land. Rails bent slightly. 
XI. Rails bent greatly. Underground pipelines 
completely out of service. 
XII. Damage nearly total. Large rock masses 
displaced. Lines of sight and lPvel distorted. 
Objects thrown into the air. 
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